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INTRODUCTION 
"Empty gestures are all too easy to make: an effective, efficient and 
equitable collective security system demands real commitment. "1 
According to UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, the biggest security threats the world faces today "go far 
beyond States waging aggressive war [and] ... extend to poverty, infectious 
disease and environmental degradation, war and violence within States; the spread 
and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; 
terrorism; and transnational organized crime."2 
Africa is no exception in this regard. Regrettably the situation is even 
more complicated given conditions of grinding poverty, the continued surge of 
infectious diseases, the alarming environmental degradation, unresolved long-
standing disputes, unsettled border disputes, rising ethnic tension, challenges of 
good governance, the colonial legacy and the regional and international 
dimensions of intrastate conflicts in the continent. It needs to be underscored here 
that the international community cannot make itself invulnerable from the 
impending threats of international peace and security while the security 
challenges in Africa are still pressing. 
The United Nations (UN) has primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.3 Though the ideological divide during the 
1Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more 
secure world: Our shared responsibility, United Nations, A/59/565 (2 December 2004), p. 13 
2Id, II 
3 See Article I of the UN Charter 
1 
Cold War era largely crippled the UN from acting on important collective security 
issues, its involvement in global security issues including those in Africa 
increased exponentially following the end of the Cold War. 4 The number of 
Security Council Resolutions rose from an average of fifteen per year prior to the 
end ofthe Cold War era to twenty-five in 2014. Its involvement in Africa has also 
substantially increased. In 1988, immediately before the end of the Cold War, the 
Security Council passed nineteen Resolutions out of which only four were on 
Africa,5 while in 2014 the Council passed twenty-five resolutions on Africa out of 
an overall total of forty. 6 Between 1946 and 1989, the UN had only three 
peacekeeping operations in Africa.7 Following the end of the Cold War, the UN 
conducted twenty-one peacekeeping operations out of which sixteen are still 
active. 8 
Increasingly, the African Union (AU) is also taking an active role in 
responding to the crisis in the continent by providing leadership in the promotion 
and advancement of regional security. The UN has welcomed the AU emerging 
role with optimism and high expectations.9 More importantly, there has been a 
growing trend of cooperation between UN, AU and various sub-regional 
organizations in Africa since the mid 1990s. 
40scar Schachter, THE UN LEGAL ORDER: AN OVERVIEW, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, (1997), 3 & 13 
5United Nations, Security Council Resolutions, 1988, available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1988/scres88.htm (last visited on May 7, 2009) 
6http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2014.shtml (last visited on November 18, 2014) 
7UN Peace Keeping, List of Peacekeeping Operations, available at 
http://www. un. org/Depts/ dpko/1 ist/1 ist. pdf (last visited on 1 0 October 20 14) 
8 Id. 
9United Nations Security Council, Resolution on Peace and Security in Africa, S/RES/1809 
(2008), 16 April 2008 
2 
Although the UN Security Council supports the general idea of stronger 
cooperation between the UN, and regional organizations such as AU as well as 
sub-regional organizations, 10 it has not traditionally shown much inclination to 
consider this issue other than at the abstract level. Rather the Security Council has 
tended to focus its energy on concrete cases in an ad hoc manner rather than 
proceeding from the general to the specific. 
Obviously the AU has neither the United Nations' level of resources, 
institutional capacity nor experience in dealing with threats to regional peace and 
security. Nonetheless, its founding instrument, the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, provides the promotion of peace, security and stability on the African 
Continent as one of the major objectives of the Union. The important centerpiece 
of the Organization of African Unity's (AU's predecessor) reform was in fact in 
the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution that culminated in the 
foundation of a more permanent legal and institutional framework under the 
African Union. 11 In addition to creating the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as 
a standing organ of the Union, the AU framework also provides additional 
mechanisms, including: the Panel of the Wise; the PSC Secretariat; the 
Continental Early Warning System; the Peace Fund; and, the African Standby 
Force. 12 
10 ld. 
11The first attempt by the OAU to institutionally address the issue of peace and security in the 
region was the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution in 1993. 
12 The Secretary General, Report of the Seminar on Cooperation between the United Nations and 
the African Regional Organizations in the field of Peace and Security, (Dec. 15, 2005) 
3 
The AU Assembly attempted to make this mechanism even stronger 
through the adoption of a Common Defense and Security Policy and, later on, the 
AU Non-aggression and Common Defense Pact. 13Despite the resource and 
capacity limitations, AU has also gained considerable experience in the area of 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. 14 This arguably puts AU in a 
better position to take more responsibility in the maintenance of regional peace 
and security. 
African sub-regional organizations such as Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOW AS), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
(IGAD), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and Economic 
Communities of Central African States (ECCAS), Community of Sahelo-Saharan 
States (CEN-SAD) also responded to the conflicts in Africa with the creation of 
sub-regional security mechanisms. 
And yet Africa is still expenencmg multiplicity of conflicts. 15 The 
prevailing intrastate conflicts and internationalized intrastate conflicts is 
particularly pressing. Reports suggest that Africa suffers more armed conflicts 
than any other region and even compared to the rest of the developing world. 
Regrettably conflict appears to be the hallmark of African societies. 
The current state of insecurity in Africa is dire and is characterized by: 
13 Assembly/AU/Dec.71 (IV) (2005) 
14 Margaret Vogt, Analysis of African Mechanisms for Peace and Security, Seminar on 
Cooperation between the United Nations and the African Regional Organizations in the field of 
Peace and Security, (December 15, 2005) 
15 Matthew S. Barton, ECOWAS and West African Security: The New Regionalism, 4 DEPAUL 
INT'L L.J. (Winter 2000) 79, 80 
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• armed conflicts both within and between states, including unresolved 
longstanding conflicts; 
• extremely fragile peace accords; 
• uninterrupted flow of arms to the continent, including unchecked proliferation 
of small arms; 
• the deplorable incidents of mass killings and genocide; 
• the influx of refuges and internally displaced persons; 
• a growing tendency of lawlessness; 
• the precarious situation of failed states destabilizing the continent; 
• the recent trend in Piracy against international navigation; 
• the tension over shared resources; and, 
• increased vulnerability of the continent to serve as a safe heaven for 
international terrorism. 
The enormity of these challenges is incontrovertible. 
The prevailing conflicts in Africa understandably increased the security 
responsibilities of the UN, which, in tum, has burdened AU and African sub-
regional organizations, such as the ECOW AS, IGAD, SADC, ECCAS and CEN-
SAD with more responsibilities in the prevention, resolution and management of 
conflicts. Although one may persuasively argue that the situation could have been 
worse without the increased involvement of the global, regional and sub-regional 
security mechanisms, it still triggers an important question about the effectiveness 
and adequacy of the existing security mechanisms. This will be one of the central 
questions throughout the research. In the course of the inquiry, a closer 
5 
examination will be made on factors that hold back the international security 
mechanisms from effectively averting the present dire security situation in the 
continent. This will be done through an in-depth review of major conflicts in 
Africa. 
The dissertation will, therefore, examine the evolving concept of security; 
the security mechanisms of the UN, AU and the African sub-regional 
organizations and their respective mandates in the maintenance of peace and 
security in Africa; assess the state of security in the continent; identify the key 
factors for the deterioration of the security situation in the continent; evaluate the 
effectiveness of the existing international security mechanisms in overcoming this 
dangerous trend; identify the key challenges and drawbacks in the present global 
security system; and suggest some recommendations on the way forward to meet 
the security challenges of the African continent in the 21st century. 
The first chapter explores the evolving concept of security. "Security" is 
an important notion that divides the international community. However the 
conception of this important notion is key in addressing the security challenges 
the world faces today. This chapter will, therefore, discuss the traditional concept 
of security; the pillars and values of collective security under the UN Charter; the 
expansion of the concept of traditional security over the past few decades; and 
factors that led to the expansion of this important concept. This will be followed 
by an inquiry on the sufficiency of the UN security mechanism to cope with the 
pressing challenges arising from the expansion of the notion of security. 
6 
The second chapter of the dissertation will discuss the UN security 
mechanism and the place of regional security mechanisms under the UN Charter. 
After providing some insights into the circumstances that led to the setting up of 
the UN security mechanism, an attempt will be made to explore the security 
mandates of the UN, the various mechanisms in place to discharge its security 
mandates, and the place of regional security mechanisms under the UN Charter 
that sets the underlying legal framework for the global-regional security 
cooperation. 
The third chapter will discuss the regional and sub-regional security 
mechanisms in Africa. Following a historical synopsis on the AU security 
mechanism, the dissertation will discuss the scope of AU's security mandates, the 
respective responsibilities of those AU organs and bodies with a security mandate, 
the regional legal frameworks in place to address the security challenges of the 
continent, and the place of UN as well as African sub-regional security 
mechanisms under the AU Constitutive Act. The dissertation will then examine 
three sub-regional security mechanisms in Africa, namely ECOW AS, IGAD, and 
SADC that have been active on the security domain. On the basis of a critical 
evaluation of the cooperation agreement as well as the de facto cooperation 
between AU and the three sub-regional organizations, an attempt will be made to 
define and analyze the scope as well as challenges of the existing cooperation in 
the security domain. 
The fourth chapter will be devoted to an inquiry and analysis of the 
existing cooperation among the UN, AU and African sub-regional security 
7 
mechanisms. This chapter will review and analyze the cooperation at different 
levels. First an attempt will be made to review the de jure and de facto 
cooperation between the UN and AU in the maintenance of regional peace and 
security. The examination on the cooperation between the UN and sub-regional 
security mechanisms in Africa will focus on bilateral cooperation between the UN 
and each of the sub-regional organizations in Africa. It is hoped that this inquiry 
will eventually lead to an identification of the missing link required for a more 
effective cooperation of the UN-AU-African Sub-Regional Security Mechanisms. 
The fifth chapter will discuss the contemporary security challenges in 
Africa with a view to evaluating the sufficiency and effectiveness of the global, 
regional, and sub-regional security mechanisms. After highlighting the current 
state of security in Africa, this chapter will analyze selected case studies of 
conflict situations in Africa in which the UN, AU and sub-regional security 
mechanisms took part. The case studies will cover the conflict situation m 
Somalia, the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute, the conflict in Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and the case of Liberia. The case studies will identify the root causes of 
conflict and security challenges in the continent, internal and external factors 
complicating the situation, and common cluster of security threats that loom large 
in Africa, and perhaps those specific to Africa. Conceivably these case studies 
will be important for the lesson they may hold for the much needed and effective 
security system at the global, regional, sub-regional and national levels. Based on 
the findings of the case studies, the key challenges and stumbling blocks that 
adversely impact the effectiveness of the existing international security 
8 
framework in the prevention, resolution and management of conflicts in Africa 
are also identified. 
My conclusion will focus on what the United Nations, the African Union, 
the African sub-regional organizations, and each African state need and ought to 




THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
"No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor 
commands the disciplinary power of 'security'"1, Ronnie D. Lipshutz 
"Security" literally means to be safe or free from danger.2 It is 'the 
absence of a threat to the stability of the international system, to countries or to 
individuals. d Security has been the central preoccupation for both the powerful 
and weaker governments.4 Weaker governments are concerned of threats that 
could bring their very existence questionable, while the powerful ones have 
frequently had to face the threat of wars. 5 
The concept of 'international security' implies a common interest in 
security among nation states going beyond the particular interests of sovereign 
states.6 It is virtually understood as 'the ability of sovereign states to defend 
themselves against external threats to their existence as states through conquest, 
military defeat, or political and economic domination.' 7 The state is the primary 
focus of analysis and action. 
1 Ronnie D Lipshutz, ed., ON SECURITY, New York Colombia University Press, 24-25 
2 Andrew Martin & Petro Patrice, Eds. RETHINKING GLOBAL SECURITY: MEDIA, 
POPULAR CULTURE AND THE WAR ON TERROR, 2006 
3Sean Kay, GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY: THE QUEST FOR 
POWER AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, (2012), I 
4 Patrick M Morgan, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, (2006), 
I 
5 Id 
6 Michael Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN's Role in International Security, " 
United Nations Divided World, 63, (1993), at 63 
7 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The New Challenges to International, National and Human Security 
Policy, A Report to the Trilateral Commission, (2004), 58 
10 
The issue of international security has been at the fore-front of the world's 
political agenda since the last century. 8 However the concept is invitingly broad, 
and complex. This chapter, therefore, examines the evolving dimensions of 
international security, surveys the major conceptual frameworks of the notion, and 
identifies the major international security challenges in the twenty-first century. 
The field of security studies has been considered as "a child of 
Machiavellian and Hobbesian realism."9 It is important to understand the main 
assumptions behind the traditional view of international politics, realism, in order 
to properly understand the concept of security. This is rooted in the writings of the 
ancient Greek historian Thucidides and great Renaissance and Enlightnemnt 
philosophers such as Nicolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes, who tried in their 
writings to capture how states behave. 10 
Thucydides illustrated that the strong states do what they can, and the 
weak states do what they must when it comes to international security. 11 
Machiavelli in his study known as The Prince wrote the following: 
"A man striving in every way to be good will meet his ruin among the 
great number who are not good. Hence it is necessary for a prince, if he wishes to 
remain in power, to learn how not to be good and to use his knowledge or refrain 
from using it as he may need." 12 Machiavelli advised the Prince that where he 
must choose between being loved or being feared, he should choose to be 
8 Agostinho Zacharias, THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING, 
( 1996), I 
~eta Crawford, , Once and Future Security Studies, SECURITY STUDIES, I, ( I99I) 283, 292 
10 Morgan, Supra note 4, at 3 
11 Kay, Supra note 3, at 20 
12 Id 
11 
feared.U In Machiavelli's view, a leader should "care nothing for the accusation 
of cruelty so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal; by making a very few 
examples he can be more truly merciful than those who through too much tender-
heartedness allow disorders to arise whence come killings and rapine." 14 
Thomas Hobbes, a renowned philosopher and scientist during the 
1 ihcentury, emphasized on the expectation of the citizenry from the state a 
protection against both domestic and foreign threats. 15 He also advanced the 
concept of power and anarchy. 16 In the anarchical world, incentives for war are 
built into the international system as men seek to become first "masters of other 
men's persons, wives, children and cattle". 17 Note that Hobbes also recognized 
the dangers arising from domestic turmoil within a country. 
The traditional conception of security only relates to issues of militarized 
relations between competing states. 18 Until the late twentieth century, security 
thinking emphasized the nation-state and competition for power in the 
international system. 19 
Realists conclude that the key objective of states is survival, and power is 
the means to that end.20 The Realists' tendency to equate international security 
13 David P. Fidler, ,A Symposium on Reenvisioning the Security Council: Article: Caught between 
Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical Conundrum, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411 
14 Kay, Supra note 3, at Sean20 
15 Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 16 
16 Kay, Supra note 3, at 20 
17 Id 
18 Aristotle Constantindes, SECURITIZING DEVELOPMENT: ADVANTAGES AND 
PITFALLS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S INVOLVEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT 
ISSUES, 2003, at 204 
19 Kay, Supra note 3, at I 
12 
with the use of force between nations is premised on the view that international 
security involved territorial integrity of nations and the greatest threat to such 
territorial integrity was posed by wars between states?1 
The realist understanding of international security is structured by specific 
ideas about the nature of politics at the international level.22 They start with the 
premise that the system of international relations is anarchic, and 'dominated by a 
struggle for power and security against the military capabilities of other states in 
the system.' 23 For Realists the pursuit of power by states is assumed to be 
"ubiquitous and inescapable", generating inevitable conflict of interest between 
states.24 For them such conflict of interest can only but mitigated but may not be 
avoided. 
For realists, the core purpose of the state is to protect its citizens from both 
the external and internal danger. 25 It is out of this necessity that the working 
definition of security under realism is strictly limited to military power. 
For classical realists, the determining factor of the security dilemma is 
attributed to a flawed human nature, which is power-seeking and prone to 
violence.26 It emphasized on the degree to which an effort by one state to increase 
its security might be perceived as a threat by another state.27 However, this realist 
account of the security dilemma would naturally lead to insecurity because it 
21 See for instance Joseph S. Nye Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A 
Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," International Security, 12 (Spring 1988): 5-27. 
22 Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 7 
23 Id at 16 
24 Michael Joseph Smith, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO KISSINGER. BATON 
ROUGE, Louisiana State University Press, ( 1986), 220 
25 Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 7 
26 Id, at 17 
27 Kay, Supra note 3, at l 
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assumes that all states or units in the international system behave similarly, and 
this will further exacerbate the competition for more power making the realization 
of security unachievable. 28 
Structural realists, also known as Nco-realists, however questioned the 
human nature explanation of classical realists. They argue that the human nature 
explanation is flawed. For them, the determining factor of the security dilemma is 
attributed to the structure of the international system and the patterns of behavior 
it compelled states to fall into. 29 
The continued centrality of international security consideration since the 
establishment of the League of Nations indicates the significance of international 
security in international politics. 30 In all the deliberations of the League of 
Nations in 1918-19, the central theme of the discussion on international security 
endorsed the traditional conception of security. The discussion was focused on 
'deterring potential aggressors by agreeing in advance to oppose them with a 
united front of all other states'. 31 
President Woodrow Wilson's Final Addresses in Support ofthe League of 
Nations explains the context under which the League of Nations came into 
existence. President Wilson noted the following: 
All the Nations that are going to be members of the League of Nations 
enter into a solemn promise to one another that they will never use 
28 Hugh Dyer, Environmental Security: The New Agenda, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN A 
GLOBAL AGE: SECURING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, (2000), 140 
29 Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 17 
30 Agostinho, Supra note 8 at 1 
31 David Armstrong, THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: A SHORT 
HISTORY, Palgrave Macmillan (1982), 11 
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their power against one another for aggression; that they never will 
impair the territorial integrity of a neighbour; that they never will 
interfere with the political independence of a neighbour; that they will 
abide by the principle that great populations are entitled to determine 
their own destiny and that they will not interfere with that destiny; and 
that no matter what differences arise amongst them they will never 
resort to war without first having done one or other of two things -
either submitted the matter of controversy to arbitration, in which case 
they agree to abide by the result without question, or submitted it to the 
consideration of the council of the League of Nations, laying before 
that council all the documents, all the facts, agreeing that the council 
can publish the documents and the facts to the whole world, agreeing 
that there shall be six months allowed for the mature consideration of 
those facts by the council, and agreeing that at the expiration of the six 
months, even if they are not then ready to accept the advice of the 
council with regard to the settlement of the dispute, they will still not 
go to war for another three months. 32 
The League of Nations was established in 1919 with a view to providing 
security for its members through collective action. 33 Under Article 10 and 11 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations, members of the League 'undertake to 
respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and 
existing political independence of all Members of the League. d 4 This is perhaps a 
clear endorsement of the traditional conception of security. 
When the United Nations was founded in 1945, the sovereign state was 
still the building block of the international order.35 The San Francisco Charter of 
1945 was a response to the determination to avoid war, and the structure of the 
Organization and the integration and competence of its bodies were geared to that 
end. The forefathers had in mind the tragedies of interstate war when they 
32 President Woodrow Wilson's Address in favor of the League of Nations, 25 September 1919, 
available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/wilsonspeech league.htm, last accessed on 
September 30, 20 II 
33 Armstrong, Supra note 3 I, at II 
34 See Article 10 and 11 of the Covenant of the League ofNations 
35 Armstrong, Supra note 31, at 64 
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negotiated the UN Charter.36The threat of inter-state armed conflict was, 
therefore, primarily in the minds of the architects of the UN Charter.37 
The UN Charter also endorsed the traditional conception of security by 
envisioning the UN collective security system with a view to save the world 
above all from the "scourge ofwar".38 
Though the underlying consideration m setting up the UN security 
mechanism was the existing reality at the end of World War II, the UN 
preparatory documents suggest that any other situation or dispute which may lead 
to international friction or which is likely to endanger international peace and 
security falls within the conception of international security. Though the drafters 
of the UN Charter were preoccupied with state security, "they understood well, 
long before the idea of human security gained currency, the indivisibility of 
security, economic development and human freedom."39 
For example, the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference suggested that the 
UN Security Council "should be empowered to investigate any dispute or any 
situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order 
to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
. . 1 d . ,40 mternatwna peace an secunty. 
36 Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, Eds, WORLD POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
SINCE 1945, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 13 November 2008, 25 
37 Id, at 5 
38 See the Preamble of the United Nations Charter 
39 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, at II (2004), available at 
<http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf 
40 UN Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United Nations, ( 1946-4 7), 7 
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The Dumbarton Oaks Conference, however, qualified the reference to 
"any dispute or any situation which may lead to international friction ... " by 
stating that it "should not apply to situation or dispute arising out of matters which 
by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state 
concerned."41 This view was eventually endorsed as one of the key principles in 
the UN Charter. It provides that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state". 
Paradoxically the Charter has not defined the matters that fall under 
"domestic jurisdiction" of states. At the time, Uruguay, Belgium and Peru 
expressed their regrets that the UN Charter failed to establish a rule of 
international law that sets a criterion as to what matters fall within domestic 
jurisdiction of states.42 
This attitude reflects the then mentality of the founders to jealously guard 
the sovereignty of states, even at the expense of international peace and security. 
One could perhaps conclude that they ignored the critical importance of domestic 
matters in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
In the immediate post-World War II period, the expression "national 
security" was used to describe the preservation of state independence and 
autonomy.43 In 1952, Arnold Wolfers, a realist, introduced debate over the larger 
41 Id, at 7 
42 Id, at 20 
43Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 5 
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meaning of national security beyond the defense ofterritory.44 He made a crucial 
distinction between objective and subjective security, the absence of threats to 
acquired values as against the absence of fear that such values will be 
attacked.45Wolfer also made the point that the realist conception of security was 
no less idealistic than conceptions proposed by its critics, since "the demand for a 
policy of national security is primarily normative in character.46 
Nation states tend to strengthen their military security, either through 
unilateral force improvements or through membership of alliances until the Cold 
War evolved toward the superpower detente of the 1970s, at which period this 
prevailing Western conception gradually shifted from "national security" to 
international security.47 Throughout this period, however, the concept of 
international security was conceived purely in the military context, i.e. military 
security against the military power of other states.48 
In 1977, Lester Brown introduced global assessments of environmental 
and energy challenges, arguing that national security included these dimensions as 
well as military issues.49 
Richard Ullman, in his 1983 article entitled, "Redefining Security"50, first 
challenged the traditional conception of security, which ultimately sparked 
44 Kay, Supra note 3, at I 
45 Id 
46 Arnold Wolfers, National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, POLITICAL SCIENCE 
QUARTERLY 67, (1952) 481, at 483 
47 Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 2 
481d 
49 Lester Brown, Redefining National Security, WORLD WATCH PAPER 14 (Washington, DC, 
1977) 
50 Richard Ullman,, Redefining Security, 8 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (1983), 129-153 
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theoretical debate over the subject. The debate was centered on whether or not 
certain threats could reasonably fall under the common rubric of security. 51 
Barry Buzan's, in his book People, State and Fear, 52 advocated a much 
broader approach to security. For Buzan what counts as a security issue is a result 
of political and social discourse. 53Buzan presented Security as an "essentially 
contested concept". 54 He further portrayed security as a socially constructed 
concept conveying specific meaning only within a particular social context and 
accordingly introduced the concept of securitization. 55Buzan presented the issue 
as "urgent and existential threat" and asserted that it should be prioritized with a 
view to handling it through extraordinary means."56 
These debates opened up the possibility to broaden the scope of security to 
include a wider range of areas, including the economic and environmental 
realms. 57 
There IS a marked shift in security discourse in the post-Cold War 
period.58 The end of the Cold War not only ended the superpower rivalry and 
bipolar politics59, but also the notion of international security has become a 
subject of serious rethinking among scholars and perhaps the international 
51 Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 4 
52 Barry Buzan, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1983 
53 Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 4 
54Constantindes, Supra note 18, at 204 
55 Id 
56 Id 
57 Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 4 
58 Alexander C. Lynn, International Security and War, 8 WM. & MARY BILL OF 
RTS. 1,.725 
59 Alice Edwards, Symposium: Territory without boundaries: Immigration Beyond 
Territory: Human Security and the Rights of Refugees: Transcending Territorial 
and Disciplinary Borders, 30 MICH. J. 1NT'L L. 763, 771 
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community.60 The nature of security challenges have changed radically with the 
end of the Cold War era.61 
Since the UN Charter was fashioned in response to interstate wars, the 
central problem since the end of the Cold War has been how to define security in 
light of this new shift from inter-state conflict to predominantly intrastate 
conflicts.62 Given the potential impact of intrastate conflicts on international 
security, it has become increasingly problematic to simply characterize it as a 
purely domestic matter.63 It was equally problematic for the UN since Article 2(7) 
of its Charter put a restrain on it from intervention in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state. Coupled with its traditional reluctance to get involved in 
ostensibly domestic affairs, the efforts of the UN have been belated and hesitant. 64 
The traditional realist conceptualization of security, whose focus is 
"limited to issues of militarized relations between competing states"65 , therefore, 
came under manifold criticism as narrow and inadequate. According to Sheehan 
this was primarily because the concept "was increasingly seen as unsatisfactory in 
its own terms, and because it was ignoring important aspects of an emerging 
international policy agenda."66 The post Cold War period is, therefore, defined by 
61 Andrew Mumford & Natasha Kuhrt, Poli'-'Y Challenges to international law, security and ethics 
in the post 9111 world, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SECURITY AND ETHICS: POLICY 
CHALLENGES IN THE POST 9/11 WORLD, (2011), I 
62 Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security: An Opening for UN Reform, THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND GLOBAL SECURITY, 245, (2004), 248 
63 Id 
64 Armstrong, Supra note 31, at 91 
65 Sheehan, Supra note 15, at 2 
66 Id, at 2-3 
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changed priorities, and it has become commonplace to reconsider the concept of 
security in the new context. 67 
Proponents of new conceptions of security maintain that the security 
definition must be broadened to incorporate new threats, such as environmental 
degradation. 68 This view is premised on the marked change and transformation in 
the familiar imperatives of international security. 69 
The ON-sanctioned imposition of no-fly zones in Iraq in 1991 signaled a 
new willingness on the part of the Security Council to broaden its interpretation of 
its Chapter VII powers to include intra-state humanitarian crises.70 In its landmark 
resolution 688/1991, the UN Security Council condemned 'the repression of the 
Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish 
populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and 
security in the region.' 
The ensuing international security debate over the notion of "humanitarian 
intervention" triggered significant divisions on the legal conception of the scope 
of international intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.71 When 
civil wars broke out in Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda at the beginning of the 
1990s, the UN was not prepared to employ more effective action such as robust 
67 Dyer, Supra note 28 at 138 
6s Id 
69Janne E. Nolan (Editor), GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN 
THE 21sT CENTURY, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., (1994), vii. Note that the 
cooperative approach has its own limitations in terms of achieving the security objectives. 
70 Aidan Hehir, Security, discretion and international law, International Law, SECURITY AND 
ETHICS: POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE POST 9111 WORLD, (2011),79, 80 
71 Mumford, Supra note 61, at 2 
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peacekeeping or peace enforcement to protect the population from death and 
ethnic cleansing. 
In the face of this failure, the notion of humanitarian intervention to save 
the people from war became a highly controversial issue. At first, the legal 
permissiveness of humanitarian intervention was questioned. After all, the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs is a cornerstone of the UN 
system. Non-interference is also an expression of sovereign equality between the 
UN members to shield the weak from the strong. But Article 2 paragraph 7 of the 
Charter also states that 'this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.' Consequently, if the Security Council 
decides that a civil war constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 
collective action to maintain or restore peace may also be mandated. One possible 
approach to build a broader consensus for legalizing and legitimizing 
humanitarian intervention may have been a focus on averting the international 
consequences of serious violations of human rights. 72 
Throughout the 1990s the Security Council repeatedly found that the 
conditions prevailing within a state, from starvation in Somalia to political 
intimidation and massacre in East Timor, constituted threats to international peace 
and security sufficient to require collective armed intervention.73 
In 1991 the UN Security Council recognized the continuation of fighting 
m Yugoslavia, which was causing a heavy loss of human life and material 
72CarstenGiersch, International Law and Collective Management, GLOBAUSA TION -THE 
STATE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 81, (2009), 83 
73 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Note and Comment: Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand 
Themes of UN Reform, 99 A.J.I.L. 619, (2005), 625 
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damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in 
the border areas of neighboring countries as a breach to international peace and 
. 74 secunty. 
In 1992, the UN Security Council formally recognized that "non-military 
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields 
have become threats to peace and security."75 For example, the Security Council 
considered the continuation of the "rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia 
and the heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from 
the conflict in the country" constitutes a threat to international peace and 
• 76 secunty. 
The President of the Security Council in his statement of 31 January 1992 
pointed out that "the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security."77 The UN Security Council reiterated 
this position in its resolution of 6 June 1998.78 
In 1993, the UN Security Council formally determined that a widespread 
violation of international humanitarian law occurring within the former 
Yugoslavia, including mass killings and the continuance of the practice of ethnic 
cleansing, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.79 
In 1994, the UN Security Council determined that the magnitude of the 
humanitarian crisis in Rwanda, which actually resulted in the death of thousands 
74 See UN Security Council Resolution 713 (1991 ), 25 September 1991 
75 Edwards, Supra note 59, at 771 
76 UN Security Council Resolution, 733 (1992), 23 January 1992 
77 See Statement ofthe President of the Security council, S/23500, 31 January 1992 
78 See UN Security Council Resolution, SIRES/ 1172 ( 1998), 6 June 1998 
79 See UN Security Council Resolution, SIRES/ 808 ( 1993), 22 February 1993 
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of civilians, constitutes a "threat to peace and security of the region". 80 Though 
the Security Council decided to remain seized with the matter, it did limit the 
extent of the threat to the security of the region. It was only in 1996 that the UN 
Security Council eventually recognized the situation in Rwanda, i.e. the 
"genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of 
international humanitarian law ... committed in Rwanda" as constituting a threat 
to international peace and security. 81 
In 1994, the UN Security Council reached "a high point of decisive 
action" when it approved Resolution 940 authorizing member states of the UN to 
use all necessary force to remove General Raoul Cedras of Haiti, who in 1991 
topples Haiti's democratically elected President Aristide.82 This presents a shift in 
the conception of international security to embrace a matter which is traditionally 
perceived as a subject of domestic jurisdiction or internal sovereignty. Such quick 
response of the UN defused a developing threat to international security.83 
As evidenced by interventions in Somalia and ex post facto acceptance of 
the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the Security Council itself has adopted a 
broader understanding of the international peace and security agenda. 
In 1996, the UN Security Council identified international terrorism as "an 
essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security."84 
80 See UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/929 (1994), 22 June 1994 
81 See UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994 
82See UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/940 (1994), 31 July 1994 
83 Michael D. Ramsey, Reinventing the Security Council: The U.N. as a Lockean System, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1529, 1536 
84 See UN Security Council Resolution, SIRES/ I 044 (1996), 31 January 1996 
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In 1998, the UN Security council recognized "the close relationship of the 
problem of illicit arms flows to and in Africa with international peace and 
security. "85 
In 2000, the UN Security Council underscored that "the HIV I AIDS 
pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security."86 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States and the global war on 
terror provided a new dimension to the debates over the nature and utility of 
international law in the maintenance of international peace and security. 87 It also 
reinvigorated the state centric conceptions of security. The debate over this new 
dimension had also shaken the progressive 'humanization' of security. 88 
Following the September 11 terrorist attack in the United States, the UN 
Security Council adopted a resolution declaring in the strongest terms that "acts of 
international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international 
peace and security in the twenty-first century".89 UN Security Council Resolution 
1368 of 12 September 2001 declared that international terrorism constituted a 
threat to international peace and security, and in this context recognized the right 
to self-defense. Moreover, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 of 
28 September 2001, and obliged all UN members to combat terrorism by 
translating an extensive catalogue of countermeasures into domestic law. Even 
though Article 25 of the UN Charter implicitly allows the SC to issue binding 
85 See UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1209 (1998), 19 November 1998 
86 See UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1308 (2000), 17 July 2000 
87 Mumford, Supra note 61, at 2 
88Constantindes, Supra note 18, at 204 
89 See UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1377 (200 1), 12 November 200 I 
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decisions, the making of international law neither by treaty nor by custom was a 
rather unusual act. 90 
The concept of human security emerged as an important component of 
international security in the 1990s. This concept found an early champion in the 
Canadian government, particularly Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy.91 Kofi 
Annan then embraced the concept in his millennia} "We the Peoples" report, 
where he spoke of the need for a more human-centered approach to security.92 
Human security, therefore, is not a concern with weapons.93 It rather marks a 
process of broadening the scope of security beyond state/military security towards 
the human being, 
A concern for human security is not a new phenomenon. 94 However it 
entered the mainstream discourse after UNDP's 1994 Human Development 
Report. The term was coined to shift the focus of security from the state to the 
individual, to emphasize freedom from fear and want. 
This brought the traditional conception of security under stern criticism 
that it is "narrow and inadequate."95 The need was also felt to redefine the concept 
of international security to include both state and human security. This was 
perhaps considered as a way to forge a consensus among all the world's nations, 
90Giersch, Supra note 72 at 87 
91Axworthy, Supra note 62, at 183 
92 Kofi Annan, , WE THE PEOPLES THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 21 sr 
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developed and developing, regarding the nature of the threats the international 
community face and the best strategies to respond.96 
This new conceptions of security - human security - has considered the 
individual to be the unit of analysis. And a new set of global issues were 
identified as distinctive challenges to national and international security. 
According to Kazuo Ogura, these include terrorism, environmental destruction, 
drug trafficking, international crimes, infectious diseases and refugee problems.97 
Crucially, globalization has an important role in heightening new security 
priorities because it forces a more expansive understanding of the security 
dilemma.98 
The UNDP report defined human security as follows: 
"Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, 
safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And 
second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities." 99 
The concept contained seven security elements: economic, food, health, 
environmental, physical harm, community, and political. 
The Commission for Human Security, which was launched following the 
UN Millennium Summit by the Government of Japan, defined human security as 
the protection of "the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human 
96 Slaughter, Supra note 7, at 12 
97Kazuo Ogura, COPING WITH THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY, THE NEW 
CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL AND HUMAN SECURITY POLICY: A 
REPORT TO THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION, (2004), 65 
98 Kay, Supra note 3, at 3 
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freedoms and human fulfillment." 100 The Commission observed that "[t]he state 
remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its 
security obligations- and at times has even become a source of threat to its own 
people."101 The human security approach represents an important shift in the way 
security is viewed- from the level of the state to the level of the individual. 102 
According to the United Nations secretary-general's High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, "the central challenge for the twenty-first 
century is to fashion a new and broader understanding ... of what collective 
security means ... " 103 This is premised on the marked change in the character of 
international security that triggers the need to revisit the 1945 consensus 
underlying the UN Charter, and perhaps build 'a new security consensus' .104 
The High-Level Panel underscored the need for 'a. new security 
consensus' that view of security that understands state security and human 
security to be fundamentally intertwined. Note that the collective security system 
envisaged by the forefathers of the UN Charter is principally designed to save the 
world from the 'scourge of war' .105 Accordingly, the High-Level Panel suggested 
the need to broaden the traditional definition of the concept of international 
security to include both state security and human security. The High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges, and Change boils down its own conclusions to the 
following proposition: the "dignity, justice, worth and safety" of the citizens of 
10° Commission on Human Security, HUMAN SECURITY NOW, New York, (2003), 4 
101 Id, at 2 
102Axworthy, Supra note 62, at 249 
103 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Supra note 39 at 8 
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every state "should be at the heart of any collective security system for the 
twenty-first century." 106 
In 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/1 recognizing 
that the world is facing a whole range of threats that require the international 
community's urgent, collective and more determined response. 107 Member states 
further reaffirmed their "commitment to work towards a security consensus based 
on the recognition that many threats are interlinked, that development, peace, 
security and human rights are mutually reinforcing, that no State can best protect 
itself by acting entirely alone and that all States need an effective and efficient 
collective security system pursuant to the purposes and principles of the 
Charter."108 
The World Summit further offered the basis for defining the notion, i.e. a 
common understanding that "all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are 
entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity 
to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential." 109 While 
recognizing the importance of ensuring human security, members of the UN 
committed to discuss and define the notion of human security in the General 
Assembly. 110 
106 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Supra note 39 at para. 30 
107 See para 72 of UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005 
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The Security Council reform discussion at the 601h anniversary of the UN 
m 2005 further reinforced 'the importance of dealing with the threats to 
. . 1 . . l l ' Ill mtematwna secunty m a ega manner . 
Following this World Summit, Japan and Mexico organized an open 
ended, informal forum called Friends of Human Security every six months since 
October 2006 to explore collaborative efforts and mainstreaming human security 
in UN activities. 112 The Human Security network, an inter-regional group 
established in 1998 and composed of thirteen countries, also provided a platform 
of communication between policy makers, diplomats, civil society and the 
academia to tackle critical human security threats. 113 
The General Assembly conducted a thematic debate on Human Security in 
May 2008. 114 The thematic discussion on the "Human Security" was indeed 
politically loaded. For example, Israel understood human security as a "people-
centered and individual focused approach that can be implemented in a variety of 
areas such as climate change, environment, sustainable development, non 
proliferation, human rights, armed conflict, culture of hate, crime prevention, 
terrorism and others." 115 
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Egypt cautioned the August Assembly "not to confuse "Human Security" 
with the attempts to use the "Responsibility to Protect" to justify intervention in 
domestic affairs, particularly between governments and their peoples." 116 Egypt 
suggested that any such attempt to define and implement human security "has to 
focus on human development, in order to preserve human dignity and enable all 
human beings to enjoy freedom from fear of poverty, hunger or disease ... freedom 
from want, freedom from occupation and oppression ... freedom from weapons of 
mass destruction ... and finally respect for each other's cultures, traditions and 
beliefs."117 This view is rooted on the implicit potential of equating human 
security with international security in triggering the enforcement powers of the 
UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This is perhaps a 
natural reaction under the circumstances that state sovereignty is still the core of 
international relations. 118 
Friends of Human Security divert the focus from elaborating a legal 
definition of the notion, and pursued for concrete collaboration on the basis of a 
common understanding of the broad concept provided by the Commission on 
Human Security, i.e. "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that 
enhance human freedom and human fulfillment." 119 
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During this thematic debate, human security was characterized as a 
framework to further the principles of the 1945 UN Charter but the concept still 
suffers from lack of concise definition. But it is important to note that the new 
security discourse elevated the human rights goals of the UN Charter to a new 
level. 
In 201 0, the Secretary General of the UN submitted a report on Human 
Security. 120 The report provides an update on developments related to the 
advancement of human security since the 2005 World Summit. The Secretary 
General noted the following in the Human Security Report: 
Threats such as natural disasters, violent conflicts and their impact on 
civilians, as well as food, health, financial and economic crises, tend to 
acquire transnational dimensions that move beyond traditional notions of 
security. While national security remains pivotal to peace and stability, 
there is growing recognition of the need for an expanded paradigm of 
• 121 secunty. 
The Secretary General went on and made reference to triangular 
relationships between security, development and human rights and further 
asserted that 
[G]uarantee of national security no longer lies in military power alone. 
Essential to addressing security threats are also healthy political, social, 
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together 
reduce the likelihood of conflicts, help overcome the obstacles to 
development and promote human freedoms for all. 122 
The Secretary General of the UN identified three common components 
that encompass the principles of human security. These are: 
(1) the recognition that human security is in response to current and 
emerging threats; (2) the recognition that protection and empowerment of 
120 Report of the Secretary General, Supra note 94 
121 Id at Para. 9. 
122Id, at Para. I 0 
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people form the basis and the purpose of security, and (3) the employment 
of people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and preventive 
· h · ID strategies to ensure uman secunty. 
Human security is based on a fundamental understanding that 
Governments retain the primary role for ensuring the survival, livelihood and 
dignity of their citizens. Otherwise no agreement existed on the definition and 
scope of Human Security in the UN or within any regional organization. Some 
countries expressed their concern not to confuse "Human Security" with the 
attempts to use the "Responsibility to Protect" to justify intervention in domestic 
affairs between governments and their peoples. 124 
The African Union defined human security as: 
the security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic 
needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political, 
environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and 
dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, 
good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities 
and choices for his/her full development. 125 
There is no consensus yet on the definition of the concept of human 
security. The vague definition is due to the fact that the phrase has brought 
together activists of varying issues, and a narrowing of the definition would likely 
126 
make it difficult for such a diverse coalition to function as a whole. Without 
123 ld, at Paragraph 19 
124 Statement of the Permanent Representative of Egypt in the General Assembly Thematic Debate 
on "Human Security", Supra note 116 
125 See Article 1(K) of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact, 
MON DEFENCE PACT.pdf, last accessed on September 30, 2011 (The Pact entered into force 
on December 18, 2009. 
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"clear criteria for specifying what is, and what is not, a security problem ... an 
expanded definition of security will lose its intellectual coherence."127 
The establishments of the International Criminal Court, International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, and the conclusion ofthe Agreement of the antipersonnel land mine ban 
treaty are notable outcomes principally attributed to the human security agenda. 128 
The human security concept is already one of the important peace and 
security agendas of the UN and is likely to become of increasing importance. We 
have seen the ongoing demands of asymmetric conflict and terrorism, the non-
military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and 
ecological fields, and growing concerns about energy and the environment. 129 The 
small arms proliferation, poverty and disease have indeed become threats to the 
international security. 130 Disease and disaster kill many more people every month 
than armed conflict or terrorists do in a year, a decade, or even a centuryY 1 As 
the Worldwatch Institute writes, 
All of the wars of the twentieth century are estimated to have resulted in 
the deaths of an average of 1.1 million combatants and civilians per year. 
But at present, communicable diseases are killing fourteen times that 
number of people annually. 132 
127 Heinz Gartner, Adrian Hyde-Price and Erich Reiter, Eds., EUROPE'S NEW SECURITY 
CHALLENGES, Kumarian Press (2001), 5 
128 Edwards, Supra note 59 at773-4 
129 Kay, Supra note 3, at 37 
130 Slaughter, Supra note 7 at 16 
131 Slaughter, Supra note 73 at 624 
132Worldwatch Institute, STATE OF THE WORLD 2005: TRENDS AND FACTS --
CONTAINING INFECTIOUS DISEASE (Jan. 2005) 
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We have also experienced extraordinary popular movements for 
democracy in Africa and the Arab world. 133 The recent wave of public uprisings 
against dictatorial and repressive regimes in North Africa and the Middle East 
added a new dimension to the debate on the nature and utility of international law 
and international institutions due to the demands from some quarters for 
international intervention against authoritarian regimes.It has indeed caused 
dilemma on the international community as to how to react to the specific 
situations in each country. The United Nations Security Council has dealt with 
each situation on ad hoc basis. These events, including the recent uprisings in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Libya, have provided additional impetus that 
the fundamentals of the human security framework may become more rather than 
less important. For example, the UN Security Council determined that the 
situation in Libya, i.e.the widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian 
population in Libya, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 134 
These developments provoked a discussion on the scope of the UN 
responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security, i.e. whether 
its function includes dealing with massive episodes of violence and abuse of 
human rights within the borders of states in other words a broad commitment to 
justice, law, and order. 
The concept of international security which was for long synonymous with 
the defense of territory from external attack has now evolved to embrace the 
notion of human security. The two policy discourses are likely to operate 
133 Kay, Supra note 3, at 37 
134 UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1973 (20 11 ), 17 March 201 1 
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alongside one another. 135 What is perhaps more important is the potential added 
value that this framework can contribute to existing multilateral framework and 
national actions. Though the notion of rigid state sovereignty enshrined under the 
UN Charter seems less sacrosanct today than in 1945 136, it still remains to be a 
challenge in the security mandates of the UN. However, as articulated by UN 
former Secretary General Kofi Annan, 'state frontiers ... should no longer be seen 
as a watertight protection for war criminals or mass murderers'. 137 One should 
not, however, lose sight of the critical power of the UN Security Council to 
determine the existence of any threat to international peace and security and to 
authorize use force to respond broadly to threats against international security. 
However, at a practical level, the framework has not displaced traditional 
notions of security. States continue to be the primary actors in the international 
system, and they assess their security requirements in terms of power. 138It is, 
therefore, imperative that the concept of international security should be framed 
within an expanded context including human security. 
135 Edwards, Supra note 59, at 773 
136 Weiss, Supra note 36, at 9. The UN Security Council, through its decisions and actions has 
eroded the foundations of absolute conceptions of state sovereignty fundamentally altering the 
way inwhich many see the relationship between state and citizen. See David M. Malone, 
SECURITY COUNCIL, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, (November 2008) 117, 
117 




AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
MECHANISM 
2.1 General Background 
The genesis of the UN security mechanism, and perhaps the reframing of 
the organizational structure of the world community, started when the demise of 
the League of Nations became evident following the start of the Second World 
War. 1 United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union took the leading 
initiative for the establishment of the 'United Nations Organization' _2 
Subsequently China joined them upon the issuance of the Moscow Declaration on 
General Security on October 30, 1943. This Declaration was perhaps the first 
formal recognition by the four countries on the necessity of establishing a general 
international organization for the maintenance of international peace and 
. 3 secunty. 
The US proposals entitled, "Tentative Proposals for a General 
International Organization" were accepted as the basis for discussion at the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the UN project was generally agreed.4 
These proposals contemplated the establishment of a multi-purpose organization 
whose principal purpose would be the maintenance of international peace and 
1 Bruno Simma (editor), THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, 
Second Edition, vol. 1(2002), 1. The failure of the League ofNations to take collective measures 
and the ineffectiveness of its sanctions principally led to the inevitable demise of the League. 
2 Sir Francis Vallat, United Nations General Assembly, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume IV (2002), 1119. It was a major policy shift on the part of the 
United States that pursued the policy of isolationism during the League of Nations era. 
3Simma, Supra note 1 at 7 
40scar Schachter, United Nations Charter, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, Volume IV, (2000), I 051, 1052. The Dum barton Conference was held in the late summer 
of 1944. 
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security. 5 Similarly, the Soviet Union's Memorandum dispatched at the 
Conference advanced the idea that the new global organization should be security 
centered. 6 The primary focus on the issue of security was geared towards 
remedying the defects of the League of Nations system. 7 That is why White 
characterized this important initiative as the second attempt at collective security 
after the failed collective security schemes of the League ofNations.8 
Forty-seven states that adhered to the 1941 "Declarations by United 
Nations"9 and four other states, i.e. Argentina, Denmark, Belarussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic and the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, were invited to 
attend the founding Conference of the UN in San Francisco. 10 Except Poland, all 
the invited countries attended the Conference held from 25 April to 26 June 1945. 
The composition of the negotiating countries suggests that the negotiation 
of the founding instrument started as a continuation of the wartime alliance 
against the axis powers.11 It should be added that it was indeed a post-war 
planning, as a reaction to the devastation of the Second World War, 12 to establish 
5 Id. 
6Simma, Supra note I at 5 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, 
Second Edition, vol. 1(2002), 5. 
7 Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Cambridge University Press (1991), 748 
8 N.D. White, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Manchester University 
Press, (1996), 171 
9 The "Declarations by United Nations" was a statement signed on January I, 1942 at the Anglo-
American Arcadia conference held in Washington DC. The Declaration subscribed the principles 
of the 1941 Atlantic Charter. The signatories also committed to employ their full economic and 
military resources against the Axis Powers. They further pledged not to make separate armistice 
or peace agreements with the enemy. It is important to note that the United Nations received its 
designation from this Declaration. 
10 Oscar Schachter, The UN Legal Order: An Overview, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Cambridge University Press, ( 1997), I 052 
11 John H. Barton, Disarmament, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
Volume I (1992), 1072 
12 Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD, Oxford University Press 
(1986), 68 
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a wider and permanent system of general security that would help overcome the 
biggest challenges the world had experienced during the Second World War. 
The necessity of guaranteeing a more secured world peace and the need 
for collective action were at the center of the discussion in the entire exercise of 
designing the new global peace organization. 13 Issues related to the maintenance 
of international peace and security, especially the central role of the Security 
Council and the voting formula of the Security Council, were among those issues 
top on the agenda in the course of the negotiation. Cassese compared the outcome 
of the negotiation, i.e. the new collective security system, with the 1815 Concert 
of Europe, where the big powers considered the assumption of control over 
international security affairs as necessary. 14 
The series of negotiations held in four phases eventually led to the 
adoption of the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference on 2 June 1945. 15 
The US participation and perhaps its leadership in the entire negotiation process 
was crucial in the reorganization of the new global framework. 
The preamble of the Charter articulated the factors that led to the 
formation of the UN. The determination of the Peoples of the United Nations "to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime 
has brought untold sorrow to mankind" is top among the list of factors. 16 And this 
13Simma, Supra note I at 2 
14 Cassese, Supra note I2 at 68 
15Simma, Supra note I at 2 
16 See the Preamble of the UN Charter 
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is perhaps the principal raison d'etre for its formation. It also fits the historical 
context under which the Charter was negotiated. 17 
The principal purpose of the UN is the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 18 According to the International Court of Justice, the primacy is 
ascribed to its centrality to the fulfillment of the other purposes of the 
organization, i.e. promoting friendly relations, achievement of economic, social, 
cultural, and humanitarian goals and respect for human rights, and to serve as a 
center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common 
ends. 19 High are the stakes in ensuring the effectiveness of the UN in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. It is indeed a determining factor 
for the very existence of a global legal order. 20 
The Charter envisaged two subsidiary purposes for the achievement of the 
maintenance of international peace and security. These are the use of effective 
collective measures and "the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations, which might lead to a breach of the peace". 21 The Charter explicitly 
attaches a caveat that the latter subsidiary purpose should be taken "in conformity 
with the principle of justice and international law". 
This led some scholars to assert that collective measures could be taken in 
disregard to the principles of justice and international law so long as it is deemed 
expedient.22 On the contrary, Oscar argued that the same limitation does apply to 
17Schachter, Supra note 4 at 1053 
18 See Article 1 of the UN Charter 
19 E. Lauterpacht, (Editor), INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS, Volume 34 (1967), 297. ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on the Expenses of the Organization 
20Schachter, Supra 10 at 21 
21 See Article 1(1) of the Charter of the United Nations 
22Schachter, Supra note 4 at I 054 
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collective measures. 23 His argument is based on the assertion that international 
law is an implicit normative basis of the Charter.24 
Other scholars such as Singh looked at the issue from a different angle. 
While agreeing that collective measures are not unlimited in scope, the 
proponents of this view attach the limitation to proportionality to the maintenance 
of international peace and security objectives. 25 A similar but quite a general view 
is the one articulated by Arechaga. He contends that the collective measures are 
limited only by the duty to act in accordance with the purpose and principles of 
the Charter.26 
The underlying principles of the Charter include sovereign equality of 
member states; the duty to settle international disputes by peaceful means without 
endangering international peace and security, and justice;27 the duty to refrain 
from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the UN ;28 the 
duty to provide every assistance to the UN for any action it takes in accordance 
with the Charter, and the duty to refrain from giving any assistance to any states 
against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action/9 and Non-
intervention in domestic affairs. 
The incorporation of the principle of prohibition of use or threat of use of 
force in the UN Charter distinguishes the UN from its predecessor, i.e. the League 
23 Id 
24 Id. 
25 N.D. White, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Manchester University 
Press, (1996), 170; See J. N. Singh, USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
(1984), 82 
26 Eduardo Jimenez De Arechaga, United Nations Security Council, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume IV (2002), 1168, 1171 
27 See Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter 
28 See Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 
29 See Article 2(6) of the United Nations Charter 
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ofNations. The Covenant of the League ofNations does not substantively outlaw 
war. Article 11 of the Covenant only used a vague language declaring that any 
war or threat of War was a matter of concern to the whole League. 30It should also 
be noted that principles such as the principle of non-intervention, which indeed 
constitute one of the most significant tenets of the 'Westphalian model', 31 do not 
"prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII". 32 
Article 24 of the UN Charter confers on the UN Security Council a 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.33 
The Security Council is entrusted with both recommendatory and mandatory 
enforcement powers to discharge its responsibility. Under Chapter VI of the 
Charter, the Council is given recommendatory power to encourage the pacific 
settlement of disputes while under Chapter VII the Council is entrusted with both 
recommendatory and enforcement powers to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. The rationale behind conferring primary responsibility on this 
important domain is to 'ensure prompt and effective action'. 34 
The Security Council's voting formula was the result of a compromise 
mainly between two extreme positions. While the United States and United 
Kingdom argued that the veto power is incompatible with the fundamental 
principles of the UN, Soviet Union resisted any procedure that would lead it to 
submission to majority decisions on 
30 See Article 11 of the Covenant of the League ofNations 
31 Cassese, Supra note 12 at 143 
32 See Article 2(7) of the Charter ofthe United Nations 
33 See Article 24 of the UN Charter 
34Lauterpacht, Supra note 19 at 292 
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questions of essential 
importance?5Eventually a compromise formula was adopted. The five leading 
nations of the military alliance that defeated the Axis powers became permanent 
members of the Security Council with a veto power.36 Five years later, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the United for Peace Resolution 
reaffirming the duty of the permanent members of the Security Council "to seek 
unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto".37 
Actions of the Security Council are activated when the Security Council 
determines the existence of threats to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression.38 Such determination is very complex and does not enjoy immunity 
from politicization. The danger that such determinations may be dominated by 
overriding political considerations is perhaps a notable factor for the complexity 
of the decision making process. 39 
The traditional definition of 'threat to the peace' refers to a declaration of 
war, or intervention or of other hostile intent by one state against the other.40 Over 
the past decades the concept of threat to the peace further developed through the 
decisions of the Security Council to include intra-state violence and breaches of 
fundamental international laws.41 The recent resolutions of the Security Council 
on the situation in the Sudan are notable in this regard. In its resolutions, the 
35Simma, Supra note 1 at 9 
36 Jimenez De Arechaga, Supra note 41 at 1168 
37 A/RES/3 77 (V) A, The Uniting for Peace Resolution, 3 November 1950 
38 J.G. Merrills, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, Second edition, Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications Limited, (1992) 
39Schachter, Supra note 19 at 12 
40 Quincy Wright, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS, Greenwood Press, 
Publishers (1976), 95 
41 White, Supra note 25 at 174 
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Council decided that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.42 
The concept of 'threat to the peace' is equally applicable to interstate 
conflicts. During the 1998-2000 armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the 
Security Council determined that "the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
constitutes a threat to peace and security".43 
The concept of breach of peace is, however, applicable only to inter-state 
uses of force. 44 The Security Council used the term "breach of the peace" for full-
scale attack of one state by another.45 The practice of the Council suggests that 
resort to use of force is activated when it is determined that the situation 
constitutes breach of the peace.46 In its sixty-four year history, the Security 
Council made such determination only in very limited occasions. These include 
the 1950 armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, 
the 1982 Argentina's invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, the Iran-Iraq 
war, and the 1990 Iraq's invasion ofKuwait.47 Thus far there is no single occasion 
where the Council considered a situation in Africa as breach of the peace. 
Pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter, decisions of the Security Council are 
binding on member states.48 However there have been divergent views regarding 
the scope of this provision. On the one hand countries such as the United 
42 S/Res/1627 (2005), 23 September 2005, Security Council Resolution on the Situation in the 
Sudan 
43 S/Res/1227 (1999), I 0 February 1999, Security Council Resolution on the situation between 
Ethiopia/Eritrea 
44 Wright, Supra note 25 at 93 
45 White, Supra note 10 at 17 5 
46 Id 
47 S/1511, 83 ( 1950), Resolution of 27 June 1950. 
48 See Article 25 of the United Nations Charter 
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Kingdom contended that the scope is limited to Chapter VII enforcement action of 
the Security Council.49 Others advocate a broader interpretation of Article 25. 
According to the proponents of the latter view, the scope of the provision is not 
confined to the Council's Chapter VII enforcement action. 50 The International 
Court of Justice supported this view. In its 1971 Namibia Advisory opinion, the 
court justified this position by arguing that any attempt to narrow the scope of 
Article 25 "would be to deprive this principal organ of its essential functions and 
powers under the Charter". 51 
Though the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace 
and security rests upon the Security Council, the International Court of Justice in 
the Expenses of the Organization Advisory opinion pronounced that "the 
responsibility conferred is 'primary' not exclusive".52 It is within this context that 
the Charteralso confers upon the UN General Assembly important responsibilities 
on matters of international peace and security. These include the power, (1) to 
discuss and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation in 
the maintenance of international peace and security, including disarmament; 53 (2) 
to discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except 
where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council, 
make recommendations on it;54 (3) to recommend measures for the peaceful 
settlement of any situation that might impair friendly relations among nations;55 
49 Jimenez De Arechaga, Supra note 26 at 1170 
5o Id. 
51 ICJ Reports (1971 ), Namibia Advisory Opinion, 54 
52Lauterpacht, Supra note 19 at 292 
53 See Article 11(1) ofthe United Nations Charter 
54 See Articles 11(2) and 12 ofthe United Nations Charter 
55 See Article 14 ofthe United Nations Charter 
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(4) to call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to 
endanger international peace and security,56 and (5) to elect non-permanent 
members of the Security Council upon the Council's recommendations. 
Nevertheless these recommendatory powers of the General Assembly are 
not unlimited. First and foremost, the General Assembly is prohibited from 
making any recommendation on any dispute or situation on which the Security 
Council is exercising the functions assigned to it in the Charter. 57 The second 
limitation is perhaps related to any question that calls for action. If the General 
Assembly is seized with an issue of this nature, it is required to refer it to the 
Security Council.58 The International Court of Justice in the Expenses case 
interpreted the term 'action' to mean only enforcement action, which falls under 
the Chapter VII powers of the Security Council. 59 
Article 18 of the UN Charter qualified Recommendations of the General 
Assembly with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security as 
'important question', subjecting it to a two-third majority vote of the members 
d . 60 present an votmg. 
56 See Article 11(3) ofthe United Nations Charter 
57 See Article 12(1) of the United Nations Charter. Of course the General Assembly would be at 
liberty to make recommendations on those disputes or situations if requested by the Security 
Council. 
58 See Article 11 ofthe United Nations Charter 
59 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 1962, 151 at 163 
60 See Article 18 of the United Nations Charter. Note that Article 18 of the Charter divides 
decisions of the General Assembly into two categories, namely, 'important questions' and 'other 
questions'. Whereas decisions on important questions are subject to Two-third majority of the 
members present and voting, General Assembly decisions on 'other questions' are subject to 
simple majority. 
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2.2 The UN Security Mechanisms 
The UN Charter has put in place various mechanisms for the achievement 
of the primary purpose of the UN, i.e. maintenance of international peace and 
security. There have also developed additional mechanisms such as peacekeeping 
over the course of time. These mechanisms are usually categorized under four 
general headings; namely, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Peace-enforcement, and 
Peace-building. 61 
2.2.1 Peacemaking 
According to the Charter, one of the distinct responsibilities of the UN is 
to assist parties to international disputes to settle their differences through 
peaceful means.62 Peacemaking is an important mechanism that is directly related 
with this important responsibility of the UN. It is aimed at achieving UN's 
principal objective of maintaining international peace and security.63 
As articulated by Charlesworth, the notion of collective security underpins 
the dispute resolution regime contemplated in the UN Charter. 64 Chapter VI sets 
out the framework for the pacific settlement of disputes, a principle that emerged 
after the Second World War.65 The Security Council, General Assembly and the 
61 S/25859, 28 May 1993, Report of the Secretary General on Improving the Capacity of the 
United Nations for Peacekeeping 
62Merrills, Supra note 38 at 179 
63 See Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
64 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS, Manchester University Press (2000), 280 
65 Cassese, Supra note 25 at 142 
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Secretary-General are competent to support states in the peaceful resolution of 
disputes.66 
The obligation to resort to pacific settlement of disputes is imposed on 
parties involved in any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
international peace and security.67 The reference to "parties" here suggests that 
the obligation is not limited to states. It could arguably extend to any non-state 
entity provided that the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and 
security. 
The determination as to whether the continuance of the dispute is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security appears to be left for 
the decision of the parties. However this does not prevent the Security Council 
from investigating and making such determination. 68 
The Security Council is entrusted with power to recommend appropriate 
procedures or methods of adjustment at any stage of the dispute if it determines 
that it is likely to endanger international peace and security.69 Its power extends to 
recommending appropriate terms of settlement if it deems that the continuance of 
the dispute is in fact likely to endanger international peace and security.70 In 
practice, however, the Security Council also makes such recommendation simply 
out of political considerations without any finding that the dispute is likely to 
endanger international peace and security. 71 This is just one example of how 
66Merrills, Supra note 38 at 179 
67 See Article 33 of the UN Charter 
68 See Article 34 of the UN Charter 
69 See Article 36 of the UN Charter 
70 See Article 37 of the UN Charter 
71 White, Supra note 25 at 173 
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much the Council's decision-making process could be politically driven. Because 
of the competing political interests among members of the Council and the 
Council's excessive deference to the wishes of the disputant parties, the 
performance of the Security Co unci 1 in the peacemaking domain is a dismal 
72 one. 
The powers of the General Assembly derive from Chapter IV of the 
Charter. Article 10 entitles the General Assembly to discuss any question within 
the scope of the Charter and, except where a dispute or situation is currently being 
discussed by the Security Council, make recommendations to members of the UN 
or to the Security Council. 73It is evident here that the primacy of the Security 
Council is preserved when it comes to the issue of peace and security. Article 14 
of the Charter is more specific entrusting the General Assembly with a power to 
recommend measures for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might 
impair friendly relations among nations.74 Unlike the Security Council whose 
power, at least in theory, is confined to issues of peace and security, the power of 
the General Assembly in this domain is apparently broader in that it extends to 
any situation which is likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations 
among nations. 75 
Fact-finding is an important component of the peacemaking mechanism. 
The 1991 General Assembly Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in 
the field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security defined fact-
72 Jimenez De Arechaga, Supra note 26 at 1171 
73 See Articles I 0 and 12 of the UN Charter 
74 See Article 14 ofthe UN Charter 
75Merrills, Supra note 38 at 181 
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finding as "any activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant 
facts of any dispute or situation which the competent United Nations organs need 
in order to exercise effectively their functions in relation to the maintenance of 
international peace and security".76The Declaration recognized the importance of 
fact-finding in strengthening the role of the UN in the maintenance of 
international peace and security and promoting the peaceful settlement of 
d. 77 1sputes. 
Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have established 
subsidiary organs mandated to undertake fact-finding missions on different 
occasions. 78In the recent Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute, the Security Council 
requested the Secretary-General of the UN to send a fact-finding mission at the 
border between Djibouti and Eritrea. 79 
The UN Secretary-General also has an important role to play in 
peacemaking. His power derive from Article 99 which empowers him to bring to 
the attention of the Security Council any matter which he deems may threaten 
international peace and security.80Moreover the Charter under Article 98 requires 
the Secretary General to perform any functions entrusted to him by the Security 
Council or General Assembly. 81 Theses include request for the Secretary-General 
to offer his good offices and to send fact-finding missions. For example, in the 
Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute, which we noted above, the Security Council 
76 A/RES/46/59, 9 December 1991, Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the field 
of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security 
77 Ibid. 
78 E.A. Plunkett, UN Fact-finding as a Means of Settling International Disputes, 9 VA.J.I.L. 
(1968-69), 154 
79 SC/9376, AFR/1720, Security Council Press Statement on Djibouti, Eritrea, 25 June 2008 
80 See Article 99 ofthe UN Charter 
81 See Article 98 of the UN Charter 
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instructed the Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission to the borders of 
the two countries. 82 
2.2.2 Peace-Enforcement 
Enforcement action is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security 
Council. The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the 
Expenses of the Organization affirmed that the Security Council is the only organ 
that can require enforcement by coercive action. 83 The enforcement actions could 
either be military or non-military. 
a. Non-Military Enforcement Actions 
Non-military enforcement actions are those actions the Security Council is 
mandated to take pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter. These include the 
imposition of diplomatic, economic and communication embargoes provided that 
there is a consensus among the permanent members of the Council.84 These 
measures are applied only when the Security Council determines that there is a 
threat to international peace and security, or a breach of the peace or act of 
aggression. 85 
The Council occasionally resorted to these measures. 86 The typical 
measures include economic embargoes including trade and financial embargoes.87 
Severing communications and diplomatic embargoes have also been imposed in 
82 Id, Supra note 79 
83 Lauterpacht, Supra note 19 at 292 
84 See Article 41 of the United Nations Charter 
85 See Article 41 of the UN Charter 
86 Jimenez De Arechaga, Supra note 26 at 1169 
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certain occasions. 88 The non-military enforcement measures are not limited to the 
aforementioned measures. The language of Article 41 suggests that the Security 
Council could take any type of non-military punitive measures not listed under 
Article 41.89 The establishment of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter are worth mentioning here.90 
Non-military enforcement measures have been increasingly resorted to 
following the end of the Cold War, which reinvigorated the UN Security 
Mechanism.91 • Yoshiro Matsui articulated the UN activism in the post-Cold War 
period as follow: 
The Gulf War symbolizes the UN activism after the end of the Cold War. 
The Security Council adopted many resolutions under Chapter VII of the 
Charter during and after the Gulf War, without being disturbed by the veto 
of its permanent members and this fact is highly appreciated ... as 
illustrating a 'rebirth' of the United Nation's collective security.92 
Schachter saw the end of the Cold War as one that 'raised more hopes for 
a more effective international legal order' and reinvigorated the enforcement 
powers of the Security Counci1.93 The 1993 Security Council financial, diplomatic 
and air transport embargoes against Libya in relation to the bombing of the 
PanAm Flight 1 03 over Lockerbie, 94 the 1992 Security Council authorization of 
88 See Article 41 of the UN Charter 
89Schachter, Supra note 20 at 15 
90 Note that establishment of ad-hoc criminal tribunal is not among the non-military enforcement 
measures listed under Article 41 
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the deployment of the UN Operation in Somalia,95 and the establishment of the 
International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in 199396 and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda97 are worth noting in this regard. 
b. Military-Enforcement Action 
This involves the use of armed force authorized under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. The resort to armed force is made when the Security Council 
considers that the non-military enforcement measures 'would be inadequate or 
have proved to be inadequate' .98 Article 42 sets the underlying principle on the use 
of force. It provides that the Security Council 'may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security' .99 The Charter further articulated three directives on the use of force: (1) 
prohibition of use or threat of use of force; (2) right of self-defense upon armed 
attack; and (3) the UN Security Council's legal monopoly on the use of force. 100 
The general idea of the use of force is not so unique for the UN. Its 
predecessor, i.e. the League of Nations, for example deployed an international 
force on the occasion of Saar Territory Plebiscite in 1935. 101 What makes it 
different at least theoretically is the newly devised framework that would allow 
95 S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. 
96 S/RES/827 (1993), 25 May 1993 
97 S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994 
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future military action through the employment of standing forces under the 
auspices of the UN. 102 
Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves the rights of individual or 
collective self-defense for states until the UN Security Council takes measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. 103 Beside the reporting 
obligations to the Security Council, the most important caveat is that the self-
defense measure shall not in any way prevent the actions of the Security Council 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. 104 
However, the fact that the armed forces contemplated under Article 43 
have not yet been made available to the Security Council constrained the Council 
from authorizing military action. 105 Nonetheless, on some occasions the Council 
authorized member states to use their troops to take military measures. 106For 
example, in 2008 the Security Council authorized states, regional and 
international organizations to 
take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off 
the coast of Somalia ... by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft and 
through seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related 
. d. h . . f . 107 eqmpment use m t e commissiOn o piracy .... 
The practical implementation of such authorizations pretty much depends 
on the nature of the problem and more importantly on the political will of those 
states that could afford to take the contemplated military measures. This situation 
102 Id at 1107 
103 See Article 51 ofthe UN Charter 
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raised charges of double standard in the practical implementation of the 
i". h" h. . 108 en1orcement measure, w 1c 1s uncertam. 
More importantly, the Cold War effectively prevented the UN from 
assuming an activist role in maintaining international peace and security. 109 The 
obstructive use of the veto power in the Security Council significantly prevented 
the implementation of Article 43 and resort to enforcement measures. 110 
Consequently, Chapter VII was little used during the Cold War era. 111 
The collective security system embodied under the UN Charter was rather 
largely taken over by what White designated as "a-balance-of-power system 
based on collective defensive alliances". 112 The underlying philosophical 
differences between the two systems lie on the means pursued to secure the 
stability of the global security system and the principal motives of states for their 
action. 
Collective security seeks stability through the general observance of law, 
while the balance of power system seeks it through the curbing of excessive 
power. 113 In the balance of power system, states act out of their national interests. 
But state's action under the collective security scheme is presumptively 
undertaken for the benefit of all states to restore or maintain international peace 
d . 114 an secunty. 
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Therefore the military sanction contemplated under Chapter VII within the 
framework of Article 43 has become a dead letter because of the lack of 
implementation of Article 43 of the Charter. 115 This is mainly attributed to the 
prevailing international political climate since the earliest day of the UN, 116 
especially the political rift among the permanent members of the Security 
Council, eroding the confidence and reliance of the international community on 
the UN security system. 117 
The issue was however on the agenda of the UN since the aftermath of its 
establishment. The US Deputy Permanent Representative to the Military Staff 
Committee, Herschel V. Johnson, made a forceful statement on June 4, 1947 
expressing his concern that the Security Council will be unable to fulfill its 
responsibilities as the enforcement organ of the UN until the Article 43 special 
agreements are signed. 118 Few years later the General Assembly of the UN took 
an optimistic view through the adoption of the United for Peace Resolution in 
1950. The Resolution pointed out that the UN still has "at its disposal means for 
maintaining international peace and security" pending the conclusion of the 
Article 43 Special Agreements. 119 
In 1992, former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali tabled an agenda tor 
peace, advocating a more forceful method for applying Charter principles to 
115 Jimenez De Arechaga, Supra note 25 at 1171 
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future hostilities. 120 He suggested the establishment of a permanent body that 
would be capable of quickly responding to threats to international peace. 121 This 
is the body that was envisioned under Article 43 of the UN Charter, but never saw 
the light of the day. Such arrangement is also believed serve as a deterrent to 
future threats to peace. 
2.2.3 Peacekeeping 
The peacekeeping system is not contemplated in any specific provision of 
the Charter. 122 It rather evolved in response to the political environment during 
the Cold War era. 123 The 1950 landmark resolution of the General Assembly, 
known as the Uniting for Peace Resolution, asserted that the General Assembly 
could still take action if the Security Council fails to act, owing to the negative 
vote of a permanent member, in a case where there appears to be a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 124 Accordingly, the General 
Assembly may immediately consider the matter with a view to recommending to 
Members for collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and 
0 125 security. 
Following the adoption ofthis resolution, the Security Council itself relied 
upon the resolution to call emergency meeting of the General Assembly when 
lack of unanimity of its permanent members prevented it from exercising its 
120Slomanson, Supra note 100 at 476 
121 Id 
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primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 126 
The 1960 Security Council resolution on the question of Congo is noteworthy 
here. 127 
The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first armed UN 
peacekeeping force mandated by the General Assembly of the UN to secure and 
supervise cessation of hostilities, and to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian 
and Israeli forces. 128 Since 1948, there have been a total of 69 UN peacekeeping 
operations around the globe. 129 
Even if authorizing peacekeeping operation is not explicitly referred as the 
power of the General Assembly under the Charter, the International Court of 
Justice recognized the power of the Assembly to organize peacekeeping 
operations by means of recommendations to states or to the Security Council, or 
to both. 130The court based its argument on Articles 11 (2) and 35. While Article 
11 (2) entrusted the General Assembly with the power to discuss and make 
recommendations on any questions relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, Article 35 gives the same power to the Assembly on specific 
cases brought to the attention of the General Assembly. 131 It should be noted here 
126 See United Nations Security Council Resolution on the question of Congo, S/4526, 157 (1960), 
17 September 1960 
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that the General Assembly could not deploy peacekeeping force without the 
consent of the host country. 132 
Though initially inaugurated by the General Assembly 133, the Security 
Council has subsequently endorsed the practice of UN peacekeeping operations 
and now peacekeeping operations are principally authorized by the Security 
Council. 134 
The scope of its mandate is determined on account of the nature of the 
specific conflict and the specific challenges it presents. 135 During the Cold War 
era, the mandates of the peacekeeping operations were limited to maintaining 
ceasefires, serving as a buffer and stabilizing situations on the ground, with a 
view to facilitating the peaceful resolution of the conflict at the political level. 136 
Over the years, this traditional mission expanded to include 'complex 
multidimensional' undertakings necessary for laying out the foundations for 
sustainable peace and effective implementation of comprehensive peace 
agreements. The expanded enterprises include building institutions of governance, 
human rights monitoring, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration of former combatants. 137 
132Lauterpacht, Supra note 19 at 294 
133 Jimenez De Arechaga, Supra note 26 at 1170 
134 United Nations, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND 
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With changes in the nature of conflicts especially after the end of the Cold 
War, 138 the UN peacekeeping, which was originally employed for dealing with 
inter-state conflicts, has been increasingly applied to intra-state conflicts. The 
mandate has also been extended to include protecting humanitarian operations 
during continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations and pressing the parties 
to achieve national reconciliation. 139 The 1992 United Nations Operation in 
Somalia is notable in this regard. 140 
Though peacekeeping had encountered challenges followed by reflection 
and adaptation to the evolving demands for complex operations, it has become 
UN's most successful "standard bearers" over the course of time. 141 It is now a 
key UN security mechanism to manage complex crises that pose a threat to 
international peace and security. 142 Nevertheless the UN has not yet been 
successful in setting a generally accepted standard for the setting up of any new 
peacekeeping forces. 143 
Though the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations is not questioned, there 
IS still substantial disagreement on the specific legal basis of this entrenched 
activity. 144 It is interesting to note that even the UN resolutions authorizing 
peacekeeping operations did not make specific reference to any provisions of the 
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Charter until recently where reference to Chapter VII were made when the 
deployments were authorized into volatile post-conflict setting where the state is 
not in a position to maintain security and public order. 145 
The second Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjold, referred it 
as a "Chapter Six and a Half' operation placing it between the two broad UN 
security mechanisms, i.e. Pacific Settlement of Disputes and Collective 
Enforcement Action. 146 
The position of the UN Secretariat on the subject is reflected in the official 
document of the UN entitled, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: 
Principles and Guidelines,' published in 2008. It makes a general assertion that 
the legal basis of such measure, i.e. establishing peacekeeping operation, is found 
in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. 147 The document further 
contends that 'linking United Nations peacekeeping with a particular Chapter of 
the Charter can be misleading for the purpose of operational planning, training 
and mandate implementation' .148 It appears that the Secretariat attempted to avoid 
the legal issue reducing it into a mere operational one. 
At this juncture it is important to point out the role of the Secretary-
General in the system of peacekeeping. The Security Council exercised its power 
under Article 99 on a number of occasions to assign the Secretary-General for the 
145 United Nations, Supra note 134 at 14 
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organization and administration of UN peacekeeping operations of varwus 
kinds. 149 
In conclusion, the system of peacekeeping is not a peace enforcement 
operation as envisaged under Article 42. 150Rather it is a peacekeeping operation 
carried out with the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict and later 
developed as an entrenched UN activity in lieu of the peace enforcement 
contemplated under Article 42. 151 
2.2.4 Peace building 
Peace building is basically a post-conflict measure aimed at solidifying 
peace and building trust and interaction among former foes with a view to 
avoiding a relapse into conflict. 152 To use the language of former UN Secretary-
General Boutros Ghali, peace building measures are aimed at establishing 
structures to 'strengthen and solidify peace' .153 Peace building measures include 
demilitarization, small arms control, institutional reform, improved police and 
judicial systems, human rights monitoring, electoral reform and social and 
. d I . . . t54 economic eve opment activities. 
In the foregoing discussion, we already highlighted the extension of 
peacekeeping forces' mandate to include some of these peace-building activities. 
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Under those circumstances, the UN already has an entree to undertake the peace-
building activity. This makes the task of the UN much easier. But this is not 
always true. If no peacekeeping operation is on the ground, the situation is more 
difficult as peace-building measures require the consent of the concerned parties. 
In 2005, the UN General Assembly and the Security Council concurrently 
established Peace-building Commission as an intergovernmental advisory 
body. 155 The main purposes of the Commission include bringing together all 
actors to marshal resources; suggesting and advising on integrated strategies for 
post conflict building and recovery; focusing on the required reconstruction and 
institution-building efforts for recovery from conflict, and improving the 
coordination of all relevant actors. 156 As articulated in the introductory paragraphs 
of the founding resolution, 'achieving sustainable peace' is at the center of laying 
out the coordinated and integrated approach towards peace building. 157 
The Commission has a Standing Organizational Committee whose 
membership is drawn from permanent and non permanent members of the 
Security Council, the members of Economic and Social council, top providers of 
UN assessed and voluntary contributions, top providers of military personnel and 
civilian police to UN Missions, and Members elected based on considerations of 
regional representation and experience in post-conflict recovery. 158 
It is interesting to note that the system requires participation of almost all 
concerned parties in country specific meetings of the Commission. These include 






the country under consideration, states engaged in the post-conflict process relief 
efforts and/or political dialogue, relevant regional and sub-regional organizations, 
the major financial, troop and civilian police contributors, Senior UN 
representative in the field and relevant regional and international financial 
institutions. 159 The resolution further reqmres invitation of the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors at these meetings. 160 
2.3 The Place of regional security mechanisms under the UN Charter 
The Charter of the United Nations sets the underlying legal framework for 
the global-regional security cooperation. Of particular significance are Chapter 
VIII, Article 2(4), Article 24 and Article 103 ofthe Charter. 161 
The Charter explicitly confers primary responsibility to the UN Security 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, 162 which the 
Security Council jealously guards. Almost all of the Council's resolutions relating 
to international peace and security consistently reiterate this principle. 
Accordingly, the actions of regional organizations are required to remam 
consistent with this principle in all cases. 163 This is what Berman and Sams 
characterized as basically a subsidiary role of regional organizations in the 
. f. . 1 d . 164 mamtenance o mternatwna peace an secunty. 
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Chapter VIII of the Charter addresses the anomaly under the regime of the 
League of Nations whereby regional organizations were not accorded any role in 
the area of peace and security. 165 According to the Secretary General of the UN, 
the raison d'etre of Chapter VIII is, indeed, "to ensure that global and regional 
collective security is mutually complementary" and to optimize the total 
endeavors of the international community for securing peace. 166 
Chapter VIII of the Charter provides the framework for a decentralized 
enforcement system, endorsing the legitimacy of regional arrangements provided 
that the arrangements or their activities are consistent with the UN Charter. 167 
Hence, one may contend that the UN recognizes concurrent as well as residual 
responsibility of the regional organizations in the maintenance of international 
peace and security provided that their founding treaty permits them. 168 Moore 
supported this view arguing, "[ r ]egional organizations may exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction, at least in the absence of United Nations action terminating regional 
. . d. . ,169 
JUflS lCtlon. 
Chapter VIII also encourages regional organizations to peacefully settle 
disputes amongst their members. 170 It devolves enforcement powers, allocated to 
the Security Council under Chapter VII, on regional organizations through 
delegated authority. As such, the UN Charter explicitly prohibits regional 
165 Ademola, Supra note 161 at 59 
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organizations from taking enforcement action without the authorization of the 
Security Council. 171 
Nevertheless the post-Cold War Era has witnessed a trend where regional 
organizations claim legal competence for enforcement actions on the basis of their 
founding treaties, without deference to the Security Council. 172 The African 
Union (AU) is not an exception in this regard. The Director of the Peace and 
Security Department of the AU Commission, in response to this issue, argued that 
the Union is not an arm of the UN and hence the Union will not wait for UN to 
authorize actions. 173 This argument may be justified taking into account the new 
grounds for AU intervention, i.e. war crimes, genocide and crime against 
humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order. 174 Accordingly it is 
contended that whether the AU seeks authorization or not would not make a 
difference since the grounds for intervention under the AU are beyond the 
purview of the Security Council. 175 
The legality of AU's enforcement actions should also be considered in 
light of the UN Charter. With regard to AU, it is contended that practice of the 
UN Security Council in delegating enforcement functions to regional 
organizations, including the AU/OAU for addressing regional crises and the fact 
that the AU/OAU actions in this area enjoyed close support from the UN would 
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mean that these actions have been deemed consistent with the UN Charter176and 
that AU's right to intervention in cases of international crimes is not conditioned 
on the determination of threats and breaches of international peace and security. 
In fact, if the situation presents danger to international peace and security, the 
issue falls under the domain of the Security Council, in which case any 
enforcement action by the Security Council will require authorization from the 
Security Council. 
It is important to note that the adoption of this approach by the AU was 
not aimed at usurping the competence of the Security Council but was a 
demonstration of their concern that the Council should not abrogate its primary 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability when it comes to 
Africa. 
The UN-regional organizations relations during the Cold War era was 
characterized as competitive primarily because of the suspiCIOn and fierce 
competition between the Eastern and Western blocs 177. The end of Cold War and 
the ensuing proliferation of regional conflicts created a fertile ground for 
cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. 178 Moreover, it 
increased the security responsibilities of the UN, 179 which, in turn, has burdened 
regional organizations with more responsibilities in the prevention, resolution and 
management of conflicts. Boutros Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace, argued that 
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regional organizations could more easily work together with the United 
Nations. 180 He further argued that regional action 'as a matter of decentralization, 
delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the 
burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, 
consensus and democratization in international affairs.' 181 
There is a general view, also endorsed by the Security Council, that 
"regional organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of many 
conflicts closer to home and to influence the prevention or resolution, owing to 
their knowledge of the region." 182 This represents a shift from a global security 
management to regional actors. AU's decision to send AU force to Somalia 
illustrates the contours of this emerging regional focus. 
Meetings thus far convened at different levels (i.e. Security Council, 
General Assembly and Secretariats of the UN and regional organizations) over the 
subject matter resulted in the development of agreed upon guidelines that govern 
the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. 183 These include: 
the supremacy of the Charter in governing the partnership, the 
primary responsibility of the Council in international peace and 
security, the need for consistency and impartiality by both the 
United Nations and all partner organizations, the need for 
flexibility and pragmatism, and the need for the partnership to 
reflect comparative advantage of all, developing an effective 
division of labor in ... operational collaboration. 184 
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UN and regional organizations have shared responsibilities within the 
framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. However, a de facto division of 
labor emerged over the course of time. Former UN Secretary General Boutros 
Ghali believed that regional organizations pursue the political aspects of the 
problem, i.e. peacemaking, while the role of the UN is focused on peacekeeping 
operations. 185 There is now even a very interesting trend with regard to 
peacekeeping operations whereby the de facto division of labor is such that 
regional organizations pursue rapid deployment while UN deploys the blue 
helmet forces. 186 
185Benjamin Rivlin, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE UN SYSTEM FOR 
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Chapter 3 
The African Union Regional Security Mechanism 
This Chapter exarnmes norms and institutions developed under the 
auspices of the African Union (AU), dealing with security challenges on the 
African continent. It especially focuses on the possibilities these norms and 
institutions offer to the UN in the discharge of its mandate in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, in the face of the 21st century security challenges 
facing the African continent. 
The concept of collective security was first introduced in Africa in early 
60s when the Great African leader, Dr. K warne Nkrurnah, proposed the 
establishment of an African High Command as part of his initiative to form an 
African Union governrnent. 1 Drawing lessons from the circumstances that led into 
the deployment of UN Peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Dr. Nkrurnah advocated for management of African security by Africans 
thernselves.2 
The African countries apparently moved to a new era taking charge of the 
regional security issues when they adopted the OAU Mechanism of Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993.3 This may arguably be a result 
of political maturity on the part of African nations. 
1 Margaret A. Vogt , Regional arrangements, the United Nations and Security in Africa, in 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS, United 
Nations University Press, 1999, 295, 295 
2 ld at 296 
3KithureKindiki, , The normative and institutionaljramework of the African Union relating to the 
protection of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security: A critical 
appraisal, 3 AFR. HUM.RTS. L.J. 97 (2003), 97,98 
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The OAU mechanism was put in place to address the challenges posed by 
armed conflicts in Africa. 4 Its aim was not limited to developing an institutional 
mechanism of collective African action for conflict management, but also to 
effectively coping with the significant increase in intemal conflicts as compared 
to inter State conflicts.5 
As stressed in the Declaration on the Establishment, within the OAU, of a 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, adopted by the 
29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
OAU, held in Cairo, from 28 to 30 June 1993, conflicts have brought about death 
and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families, 
and forced millions of people into a drifting life as refugees and internally 
displaced persons. 6 
OAU's approach which it pursued as a principle was to take the first 
initiative in approaching the UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an 
emergency in the continent. 7 In case UN is unresponsive, the OAU resorts to 
preliminary action while continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from 
the UN. 8 
4 ASS/ AU/Decl. 2 (1), The Durban Declaration In Tribute To The Organization Of African Unity 
On The Occasion OfThe Launching OfThe African Union, 9-10 July 2002 
5 PSC/PR/2.(CCCVII), Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Partnership 
between the African Union and the : United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater 
Strategic and Political Coherence,, 9 January 2012. 7-8 
6 AHG/Deci.3(XXIX), Declaration on the Establishment, within the Organization of African 
Unity, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, , 28 to 30 June 
1993 
7EXP/ASF-MSC/2, (I) Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and 
the Military Staff Committee, Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff, 15-16 May 
2003, I, See http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/asf/documents.htm (Last 
visited, 02/18/20 13) 
8 Id 
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The adoption of this Mechanism not only uplifted OAU's political 
significance but also enabled the organization to engage in a number of conflict 
situations in the Continent.9 Nevertheless, OAU is criticized for its failure to help 
with a number of conflict situations, including the genocide in Rwanda, the civil 
war in Liberia, the crisis in Burundi or the conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). 10The nature and complexity of the conf1icts in Africa, revealed the 
limitations of the Mechanism, especially its limitation to providing for the 
deployment of peacekeeping operations. The efforts deployed in this regard also 
formed part of the plans to transform the OAU into the AU. 
In September 1999, the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi requested 
the 41h extraordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government in Sirte, Libya to discuss the formation of a 'United States of 
Africa'. 11 The OAU Assembly, which under the theme "strengthening OAU 
capacity to enable it to meet the challenges of the new millennium," 12 endorsed 
the request, and adopted the Sirte Declaration, which inter alia called for the 
establishment of a new continental organization. 13 
About a year later, the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government 
adopted the founding instrument ofthe African Union, i.e. the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union. 14 The African Union (AU) replaced its predecessor, the 
9 Supra note 5 
10 A A bass& M Bacterin, Towards effective collective security and human right protection in 
Africa: An assessment of the Constitutive Act of the new African Union'(2002), 49 
NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, 112 
11 EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.l, Sirte Declaration, See 
http://www. iag-agi.org/bdtidocs/sirte declaration. pdf (Last visited, 02/27/201 3) 
12 A bass, Supra note I 0 
nSirte Declaration, Supra note II, See Article 8(i) 
14See the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
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Organization of African Unity (OAU) on July 9, 2002, upon its formal launching 
as an umbrella organization for the African continent. 15 This period perhaps 
marked the end of the OAU, i.e. the organization that had united African nations 
on the Pan-Africanist ideals since 1963. 16 
In designing the Constitutive Act, the African nations made efforts to 
adapt the structures and resources of the continent to the prevailing situation and 
to the new challenges resulting from the changes that had taken place in the 
international system. 17 The preparatory documents for the AU Constitutive Act 
suggest that the AU Constitutive Act was a response to the changes taking place 
globally. 
An important centerpiece of the OAU's reform was in the area of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution that culminated in the foundation of a 
more permanent legal and institutional framework. 18 AU now represents "a 
continental mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution." 19 It 
occupies a central position in the international security architecture; and becomes 
an indispensable pillar of multilateralism.20 
The founding instrument of AU, i.e. the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, acknowledges the scourge of conflicts in the continent as a major 
15Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Institutional Structure of the Afi·ican Union: A Legal Analysis, 
CAL. W. INT'L L.J., 72 (2002) 
16 Corinne A. A. Packer and Donald Rukare , Current Development: The New 
African Union and Its Constitutive Act, 96 A.J.I.L. 365, 366 
17 Supra note 5 at 6 
18 The first attempt by the OA U to institutionally address the issue of peace and security in the 
region was the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution in 1993. 
19 Ad Hoc Working Group of the Security Council on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in 
Africa, Concept for a Seminar on the Cooperation between United Nations and African Regional 
Organizations in the fields of Peace and Security 
20 Supra note 5, 21 
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impediment to the socio-economic development of Africa. 21 As such, the Act 
provides the promotion of peace, security and stability on the African Continent 
as one of the major objectives of the Union. 22 This demonstrates that peace and 
security is a central concern for African leaders, for this is a prerequisite for the 
development ofthe continent and the well-being of its peoples. 
The AU Constitutive Act recognized the primary jurisdiction of the UN in 
the maintenance of international peace and seeurity.23 Concerning local disputes, 
prior to referral to the Security Council, members of regional organizations, such 
as the AU, need to exhaust the available remedies in the regional system.24 
Article 52(2) of the UN Charter supports this view.25 
Despite AU's positive move in designing Africa's security architecture, 
the AU Assembly surprisingly failed to incorporate within the founding 
instrument of the AU an organ responsible for the maintenance of regional peace 
and security?6 It was in July 2001 that the AU Assembly adopted a declaration 
incorporating the 1993 OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management 
and Resolution as an organ of AU. The Assembly particularly noted that the 
Mechanism was an organ within the OAU that constituted an integral part of the 
21 Constitutive Act of the African Union 
221d. Art. 3(t) 
23 See Article 3(e) ofthe Constitutive Act ofthe African Union. The provision provides that one of 
the objectives of the African Union is to encourage international cooperation taking due account 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
24 John Norton Moore, THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, DOCUMENTS ON 
REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS, (1997), 351-2 
25 Article 52(2) of the UN Charter provides, "The Members of the United Nations entering into 
such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific 
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements before referring them to the 
Security Council." 
26Udombana, Supra note 15 at 122 
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declared objectives and principles of the AU, thus reaching a decision to 
incorporate it as one of the organs of the AU. 
The OAU Heads of State and Government in its 2000 Solemn Declaration 
on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation, agreed 
on fundamental principles to govern cooperation in security among member 
states. 27 
This was followed by the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
(hereinafter referred to as PSC protocol) that formally established Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) as an organ primarily responsible for the maintenance of 
regional peace and security.28 The PSC Protocol entered into force on 26 
December 2003. 29 
In the words of J egede, the adoption of the PSC Protocol in 2002 "marked 
the peace and security architecture of the African Union (AU)."30 Africa perhaps 
reinvigorated the regional security mechanism with the adoption of the PSC 
Protocol. 
The PSC Protocol, while acknowledging the positive contributions by the 
OAU conflict prevention mechanism, reflected upon many sources of potential 
instability and uncertainty that remain, and committed to address those through 
the PSC mechanism. 
27 Supra note 4 
28 Doc. A/234 (xxxviii), AU Assembly Decision On The Establishment Of The Peace And Security 
Council Of The African Union, 10 July 2002 
29 See list of OAU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters, http://www.au.int/en/treaties (Last 
visited on 01/2112013) 
30AdernolaJegede, African Union Peace and Security Architecture: Can the Panel of the Wise 
Make a Difference, 9 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. (2009) 409,409 
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About a year later, the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union was adopted. 31 The Protocol formally listed the PSC as a 
standing organ ofthe AU, replacing the OAU Central Organ. 32 The Protocol also 
broaden the scope of intervention power by the Union by adopting an amendment 
to Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act to extend the grounds of intervention to 
include 'a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the 
member state of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security 
Council. ,33 However, the Protocol on the Amendment of the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union has not yet entered into force. 34 Only 28 member states had 
deposited instruments of ratification as of August 27, 2014, and the Protocol has 
not yet entered into force. 35 
The vital tasks of the peace and security architecture of the AU include: 
anticipation and prevention of conflicts; promotion and implementation of peace-
building; post-conflict reconstruction; coordination and harmonization of 
continental efforts in the tight against terrorism; and the promotion and 
encouragement of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 36 
Different organs of the AU, including the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government and the Executive Council, have important roles in the peace and 
31 See The Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, July II, 2003 
32ld, Article 5 
33 Id at Article 4(h) 
34 List of Countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol on the Amendments to the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, See 
(Last visited on 02/l9/2013) 
35Amendments to the Constitutive Act ofthe African Union, Supra note at Article 5 
36The Secretary-General, Supra note 9, at Para. 8 
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security structure of the AU. The Assembly, which is the supreme organ of the 
AU, is entrusted with the powers of 'managing conflicts' and 'restoringpeace' 
under the ConstitutiveAct of the African Union.37 The Assembly delegated its 
power to the AU Executive Council, which is composed of the Foreign Ministers 
of member states ofthe African Union.38 
The Chairperson of the AU Commission IS entrusted with important 
responsibilities in the area of peace and security. The AU Constitutive Act and the 
PSC Protocol specifically define the role of the Chairperson with regard to 
conflict prevention and resolution including the maintenance of peace, security 
and stability on the continent. These include taking his/her own initiative to use 
regional mechanisms to prevent potential conflicts, resolve actual conflicts, 
promote peace building, and post conflict reconstruction.39 
The Chairperson of the AU Commission is also mandated to bring any 
matter that is relevant for the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa 
to the attention of the AU Peace and Security Council or the Panel of the Wise.40 
The PSC Protocol requires the Chairperson to use the information gathered under 
the Protocol's 'early warning system' to advise the AU Peace and Security Council 
on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend 
37 See Article 9(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
3& Id. 
39 See Article I 0(2)( c) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union, 9 July 2002 available at 
http:llwww.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol peace and security.pdf, (Last visited on 
02/23/20 13) 
40 Id at Article I 0(2) 
77 
the best course of action.41 Moreover, the Chairperson is responsible for ensuring 
the implementation and the follow up of decisions of the PSC.42 
The Chairperson indeed has a role in the selection of members of the 
Panel of the Wise. The PSC Protocol entrusted the Chairperson with the power to 
select members of the Panel of the Wise.43 
Another important aspect of the Chairperson's role in the area of peace 
and security is the use of his/her good offices to prevent potential conflicts, 
resolve actual conflicts and promote peace-building and post-conflict 
. 44 reconstructiOn. 
The Chairperson of the AU Commission is further entrusted with 
additional responsibilities by the various organs of the AU from time to time. 
Noteworthy is the 2004 Decision of the Assembly of the Heads of State and 
Government of the AU, which instructed the Chairperson to take the necessary 
measures to operationalize all aspects of the PSC Protocol including in particular 
the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African 
Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the areas 
of peace and security, and to report to the Executive Council and the Assembly on 
the progress made in this direction. 45 
41 Id at Article 12(5) 
42 Id at Article I 0(3) 
43 Id at Article 11 (2) 
44 ld. 
45 Assembly/ AU/2 (III), AU Assembly Decision On The Operationalization Of The Protocol 
Relating To The Establishment Of The Peace And Security Council Of The African Union, 6-8 
July 2004 
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However, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of regional peace 
and security rests on the PSC. 
3.1 The Five Pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
The AU Constitutive Act and Protocol on the Establishment of the 
Peace and Security Council provide the basis for the African Peace and 
Security Architecture.46 The five main pillars comprise the Peace and 
Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force (ASF), 
the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the African Peace 
Facility.47 The African Union actively pursued the development, 
operationalization and institutionalization of these pillar structures.48 
3.1.1 Peace and Security Council 
The adoption of the PSC Protocol marked a turning point, strengthening 
the powers of the AU m matters of conflict prevention and 
resolution.49 Subsequent to the election of the PSC members in March 2004, the 
PSC was officially launched on 25 May 2004, ending the legacy of the OAU 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism that had been in 
place since 1993.50 
The Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the key pillar of the 
African peace and security architecture, is a standing decision-making organ for 
46 The Secretary General, Report of the Seminar on Cooperation between the United Nations and 
the African Regional Organizations in the field of Peace and Security, (Dec. 15, 2005) 
47 Id 
48 PSD/EW/CEWS Handbook, The CEWS Handbook, African Union Continental Early Warning 
System, February 2008 
49 Supra note 5 at 7-8 
50 See Article 22(1) of the PSC Protocol 
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the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent. 51 It is a 
legitimate mandating authority under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 52 It is also 
responsible for facilitating timely and efficient response to cont1ict and crisis 
situations in Africa. 53 Its powers and responsibilities are defined by the PSC 
Protocol. 54 
Under Article 2 (1) of the PSC Protocol, PSC IS defined as 
"a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and 
efficeint response to conflict and crisissituations in Africa". The objectives of the 
Peace and Security Council include the anticipating and pre-empting of armed 
conflicts, preventing massive violations of fundamental human rights, promotion 
and encouragement of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, 
human rights, the respect for the sanctity of human life and international 
humanitarian law. 55 The PSC protocol establishes an organic link between 
conflict prevention, on the one hand, and good governance, rule of law, protection 
of human rights and freedoms, and respect for the sanctity of human life, on the 
othcr. 56 
In order to achieve these objectives, the PSC is entrusted with broad 
mandates that include early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace 
51 Supra note 5 at 7-8 
52 EXP/ASF-MSC/2 (!), Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force 
and the Military Staff Committee, Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff, 15-16 May 
2003, 4, See (Last 
visited, 02/18/2013) 
53 ld at 8 
54 Supra note 5 at 8-9 
55 See Article 3 of the PSC Protocol 
56 Art. 7(1)(1) ofthe PSC Protocol 
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building, and post-conflict reconstruction functions. 57 In January 2007, the AU 
Assembly adopted a decision calling upon the PSC "to pursue its efforts, with 
special emphasis on conflict prevention, by examining potential conflict situations 
before they degenerate into conflicts."58There is a growing tendency of placing 
particular emphasis on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 
activities. 59 
The PSC IS an inevitable product of a political compromise among 
member states. 60 This organ, which is analogous to the UN Security Council, is 
composed of fifteen member states elected by the Assembly of the Heads of State 
and Government of AU on the basis of criteria enumerated under Article 5(2) of 
the PSC Protocol.61 These include; the commitment of member states to uphold 
the principles of the African Union; contribution to the maintenance of peace and 
security; capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibility; and, respect for 
constitutional governance, rule of law and human rights. Additionally, the 
Protocol puts in place a periodic review mechanism whereby the AU Assembly 
will evaluate fulfillment of the criteria and take appropriate action accordingly.62 
Though the Protocol has not specified possible actions by the Assembly, one may 
57 Id 
58 Assembly/AU/3(VIII), AU Assembly Decision On The Activities Of The Peace And Security 
Council Of The African Union And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 29-30 January 
2007 
59 Assembly/ AU/Dec. 3 (VI), African Union, Declaration on the Activities of the Peace and 
Security Council of the AU and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, 24 January 2006, 
available at http:/ jwww.africa-
union.org/root/au!Documents/Decisions/hog/ AU 6th_ ord _ KHARTOUM_Jan2006.pdf (Last 
visited, 12/02/2008) 
60 The writer of this paper had the chance to participate in the negotiation of the Protocol. 
61 Art. 5( I) of the PSC Protocol. The principles of equitable representation and rotation are also 
applied in electing the Council members. 
62 ld. 
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plausibly argue that it could extend up to removal from the Council membership. 
This provision is yet to be tested. 
Though all members have equal rights, there are two classes of 
membership in the PSC. Ten members are elected for a term of two years while 
five are elected for three years. This modality is triggered by the need to ensure 
continuity in the Council.63 
AU departed significantly from the OAU practice both in terms of 
organization and mandate. One of its major departures is the recognition of the 
AU's right of intervention in a member state. 64 The ambiguity surrounding 
humanitarian intervention appears to have prompted AU to include provisions in 
the Constitutive Act that provide for the possibility of AU intervention in certain 
grave circumstances. These circumstances include war crimes, genocide and 
crime against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order. 65 
In the words of Dejo, this shift apparently 'redresses the statutory 
inhibitions of its predecessor during threatening conflicts or incidents. ' 66 The 
1994 genocide that resulted in the death of over half a million Tutsis and 
moderate Hutu Rwandese in just 100 days and the massive human rights 
violations in Darfur, Sudan, are but only two recent events in Africa that signify 
the relevance of AU's right of intervention against genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes inside states. 
63 ld 
64 Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act 
65 !d. 
66Dejo0lowu, Regional Integration. Development. and the Afi·ican Union Agenda: Challenges, 
Gaps, and Opportunities, 13 TRANSNA T' L L. & CON TEMP. PROBS, (Spring 2003), 211, 222 
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Neither the Constitutive Act nor the PSC Protocol defines the listed 
grounds for intervention. The decision, rather, is left to the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the AU. 67 The Assembly is expected to resort to 
relevant international conventions and instruments in defining these crimes, 
although the Protocol doesn't specifically identify the relevant conventions.68 
Interventions by the PSC in the maintenance of regional peace and 
security take different forms. For instance, in 2005 the PSC suspended Togo from 
participating in the activities of all the organs of the AU 'until such a time when 
constitutional legality is restored'. 69 
The PSC is guided by principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 70 Shared principles with 
the UN include peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member states. The AU Constitutive Act also provides for 
humanitarian intervention, consisting of, the use of force by states or states to pre-
erupt or halt gross human rights violations leading to massive loss of lives, 
without the consent of the target state. 
As of October 27, 2014, PSC has already met 463 times, to address the 
security challenges facing the continent. 71 Since its launch in 2004, PSC has been 
67 Art. 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
68ld at Art. 7(1 )(e) 
69 AU Doc PSC/PR/Comm(XXV), 25 February 2005, para 3. Communique of the 25th meeting of 
the PSC 
70 See Art. 4 ofthe PSC Protocol 
71 PSC/PR.COMM.(CDLXIII), Communique of AU Peace and Security Council, 463'd Meeting, 
27 October 20 14 
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called upon to undertake peacekeeping missions to the Darfur region of western 
Sudan and Somalia.72 
3.1.2 Panel of the Wise 
The Panel of the Wise is another pillar for continental architecture of 
peace and security in Africa. The Panel was inaugurated on 18 December 2007.73 
It is established to assist the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission 
particularly in the areas of conflict prevention.74 
The setting up of the Panel of the Wise 'reflects the long-held notion of an 
African solution to African problems.' 75Proponents of this notion have premised 
their arguments on the values and practices from different settings of Africa on 
fl . . d 1 . 76 con 1ct preventwn an reso utwn. 
Gounden, Pillay and Mbugua defined this notion as follows: 
African solutionsto African conflicts' means that Africans should not only 
design theiragendas for peace and security: they should also own the 
processes for creatingsuch agendas and their implementation. Further, 
only through analysisand evaluation, understanding and development of 
an 'African identity' can African solutions to African conf1icts emerge. 77 
The establishment of the Panel is, therefore, a renaissance of African 
values in addressing its contemporary challenges. 
72 Benjamin Carvalho, Thomas Jaye, Kasumba Yvonne &WafulaOkumu , Peacekeeping in 
Afi'ica: The Evolving Roles of the Afi'ican Union and Regional Mechanisms, NORWEGIAN 
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (20 I 0), 13 
73 A Mazrui, Towards containing conflict in Afi'ica: Methods, mechanisms and values, EAST 
AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, (1995), 81-90 
74 See Article II (I) ofthe PSC Protocol 
75Jegede, Supra note 30 at 412 
76 Supra note 73 
77 Carvalho, Supra note 72 at 21 
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The Panel is mandated to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the 
Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, 
security and stability in Africa. 78 It is indeed entrusted a broader power to 
undertake appropriate action, either at the request of the PSC/the Chairperson of 
the AU Commission or on its own initiative, to "support the efforts of the Peace 
and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission for the 
prevention of conflicts, and to pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion 
and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa."79 
The Panel may also conduct shuttle diplomacy between parties unwilling 
to engage in formal talks; assist and advice mediation teams engaged in formal 
negotiations; and develop and recommend ideas and proposals that can contribute 
to promoting peace, security and stability on the continent. 80 As the advisory body 
of the PSC, the Panel's work is presumptively guided by the principles 
enumerated under Article 4 of the PSC protocol as the guiding principles of the 
PSC. 
The Panel is composed of five highly respected personalities from various 
segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to peace, security 
and development on the African continent. 81 The Chairperson of the AU 
Commission is entrusted with the power to select the members on the basis of 
regional representation. 82 However, the Chairperson is required to make 
78 See Article 11(3) ofthe PSC Protocol 
79 See Article 11(4) ofthe PSC Protocol 
80 Modalities of the Panel of the Wise, adopted by the Peace and Security Council at its I OOth 
meeting held on 12 November 2007, available at 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/modalitieseng.pdf 
81 See Article II (2) of the PSC Protocol 
82 Id 
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consultations with the member states concerned prior to the selection of the 
members. 83 The reference to consultation with concerned member states, though 
not defined in the instrument, should be interpreted in light of the regional 
representation requirement for the selection of the Panel members. The 
Chairperson should, therefore, consult with the countries of each region regarding 
the selection of the member from the respective region. 
Each term ofthe members is limited to three years.84 The political clout of 
the members of the Panel and the respect they command might provide the panel 
more leverage in discharging its security mandate. 
Some scholars argue that there is a potential overlap in the interaction of 
the Panel and Special envoys/representatives with the PSC and the Chairperson of 
the Commission.85 Despite the potential overlap, one should not, however, lose 
sight of the ad-hoc nature of special envoys while the Panel is a permanent 
institution with a broader mandate. 
The Panel meets as often as the circumstances may require. 86The Panel 
may also meet at any time upon the request of the PSC or the Chairperson of the 
Au C . . 87 omm1sswn. 
The effectiveness of the panel is criticized on account of its limited 
number of membership considering the level and spontaneity of conflicts and 
crises in Africa. For example, Jegede suggested broadening the Panel's 
s3 Id 
84 Id 
85Jegede,Supra note 30 at 422 
86 Modalities of the Panel of the Wise, Supra note 30 at Paragraph IV(3) 
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membership arguing that doing so "will offer an opportunity for more influence 
over conflict and crisis situations in Africa. "88 
3.1.3 African Standby Force 
In 2002, the late Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, tabled an 
initiative on the establishment of a single African army. 89 The framework 
document for the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) was adopted 
by the Third Session of African Chiefs of Defense Staff held in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, on 15-16 May 2003.90 A year later, the AU Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government approved the Policy Framework Document, on the establishment 
ofthe African Standby Force (ASF). 91 
ASF is envisioned as a tool to support the PSC in discharging "its 
responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and 
intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and U) of the Constitutive Act."92 As 
Majinge noted, ASF would "give teeth to the Council's peacekeeping efforts."93 
The PSC Protocol provides for its composition, mandate,chain of 
command, training, and role of AU member states in providingtroops and all 
forms of assistance and support.94 In addition to its functions in the context of 
preventive deployment and peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament 
88Jegede,Supra note 30 at 417 
89 Assembly/ AU/Dec.16 (II), Decision On The Operationalization Of The Protocol Relating To 
The Establishment Of The Peace And Security Council, July 2003 
9o Id 
91 Doc. EX.CL/110 (V), AU Assembly Decision On The African Standby Force (ASF) And The 
Military Staff Committee (MSC), 8-10 July 2004 
92 See Article 13(c) ofthe PSC Protocol 
93 Charles RizikiMajinge, The Future ol Peacekeeping in A/i"ica and the Normative Role of the 
African Union, GOETTING EN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2 (20 I 0) 2, 463, 485 
94 See Article 13 of the PSC Protocol 
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and demobilization, the ASF is also designed to provide humanitarian assistance 
to address the challenges of the civilian population in conflict areas.95 
The ASF is designed with a view to operate in six possible mission 
scenanos: 
(1) providing military advice to a political misswn, (2) AU observer 
mission co-deployment with a UN peacekeeping mission, (3) a stand-
alone AU observer mission, (4) a traditional peacekeeping or preventative 
deployment mission, (5) complex multidimensional peace operations, and 
( 6) peace enforcement or what the ASF Framework document refers to as 
. . . . 96 
mterventwn misswns. 
The detailed tasks of ASF and its modus operandi are, however, 
determined by the PSC on a case by case basis for each authorized mission.97 
ASF is composed of 'standbymultidisciplinary contingents, with civilian 
and military components intheir countries of origin and ready for rapid 
deployment at appropriatenotice. ' 98 It is, therefore, conceived along the lines of 
the UN "standby arrangement" where a state assumes the responsibility to train 
and equip contingents for peacekeeping operations for eventual deployment.99 AU 
has set up a Peace Fund to provide the necessary financial resources for the peace 
support mission including that of the ASF. 100 
The June 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AUand the 
African Regional Economic Communities was entered to make the ASF 
95 AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government Solemn Declaration on a Common Defence 
and Security Policy, 28 February 2004, See http://www.africa-
union.org/News Events/2ND%20EX%2QASSEM B L Y /Declaratiol}_%20on%20a%20Comm.M1% 
20 D~1}.:g2_QSec_J!_QJ(Last visited on 02/25/20 13) 
96 Supra note 52 
97 See Article 13 of the PSC Protocol 
98 See Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, 
99Majinge, Supra note 93 at 463 
100 See Article 21 of the PSC Protocol 
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operational on the basis of the Policy Framework on the Establishment of the 
African Standby Force. 101 The Memorandum reflects the commonunderstanding 
of the AU and the RECs that the latter serve as a crucial building block for the 
operationalization of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture. 102 
The Policy Framework on the Establishment of the African Standby Force 
and Military Staff Committee provides for the establishment of five regional 
brigades to constitute the African Standby Force. ASF comprise five regional 
brigades; namely, Economic Community of Central African States Standby 
Brigade, Eastern African Standby Brigade, Northern African Regional Capability, 
Southern African Development Community Brigade and ECOWAS Standby 
Force. 103 
A brigade is "the first level of military command where multiple arms and 
services are grouped under one HQ [Headquarter]." 104 Although some of these 
regional brigades are established under the auspices of regional economic 
communities like ECOW AS, SADC and the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), ASF peace operations are under the political control of 
the AU. 105 
101 See Memorandum of Understanding between the AUand the African Regional Economic 
Communities, June 2008, http://www.paxafrica.org/areas-of-work/peace-and-security-
architecture/peace-and-security-architecture-documents/mou-in-the-area-of-peace-and-securitv-
between-the-au-and-the-recs (Last visited 02/20/20 13) 
102Carvalho, Supra note 72 at 58 
103 Id at 57 
104 Supra note 52 at 5 
105Carvalho, Supra note 72 at 57 
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3.1.4 The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) 
CEWS is an important pillar of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture. It is envisaged under Article 12( 1) of the PSC Protocol, which 
provides the following: 
In order to facilitate the antiCipation and prevention of conflicts, a 
Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning 
System shall be established. 106 
A fundamental responsibility IS, therefore, bestowed upon the CEWS 
through the collection and analysis of data and information. Based on a closer 
reading of the PSC Protocol, CEWS functions could be summarized as 
information collection, information sharing, information analysis, coordination 
and harmonization. 
This early warning system helps the key institutions ofthe 
Union and other pillars of the peace and security architecture to properly 
discharge their responsibilities in the areas of maintenance of peace and 
• 107 secunty. 
The PSC Protocol further provides the following regarding the framework 
ofthe Continental Early Warning System: 
The Early Warning System shall consist of: 
a. an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as "The Situation 
Room", located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union and 
responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate 
early warning indicators module; and 
b. observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be 
linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the 
Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level 
and transmit the same to the Situation Room. 108 
106 See Article 12(1) ofthe PSC Protocol 
107 The CEWS Handbook, Supra note 48 at 7-8 
108 See Article 12(2) ofthe PSC Protocol 
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In July 2003, the AU Assembly invited the AU Commission to prepare a 
Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the Early Warning 
System provided for under the PSC. 109 After series of consultations, the 
Commission developed a draft Road-map for the operationalization of the 
Continental Early Warning System in July 2005. In its gth Ordinary Session of 
29-30 January 2007, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU 
finally endorsed the "Framework for the Operationalisation of the Continental 
Early Warning System" that was initially approved by the Executive Council of 
the African Union. 
As summarized under the CEWS Handbook, the purpose of the CEWS is 
"the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and 
security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to a number 
of principle users at the AU: the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC and 
other Departments within the Commission. Others include various organs 
and structures of the AU, namely the Pan-African Parliament, the Panel of the 
Wise and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights." 110 
3.1.5 The Peace Fund 
Article 21 of the PSC Protocol established the Peace Fund to provide 
"financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities 
related to peace and security". 111 The Peace Fund is one of the important pillars 
that make up the African Peace and Security Architecture(APSA). 
109 AU Assembly, Supra 89 
110 The CEWS Handbook, Supra note 48 at 16 
111 See Article 21 of the PSC Protocol 
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The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriations from the regular 
AU budget; voluntary contributions from Member States, international partners 
and other sources such as the private sector, civil society and individuals; as well 
as through fund-raising activities. 112 Article 21.3 of the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union requires 
the Chairperson of the AU Commission to raise and accept voluntary 
contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the AU's objectives 
and principles. The Peace Fund has become operational and receives funds for all 
P ds . D ... 1!3 eace an ecunty epartment activities. 
The Trust Fund, which is envisaged to be established within the broader 
Peace Fund, has not yet become operational. 114 This Trust Fund was anticipated to 
serve as a standing reserve for special projects in case of emergencies and 
unforeseen priorities. 115 
The contribution of African states to the Peace Fund between 2008-
2011 was only 2%. 116 The remaining 98% of the funding came from international 
donors. 117 This means that international donors provided 98 percent of the 
funding, making it difficult to institute African solutions to African problems. 
Given the challenges of sustainable funding for the AU, the Chairperson 
of the AU Commission brought to the attention of the Assembly of the Heads of 
112 See Article 21.2 of the PSC Protocol 
113 African Union Handbook, 2014, p.43 
114 Jd. 
115Id at 44 
116 Raymond Gilpin & Michelle Swearingen, Financing and Refocusing of African Union's Peace 
Fund, United States Institute of Peace, 24 June 2013, available at 




State and Government of the African Union about the urgent need to explore 
alternative means of financing in order to address the various socio-economic 
challenges facing the African Continent.ll8 
In July 2011, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
African Union requested the AU Commission to expeditiously set up a High 
Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the Union. 
At the May 2013 summit of the African Union the High-Level Panel on 
Alternative Sources of Funding the African Union, chaired by Former Nigerian 
President OlusegunObasanjo submitted their report, which included two 
innovative fundraising measures: a $1 0 levy on air travel and a $2 levy on hotel 
accommodations. 119 Although the proposals have received criticism from several 
African leaders for the potential negative impact on the tourism industry, 
the report was approved by the heads of state and was sent to finance ministers for 
feedback at the January 2014 meetings. Even if these proposals are eventually 
adopted, they are unlikely to resolve larger fund-raising challenges. 
3.2 Other important pillars of the AU Security Mechanism 
The African Union endeavored to further strengthen the continental 
security mechanism by taking further measures, 120 such as the adoption of a 
Common Defense and Security Policy, and, later on, the AU Non-aggression and 
118 Assembly/ AU/18(XIX), Progress Rep011 of the High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of 
Financing the African Union chaired by H.E. OlusegunObasanjo, Former President of Nigeria 
consultations with Member States, July 2012, I 
119 ld. 
120 Assembly/AU/Dec.71 (IV) (2005), Assembly of the African Union Decision on the Draft 
African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, 30-31 January 2005, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ ASSEMBLY EN 3Q%20 %2031 JANlJARY %;?02005 
AUC FOURTH ORDINARY Sl;::J;SlQf:Ln9.1, (Last visited 12/02/2008) 
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Common Defense Pact, which seeks to define a framework under which the 
Union intervenes or authorizes intervention in preventing or addressing situations 
of aggression in conformity with the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and 
the Common Africa Defense and Security policy. 121 AU also designed various 
mechanisms to address the many security challenges of the continent, including 
for terrorism, border problems, nuclear weapons proliferation, and coup d'etat. 
The following part provides an overview of these security mechanisms pursued 
by the AU. 
3.2.1 Common African Defense and Security Policy 
The AU Constitutive Act provides that the union shall function in 
accordance with the principles of the 'establishment of a common defense policy 
for the African Continent'. 122 In July 2002, the AU Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government requested the AU Chairman to establish a group of experts to 
examine and to make recommendation on all aspects related to the establishment 
of a common African defense and security policy. 123 
A year later, i.e. in July 2003, the Draft Framework for a Common African 
Defense and Security Policy was submitted for consideration by the Assembly. 124 
After a preliminary debate over the draft, the Assembly requested the AU 
121 African Union, African Union non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact, Art. 2(b), available 
at, 
http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/Non%20Aggression%20Common% 
20Defence%20Pact.pdf (Last visited, 12/02/2008) 
122 See Article 4U) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
123 Doc. Ass/ A U/3 (I) Add.4, Decision On A Common African Defence And Security, 9-10 July 
2002, available at (Last visited 
12/30/2008) 
124DOC.Assembly/ AU/6(11), Decision On The African Defence And Security Policy, July 2003, 
available at h!!Q_:_/L_\~ww.peaCfJ!U.orgLuploads/as_sembly_:?_u-dec-1 ~-jj-e.pdf (Last visited 
10/31/2014) 
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Commission to conduct further consultations with all stakeholders and finalize the 
Common African Defense and Security Policy for its consideration. 125 
On February 28, 2004, the AU Assembly adopted a Common Defense and 
Security Policy. 126 The Assembly further endorsed the proposal by the African 
States Ministers of Defense and Security to establish, within the framework of 
Article 14.2 of the Constitutive Act ofthe AU, a specialized Technical Committee 
comprising Ministers responsible for Defense and Security of the AU, to work 
with the Peace and Security Council, in the implementation of the Common 
African Defense and Security Policy and in addressing the complex issues of 
d . h . 127 peace an secunty on t e contment. 
The Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy is a 
proactive Declaration "based on the notion of human security rather than the 
narrow approach which perceives security solely as state security." 128 The 
Declaration provides for an interventionist policy to the security challenges of 
Africa. It also encourages "the conclusion and ratification of non-aggression pacts 
between and among African States and the harmonization of such agreements." 129 
3.2.2 African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact 
On January 31, 2005, the AU Assembly adopted the AU Non-aggression 
and Common Defense Pact. 130 The Pact gives due recognition to the gravity of the 
125 !d. 
126 AU Assembly, Supra note 95 
127 AU Assembly Decision, Supra note 91 
128 Jegede, Supra note 30 at409 
129 See Chapter III paragraph (t) of African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact 
130 AU Assembly, Supra note 120 
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impact of interstate and intra-state conflicts on peace, security, stability, and 
socio-economic development in the African continent. 131 
The AU Non-aggression and Common Defense Pact defines aggression 
and seeks to define a framework under which AU intervenes or authorizes 
intervention in preventing or addressing situations of aggression in conformity 
with the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and the Common Africa Defense 
d S . 1. 132 an ecunty po 1cy. 
3.2.3 Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 
AU recognized terrorism as a security challenge both to the African 
continent, and the international community at large. 133 Accordingly, AU has 
placed emphasis on the importance of a global approach in pursuance of the fight 
against international terrorism. 134 
Nevertheless, given the increasing threat posed by international terrorism 
on the security situation and the socio-economic development of the African 
continent, AU adopted various measures towards the prevention and combating of 
terrorism. 135 
These include the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism adopted in July 1999 in Algiers, Algeria, and the Protocol thereto, as 
well as the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in 
Africa (2002). 
131 African Union, Supra note 121 
132 Id at Article 2(b) 
133 Assembly/AU/Dec.l5 (II), Decision On Terrorism In Africa, I 0-12 July 2003, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY EN 10 12 July 2003 AUC %20TI1E SE 
COND ORDINARY SESSION O.pdf, (Last visited 02/25/2013) 
134Assembly/AU/8(II) Add. 11, AU Assembly Decision On The Elaboration Of A Code Of 
Conduct On Terrorism,, July 2003 
135 AU Assembly, Supra note 133 
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The AU Commission also elaborated a Model Law, following the Member 
States experts meeting held in Algiers, in December 2010. 136 The Model law is 
designed to guide member states to streamline and strengthen their national 
legislations to overcome this security challenge in the African continent. 137 The 
AU Commission is further entrusted with the responsibility to provide technical 
assistance to member states by availing the expertise required, including through 
the establishment of standby team of experts. 138 
Another innovative approach AU pursued to facilitate an enhanced and 
coordinated response to the terrorism threat was the establishment of the African 
Centre on the Research and Study on Terrorism (ACRST). 
AU also adopted various decisions condemning the acts of terrorism 
committed in the African soil. For example, in July 20 I 0, the AU Assembly 
adopted a decision condemning the terrorist attack perpetrated by Al Shabab 
terrorists on July 11, 20 I 0 killing and injuring innocent civilians in Kampala, 
Uganda. 139 The Assembly further expressed serious concern over the worsening 
of the scourge of terrorism and the threat posed by this situation to peace, security 
d b.1. . A~. 140 an sta 1 tty m mea. 
136Assembly/AU/Dec.369(XVII) AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And 
Security Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, Doc. 
Assembly/AU/4(XVII)30 June- I July 2011, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ Assembly_ AU_ Dec _363-390 --(XVII)_ E.pdf (Last 
visited I 0111/20 13) 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Assembly/AU/Dec.3li(XV), AU Assembly Decision On The Prevention And Combating Of 
Terrorism, 25-27 July 20 I 0 available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/diaspora/docs/audecision/summitJul?O I ODecisions.pdf (Last visited 
I 0/11 /20 13) 
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In January 2012, the AU Assembly expressed deep concern at the spate of 
terrorist attacks in different parts of Africa, in particular, in Nigeria. 141 The AU 
Assembly also anticipates the emerging linkages among terrorist groups, as well 
as between terrorist groups and criminal networks. 142 One typical example is the 
growing maritime piracy in the Mediterranean Sea, a major corridor for 
international sea trade, the follow-up on the decisions of the AU regarding the 
prohibition of the payment of ransom to terrorist groups, and the convening, in 
Algiers, Algeria, on 15 and 16 December 2010, of a meeting of experts from 
Member States to consider and adopt the draft African Model Law on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, prepared by the Commission. 143 
3.2.4 African Solidarity Initiative 
AU launched the African Solidarity Initiative, on July 13,2012. 144 It is an 
effort towards post-conflict reconstruction and development in order to 
consolidate peace where it has been achieved. 145 The African Solidarity Initiative 
is premised with the notion that African countries should complement the support 
of international development partners by directly taking part in offering assistance 
141 Assembly/AU/6(XVIII), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 29-30 January 2012, 
available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ ASSEMBL Y%20AU%20DEC%2039l %20-
%,20415%20(XVIIJ)%20 E.pdf 
(Last visited lOll 5/20 13) 
142 Id 
143 AU Assembly Decision, Supra note 136 
144 AU Assembly Decision, Supra note 142 
145 Assembly/AU/6(XIX ), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, , 15-16 July 2012, 
available at http://www.au. int/en/sites/default/files/ AssemblyttQJOA Lio/o20Des;_%20416-
449%2._Q{X.LXJ%20 E Final. pdf (Last visited 08/20/20 13) 
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in post-conflict reconstruction and development of AU member states emerging 
from conflicts. 146 
The African Solidarity Initiative is a culmination of the AU Policy on 
Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU PCRD) that was adopted by 
the Executive Council of the AU during its 9111 Ordinary Session held in Banjul, 
The Gambia, from 25 June to 2 July 2006. 147 The AU PCRD Policy was intended 
to serve as a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies 
that seek to consolidate peace, promote sustainable development and pave the 
way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from 
conflict. 148 Subsequent to the adoption of the policy, AU sent out missions to a 
number of African countries that emerged out of conflict with a view to 
evaluating their needs and facilitating the launching of the African Solidarity 
Initiative. 149 
3.2.5 AU Border Program (AUBP) 
AU has recognized the border problem in Africa as a security challenge 
for the continent. The border problem in Africa is the legacy of colonialism in the 
past two centuries. In June 2007, the AU Executive Council adopted the 
Declaration on the AU Border Programme (AUBP) with the overall objective of 
preventing conflicts and deepening integration on the continent. 150 The border 
146 Supra note 5 at 9 
147 Decision EX.CL!Dec. 302 (IX), Decision on the AU Policy Framework on Post-Conflict 
reconstruction and Development, 29 June 2006, available at http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-
cl-dec-302-ix-e.pdf, (Last visited I 0/20/20 14) 
148 Supra note 5 at 9 
149 Supra note 5 at 9 
150 EX.CL!Dec.370(Xl), AU Executive Council adopted the Declaration on the AU Border 
Programme, 25-29 June 2007, available at 
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program (a.k.a. AU Border Programme) was eventually launched in 2010. 151 The 
AUBP revolves around three main axes, namely: delimitation and demarcation of 
African borders where such an exercise has not yet taken place, development of 
cross border cooperation, and capacity building. 152 With regard to cross-border 
cooperation, the AU is working on a Draft Convention on Cross-border 
Cooperation. 153 
In view of the many challenges the African continent encounter, the AU 
Assembly set a new deadline for the completion of the demarcation of all African 
borders by 2017. 154 Note that the initial deadline set by the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and 
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) of July 2002, was 2012. 155 
This program is perhaps designed to address one of the root causes of 
interstate conflicts in Africa, i.e. border disputes. However this new deadline does 
not appear to be realistic taking into account the magnitude of the border 
problems in the continent. And yet, AU should be commended for designing this 
innovative approach to address the problem in a special and targeted manner. 
3.2.6 Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) 
In January 2005, AU Assembly endorsed the establishment of the 
Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA). 156 CISSA is 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/EX%20CL%20DEC%20348%70-
%20377%20'}o28Xl%29%20 E.pdf, (Last visited 10/25/2011) 
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designed to address Africa's myriad security, stability and developmental 
problems. 157 The Committee is structured under the Office of the Chairperson of 
the African Union Commission who shall be the recipient of reports from the 
1'8 CISSA Secretariat or other CISSA structures. ) 
3.2.7 AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
In January 2008, the Assembly of the Union adopted an AU Plan of 
Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention. A year later, the Heads of State 
and Government adopted a decision on the threat of drug trafficking in Africa, 
which recognizes that this phenomenon was becoming a major challenge to 
security and governance in Africa. 159 
3.2.8 The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
The African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) of 
1996 is another essential tool for the continent's collective security. The Treaty 
bans the testing, manufacturing, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of nuclear 
explosives in Africa. 16° Following the entry into force of the Treaty on 15 July 
2009, the AU Commission convened the first meeting of the State Parties on 4 
November 2010. 161 This was followed by the establishment of the African 
In The Office Of The African Union Commission Chairperson, 30-31 January 2005, available at 
http://www.peaceau.org/JJQ!oads/~semblv-au-dec-6£-iv-e.pdf (Last visited 10/1 0/2009) 
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158 !d. 
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160 See Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty), 11 
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http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Treaty En Aftjcan Nuclear W?J!non Free Zone AddisA 
baba Julyl995.pdf, last visited on 10/08/2014) 
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Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), which is primarily established to 
ensure States Parties' compliance with their undertakings. 162 
The Treaty of Pelindaba that established AFCONE mandates AFCONE, to 
collate States Parties annual reports, review the application of peaceful nuclear 
activities and safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency, bring into 
effect the complaints procedure, encourage regional and sub-regional cooperation, 
as well as promote international cooperation with extra-zonal States for the 
peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. 163 AFCONE has a 
Secretariat based in Pretoria, South Africa. 164 
Equally important are the various decisions and instruments pertaining to 
landmines, in particular the May 1997 Kempton Park Plan of Action on a 
Landmine Free Africa, as well as to small arms and light weapons. In this respect, 
it is important to point out the ongoing process towards the adoption of an African 
Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking 
of Small Arms and Light Weapons. 165 
3.3 African Sub-regional Organizations 
A proliferation of internal conflicts m the wake of the Cold War era 
coupled with the relative disengagement of the developed world from Africa led 
African sub-regional organizations to assume unprecedented role in conflict 
162 Id 
163 See Article 12 of the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 
164African Commission on Nuclear Energy, 
commission-on-nuclear-energyafcone#sthash. KSHsZQWU .dpuf, (last visited on I 0/08/2014) 
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management. 166 AU formally recognizes eight regional economic communities 
within the African Continent. These are the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD); the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOW AS); the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC); the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); 
the Eastern Africa Community (EAC); and the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CEN-SAD). 167 
Though most of these Regional Economic communities were originally 
established for economic purposes, a number of them have progressively included 
peace and security mandates in their objectives. Given the regional dimension of 
conflicts in Africa and their impacts on the neighboring states, they have a 
legitimate and compelling interest to broaden their mandates to include peace and 
security initiatives. 168 
3.3.1 ECOW AS Security Mechanism 
A. Background 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was 
founded on May 28, 1975 with the principal objective of achieving an 
"accelerated and sustained economic development of Member States" in West 
166HilaireMcCoubrey& Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, 
KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL(2000), 144 
167 
African Union,~~'-'--'-'-~=~= 
168 Fredrik Soderbaum& Rodrigo Tavares, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICAN 
SECURITY, (2001) Routledge, 7 
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Africa. 169 It was originally premised with the belief that regional cooperation and 
an inward looking approach could accelerate the economic viability of West 
African nations. 170 Out of the 55 African nations, 15 West African States are 
currently members ofECOWAS. 171 
Though security was an important Issue, the ECOW AS treaty did not 
originally contain an explicit provision that provides for a structured intervention 
in cont1icts. 172 Despite what its forefathers anticipated, ECOWAS spent a 
considerable part of its existence on resolving crises in Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Guinea Bissau and other troubled spots. 173 It has now become the most prominent 
sub-regional organizations engaged in peace enforcement operations in its 
member states. 174 
B. The 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression 
Given the distressing events in the sub-region, ECOW AS soon realized 
that peace and stability are critical factors to achieve the anticipated economic 
169 1010 U.N.T.S. 17, Treaty ofthe Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 
See Preamble 
170 Daniel Daktori, Minding the Gap: International Law and Regional Enforcement in Sierra 
Leone, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 329 (2008), 331 
171 Katharina P. Coleman, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE 
ENFORCEMENT: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY, Cambridge 
University Press, (2007), 74 
172 Jeremy Levitt, Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution: Aji·ica Regional Strategies 
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development and progress in Western Africa. 175 More so, ECOWAS member 
states came to realize that internal conflicts are indeed security threats to the sub-
• 176 region. 
Accordingly, the ECOWAS member states adopted the Protocol on Non-
Aggression to the ECOW AS Treaty on April 22, 1978. The Protocol constitutes 
an integral part ofthe ECOWAS Treaty. 
Under this Protocol, ECOW AS member states pledged allegiance to the 
U.N. Charter's prohibitions on cross-border attacks. The Protocol further 
confirmed the signatories' adherence to Art 2( 4) of the UN Charter of refraining 
from the threat or use of force and Art 3 (3) of the OAU Charter, respect of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. 177 
C. The 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance of Defense 
On May 29, 1981 ECOW AS member states adopted the Protocol on 
Mutual Assistance in Defense. The Protocol explicitly recognized the 
interdependence of economic progress and security. In this regard, it specifically 
noted that "economic progress cannot be achieved unless the conditions for the 
necessary security are ensured in all Member States of the Community." 178This 
Protocol offered a framework for a collective response to external aggression, and 
in cases of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. 
175 Protile: Economic Community of Western African States, See 
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Articles 13 of the 1981 Protocol anticipates the establishment of a standby 
armed force which is referred to as the Allied Armed Forces ofthe Community. It 
provides that any ECOW AS military intervention would be undertaken by the 
Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). 179 Article 18.2 explicitly 
provides that no intervention by the AAFC will be authorized if the conflict is and 
remains purely internal. 180 Though this force has never been created, the principle 
of collective action embodied in the Treaty remains intact. 181 
Under Article 2 of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance of Defense, 
ECOW AS member states recognized armed threat or aggression directed against 
M b S h . . h . c . !82 any ern er tate as a t reat or aggresston agamst t e enttre ornrnumty. 
ECOW AS member States expressed their resolve to provide mutual aid and 
assistance for defense against any such armed threat or aggression. 183 
The Protocol further authorized member states to take appropriate 
measures under two circumstances. One is in case of armed conflict between two 
or several Member States if the peaceful settlement procedure under the 1978 Non 
Aggression Protocol proves ineffective. 184 The second circumstance that warrants 
appropriate measure is internal armed conflict fueled by external support and 
likely to endanger the community's security and peace. 185 
179 See Article 13 ofthe ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence 
180 Van As, Supra note 173 at 337 
181 Coleman, Supra note 171 at 80 
182 See Article 2 of the ECOW AS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense 
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D. ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture 
ECOW AS peace and security architecture was initially launched as an ad 
hoc security mechanism in an effort to respond to the December 1989 crisis in 
Liberia. 186 The Liberian crisis, which started in 1989, was, therefore, a turning 
point for ECOW AS to take a lead in the maintenance of regional peace and 
security. 187 Following the eruption of the crisis, ECOW AS devised ad hoc 
security mechanism to address the crisis. 188 In May 1990, ECOWAS established a 
Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) entrusted with the responsibility of 
bringing a peaceful resolution to the crisis. 189 
Thereafter, ECOW AS developed a significant military security dimension 
with the establishment of ECOMOG as a response to the Liberian crisis. 
ECOMOG was specifically mandated to conduct a military operation for the 
purpose of monitoring the ceasefire between the rebels and the government, clear 
the Liberian capital of all threats of attack and establish and maintain law and 
order. 190 This decision of creating a military force was justified by the prevailing 
human rights abuses, the threat of large scale refugees and general regional 
destabilization. 191 ECOWAS did so without first consulting the U.N. Security 
Counci1. 192 This perhaps constitutes a departure from the typical trajectory. 
186 Jane Boulden, (ed.), RESPONDING TO CONFLICT IN AFRICA: THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, (May 2013), 54 
187 Jd at 61 
188 ld. 
189 ld. 
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191 Daniel Daktori, Minding the Gap: International Law and Regional Enforcement in Sierra 
Leone, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 329 (2008), 334 
192Id at333-4 
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ECOW AS also took other measures that provided robust legal foundation 
to the regional peacekeeping. 193 These include the adoption of the 1991 
Declaration of Political Principles sought to protect human rights. The 
Declaration bestowed each ECOW AS citizen with the "inalienable right to 
participate by means of free and democratic processes in the framing of the 
. . h. hh l. "194 SOCiety Ill W lC e IVeS. 
Given the lessons learned from its peacekeeping operations, ECOW AS 
revised its founding Treaty in 1993. 195 Under this treaty member states undertook 
"to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of 
peace, stability and security within the region." 196 ECOW AS, through the 
revision, codified ECOMOG as a regional peacekeeping force. 
The revised ECOW AS Treaty conferred the Community with the 
responsibility of preventing and settling regional conflicts. It recognized the 
following as its fundamental principles in relation to the maintenance of regional 
. . b M b S 197 . f . 1 secunty: non-aggressiOn etween em er tates ; mamtenance o regwna 
peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good 
neighborliness 198; peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, active 
Co-operation between neighboring countries and promotion of a peaceful 
193 Id at 339 
194 Declaration A/DCL.1/7/91, Declaration ofPolitica1 Principles ofthe ECOWAS, 4-6 July 1991, 
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environment as a prerequisite for economic development 199• The promotion and 
consolidation of a democratic system of governance is also recognized as one of 
the fundamental principles under Article 4 ofthe revised treaty. 
Under Article 58 of the ECOWAS revised Treaty, member states 
undertake "to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the 
maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region."200 In this regard, 
the revised treaty envisaged the establishment and strengthening of "appropriate 
mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and inter-State 
conflicts."201 These include the maintenance of periodic and regular consultations 
between national border administration authorities; establishment of Joint 
Commissions; resort to methods of peaceful settlement of disputes including 
reconciliation, mediation and good offices; the establishment of regional peace 
and security observation system and peacekeeping; and provision of assistance to 
Member States for the observation of democratic elections.202 
On October 31, 1998 ECOW AS member states authorized the 
establishment of a Framework that would regulate ECOW AS/ECOMOG 
enforcement operations. 203 The Framework envisaged the creation of an 
ECOW AS Mediation and Security Council that would have the necessary 
standing to authorize intervention actions, including military intervention?04 
Paragraph 46 of the Framework provides for military intervention by ECOW AS 
199 Id, Article 4(t) 
200 Id, Article 58(1) 
201 Id, Article 58(2) 
202 !d. Article 58 
203 V~n As, Supra note 173 at 337 
204 !d. 
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in situations of internal conflicts that are maintained and sustained from within a 
Member Country. 
This was followed by the adoption of the Protocol on the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security m 
1999. This is perhaps the most important legal instrument in the domain of 
security within ECOWAS.205 This Protocol established a "mechanism for 
collective security and peace to be known as "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security" for ECOW AS.206 And it 
provides the legal framework for regulating collective security in the West Africa 
b . 207 su -regwn. 
While negotiating this Protocol, ECOW AS defense ministers who 
convened in Banjul, Gambia in 1998 considered the reluctance of the Security 
Council to sanction UN peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau 
and decided to retain autonomy on the decision to intervene.208 
Article I of the Protocol provides for the establishment of a mechanism for 
collective security and peace to be known as the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.209 The 
objectives of the Mechanism are to prevent, manage and resolve internal and 
inter-state conflicts under the conditions provided in Art 46 of the Framework. 
205Boulden, Supra note 195 at 61 
206 See Article I of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, 
http://www .comm.ecowas.int/sec/?id=ap lO J 299&lang=en, (Last visited on 11/29/2013) 
207 Emanuel KwesiAnning, Emma Birikorang& Thomas Jaye, COMPENDIUM OF ECOWAS 
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208 AdekeyeAdebajo, Pax West Africana?, in WEST AFRICA'S SECURITY 
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As articulated in the preamble of the Protocol, the underlying reasons for 
the adoption of the Protocol was the concern of ECOWAS member states "about 
the proliferation of conflicts which constitute a threat to the peace and security in 
the African continent" and their spillover effects undermining efforts of 
ECOW AS member states "to improve the living standards" of the peoples of the 
b . 210 su -region. 
Article 3 sets out the objectives of the Mechanism. These include the 
prevention, management and resolution of internal and inter-State conflicts; 
strengthening cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, 
peace-keeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international 
terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines; maintenance 
and consolidation of peace, security and stability within the Community; 
promoting close cooperation between Member States in the areas of preventive 
diplomacy and peace-keeping; constituting and deploying a civilian and military 
force to maintain or restore peace within the sub-region, whenever the need 
arises; and setting up an appropriate framework for the rational and equitable 
management of natural resources shared by neighboring Member States which 
may be causes of frequent inter-State cont1icts. 211 
E. ECOWAS organs with the regional peace and security mandate 
The Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security identified the Authority, the Mediation 
210 See Paragraph 12 of the Preamble of Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
211 Id., Article 3 
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and Security Council (MSC) and the ECOW AS Executive Secretariat as 
institutions of the ECOW AS security mechanism.212 It further provides that the 
Authority could establish other institution as required. The Protocol under Article 
17 also established the Defense and Security Commission, the Council of Elders, 
and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as organs of 
ECOWAS in charge of assisting the Mediation and Security Council.213 
i. The Authority 
ECOW AS Authority is "the Mechanism's highest decision making 
body"214, and it is composed of heads of state and government of all ECOWAS 
member states.215 ECOW AS Authority has been entrusted with the "powers to act 
on all matters concerning cont1ict prevention, management and resolution, peace-
keeping, security, humanitarian support, peace-building, control of cross-border 
crime, proliferation of small arms, as well as all other matters covered by the 
provisions of this Mechanism." 216 It has an exclusive mandate to decide 'on the 
expediency of military force' ?17 ECOW AS Authority operates under the 
consensus rule envisaged in the ECOWAS Treaty. 
ii. Mediation and Security Council 
The ECOW AS Mediation and Security Council is composed of nine 
ECOW AS member states, out of which seven are elected by the Authority and the 
212 Id, Article 4 
213 Id, Article 17 
214 Id, Article 6 
215 See Article 5.1 ofthe ECOWAS Treaty 
216 See Article 6 of the ECOW AS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
217See Article 6 of the 1981 ECOW AS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence 
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remaining two are the current chairman and the immediate past chairman of the 
h . 218 aut onty. 
The Council is a key organ that is entrusted with the power to take 
decisions on issues of peace and security in the sub-region on behalf of the 
Authority."219 In fact, the Authority under Article 7 of the Protocol has provided 
the Council a broader mandate to take, on its behalf, "appropriate decisions for 
the implementation of the provisions of' the ECOW AS security Mechanism.220 
The Council is further entrusted with a broader power of implementing all the 
provisions of this Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.221 
Article 7 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security enumerates 
specific functions of the Council in the implementation of the Protocol. These 
include the power to decide on all matters relating to peace and security; decide 
and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, 
peace-keeping and security; authorize all forms of intervention and decide 
particularly on the deployment of political and military missions; approve 
mandates and terms of reference for such missions; review the mandates and 
terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving situations; on the 
218 See Article 8 of the ECOW AS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
219 1d,Article 10 
220 Id, Article 7 
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recommendation of the Executive Secretary, appoint the Special Representative of 
the Executive Secretary and the Force Commander.222 
iii. Executive Secretariat 
The ECOW AS Executive Secretary is mandated to "initiate actions for 
conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security in the 
sub-region."223 These actions include "fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, 
negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conf1ict."224 
iv. Defense and Security Commission 
The ECOW AS Defense and Security Commission has important advisory 
function to the Council. It assists the Council in 'formulating the mandate of the 
Peace-keeping Force; defining the terms of reference for the Force; appointing the 
Force Commander; determining the composition of the Contingents. ' 225 
v. Council of Elders 
The Council of Elders is composed of eminent personalities from various 
segments of society. The list of the eminent personalities is approved by the 
Mediation and Security Council at the level of the Heads of State and 
Government.226 The members of the Council of Elders could, on behalf of 
ECOW AS, "use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, 
222 Id 
223 Id Article 15 
224 Id, 
225 Id, Ar1icle 19 
226 ld, A11icle 20 
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conciliators and facilitators" when the need arises?27 The Council plays important 
role offering advisory function to the Council regarding military support missions 
authorized by the Council.228 
vi. ECOMOG 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was originally created as an ad 
hoc force with the task of arranging and supervising a cease-fire to be followed by 
the establishment of a sustainable interim government leading to democratic 
elections within a period of 12 months.229 It eventually evolved as one of the 
ECOWAS organs in charge of assisting the Peace and Security Council. 230 It is 
composed of "several Stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in 
their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment. "231 It is now one of 
the key bodies for the enforcement of military support missions ofECOWAS. 
ECOMOG is comparable to the UN Standby force anticipated under 
Article 43 of the UN Charter. The ECOWAS Standby Force is composed of 
contingents earmarked from national armed forces of ECOW AS member states 
for deployment in ECOW AS peace support operations as the need arises?32 
Article 22 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security provides the 
following as missions of ECOMOG: Observation and Monitoring; peace-keeping 
227 Id 
228McCoubrey, Supra note 166 at 144 
229 Id at 142 
230 Id at 144 
231 See Article 20 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
232McCoubrey, Supra note 166 at 144 
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and restoration of peace; Humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian 
disaster; Enforcement of sanctions, including embargo ;Preventive deployment; 
Peace-building, disarmament and demobilization; Policing activities, including 
the control of fraud and organized crime; Any other operations as may be 
mandated by the Mediation and Security Council.233 
Like the other African regional and sub-regional organizations, ECOW AS 
has had to overcome a number of challenges to strengthen the sub-regional 
security arrangement. In its initial years, ECOW AS had encountered challenges in 
its aspirations to evolve into a sub-regional security community. This was perhaps 
one manifestation of the colonial legacy, primarily driven by France through 
coordinating the Francophone West African nations.234 The Francophone states, 
which constitute the majority in West Africa, were concerned about the 
Anglophone Nigeria's economic and military dominance in the sub-region and its 
leverage within ECOWAS.235 That was perhaps the driving force behind the 
conclusion of the 1977 Exclusive Mutual Non-aggression and Defense Pact 
(ANAD) among the Francophone West African nations?36 More so, they were 
initially reluctant to move along with the ECOWAS more inclusive regional 
security mechanism.237 The West African Anglophone states perceived the 
foregoing exclusive arrangement among the Francophone states as a threat to 
regional unity. Coupled with the initial reluctance of the Francophone nations to 
233 See Article 22 of the ECOW AS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
234Coleman, Supra note 171 at 74 




move along with the ECOW AS more inclusive regional security arrangement, the 
sub-regional security arrangement was not an easy venture for ECOW AS in the 
early 1980s.238 
3.3.2 SADC Security Mechanism 
A. Background 
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was founded by 
the Treaty of Southern Africa Development Community signed on August 17, 
1992?39 Currently SADC has fifteen Southern African States as its members. 
These are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.240 
SADC's predecessor, i.e. Southern African Development Coordinating 
Conference (SADCC), which came into existence in April 1980 by the nine 
Southern African countries,241 had the underlying objective of coordinating and 
harmonizing economic cooperation within its member states with a view to 
improving the quality of life of the peoples of the region?42 SADCC adopted the 
slogan "Southern Africa - towards economic liberation" and pursued the goal of 
reducing economic dependence from Apartheid South Africa and dismantling the 
23s Id 
239 See SADC's official website, http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/865, (Last 
visited on 12/26/2013) 
240 See SADC's official website, http://www.sadc.int/member-states/ (Last visited on 12/29/2013) 
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Apartheid reg1me m South Africa.243 SADCC activities were based on a 
Memorandum of Agreement between Member States until the Declaration and 
244 Treaty ofthe SADC was signed on August 17, 1992. 
According to the SADC Treaty, one of the key objectives of SADC is to 
'promote and defend peace and security" in the region?45 Solidarity, Peace, 
Security and Peaceful settlement of disputes are indeed adopted as principles 
governing the acts ofSADC and its member states.246As Coleman put it, SADC is 
"the most appropriate regional framework for conducting peace enforcement 
operations in Southern Africa."247 
However, the Treaty did not provide specific mechanisms to achieve this 
important objective of the organization, except generally providing that SADC 
shall "create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilization of 
requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of 
SADC and its institutions".248 
The abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 shifted the focus of the 
Southern African states demanding reorientation in the existing sub-regional 
security architecture in the Southern Africa. 249 Note that SADC and its 
predecessor, the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC), 
viewed the apartheid in South Africa as the principal security threat for the sub-
243 C.Ng'ong'ola, , The Legal Framework for Regional Integration in the Southern African 
Development Community, UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA LA JOURNAL, vol. 8 (December 
2008),4 
244 Van As, Supra note 173 at 331 
245 See Article 5(l)(c) ofthe Treaty ofthe Southern Africa Development Community 
246 See Article 4 of the Treaty of the Southern Africa Development Community 
247Coleman, Supra note 234 at 167 
248 See Article 5(2)(c) ofthe Treaty of the Southern Africa Development Community 
249McCoubrey, Supra note 166 at 146 
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region?50 With the abolition of apartheid, it, therefore, became evident that a new 
mechanism for the maintenance and strengthening of regional peace and security 
2'1 was needed. ) 
The SADC Foreign and Defense Ministers Summit, which convened in 
January 1996, defined the sub-regional defense and security architecture through 
proposing a SADC Organ of Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) as a principal 
. h . 252 secunty mec amsm. On June 28, 1996, SADC member states adopted a 
Communique to create the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation (OPDS)?53 
Five years later, i.e. on August 14, 2001, the Protocol on Politics, Defence 
and Security Cooperation was adopted by SADC Summit, and the Protocol 
recognized OPDS as the principal security mechanism for the Southern Africa 
sub-region.254 The Protocol provides explicit recognition to the critical importance 
of peace and security in creating conducive atmosphere for regional co-operation 
and integration. 255 
This Protocol was designed in the aftermath of the intervention by Angola, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe in the war and political crises in the Democratic Republic 
25o Id 
251 Kaire M.Mnuende, Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the Southern Afhcan Development 
Community (SADC), INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON MINORITY AND GROUP RIGHTS, 
vol. 8. Issue I (200 I) 
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of Congo (DRC).256 The Protocol entered into force on 2 March 2004.257 This 
new security mechanism has an extended mandate to deal not only with regional 
collective security but also to help SADC Member States establish and safeguard 
the democratic order in the Southern Africa region.258 
In 2008, SADC articulated its vision that it is one of "a common future, a 
future within a regional community that will ensure economic wellbeing, 
improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social 
justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa."259 
While recognizing that security matters transcend national and regional 
boundaries, SADC sets out a procedure whereby co-operation agreement on 
defense, security and political matters between SADC member states and non-
State Parties, and between SADC member states and organizations take effect in 
the SADC member states. Any such cooperative agreements are subject to 
approval by SADC Summit.260 
The SADC security regime giVes due recognition to the pnmary 
responsibility of the United Nations Security Council in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 261 Likewise, the SADC Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation provide primacy to the security regime of the 
African Union?62 
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Under Article 11, sub paragraph 4 (c) of the Protocol, it is explicitly 
required that "[ t]he exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the UNSC ... " 263This is in tandem with Article 54 
of the UN Charter. But the Protocol makes no explicit reference about the 
requisite prior authorization for enforcement actions stipulated under Article 
53(1) of the Charter of the United Nations.264 
The UN has not defined the geographical scope of regional arrangements. 
SADC could, therefore, be considered as a regional arrangement envisaged under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This view is supported by McCOurbey and 
Morris, who argued in favor of a broader interpretation of the concept under 
Chapter VIII. 265 
B. Key components of SADC Security Regime 
i. Summit ofthe Heads of State or Government 
The SADC Summit, which is composed of the Heads of State or 
Government of all SADC member states, is the supreme policy making institution 
of SADC responsible for "overall policy direction and control of the functions of 
SADC."266 The Summit is led by a Troika, which consists ofthe Chairperson, the 
incoming chairperson, and the Outgoing Chairperson.267 The Summit is entrusted 
with the power to select the Troika members of OPDS. 
263 Id, Article II (4)(e) 
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ii. Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDS) 
OPDS is ceded powers and responsibilities of the Summit for the political 
and security dimensions of SADC integration.268 It operates at the summit level, 
and function independently of other SADC structures.269 This organ may be 
ranked slightly below the Summit, but above SADC Council of Ministers, in the 
revised hierarchy of SADC institutions.270 Like the Summit, OPDS also operates 
on a Troika basis. The only caveat is that the Troika members of the Summit 
could not be selected to simultaneously be members of the OPDS.271 
OPDS is entrusted with a responsibility to develop a common sub-regional 
foreign policy, sub-regional defense and security cooperation, protection against 
instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intrastate conflict, 
interstate conflict and aggression, conf1ict mediation and resolution, and the 
development of peace support capacity.272 
The Protocol sets out the conditions where OPDS will have jurisdiction to 
intervene. The first condition is the existence of significant interstate conf1ict 
between State Parties or between State Parties and Non-State Parties. The second 
condition is the existence of significant intra-state conflict in a State Party.273 
OPDS is required to obtain the consent of the disputant parties to pursue its 
peacemaking efforts for both interstate and intrastate conf1icts.274 The Protocol 
268Ng'ong'ola, Supra note 243 at 23 
269Mnuende, Supra note 251 
27~g'ong'ola, Supra note 243 at 22 
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also anticipates the possibility of SADC's involvement in mediating a significant 
interstate or intrastate conflict that occurs outside the region in consultation with 
the United Nations Security Council and the African Continental organization. 275 
The activities of OPDS are guided by a business plan, called a Strategic 
Indicative Plan tor the Organ (SIP0). 276 SIPA II was launched on November 20, 
2012?77 It covers five key sectors of Politics, Defence, State Security, Public 
S . d p 1. 278 ecunty an o Ice. 
The Protocol provides for an elaborate structure of the OPDS. These are 
the Chairperson, the Troika, a Ministerial Committee, an Inter-State Defense and 
Security Committee, and other substructures that may be established by either of 
the Ministerial Committees?79 The Organ is supported by the Directorate for 
Politics, Defense and Security Affairs based at the SADC Secretariat in 
Gaborone. 
iii. Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (/SPDC) 
The Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) is established 
with the mandate to enhance peace and security among SADC member states.280 
ISDPC is tasked with functions necessary to achieve the objectives of OPDS 
relating to defense and security. 281 ISPDS comprises ministers responsible for 
275 ld, Article I I (2) (c) 
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defense, public security and state security from each of SADC member states?82 
It has a fairly elaborate substructure, especially the Defense Subcommittee and a 
range of sub-subcommittees on functional areas of cooperation. 283 
iv. SADC Brigade 
The SADC Brigade is another key component of SADC's security regime. 
It was launched in August 2008, and is composed of the military, police and 
civilian members from SADC member states. 284 The Brigade supports regional 
peace operations under the African Standby Force Policy Framework of the 
African Union. 285 The SADC Brigade is constituted under the Protocol Relating 
to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
which require all regional economic communities, including SADC, to have 
standby peace keeping forces. 
The primary function of the SADC Brigade is to participate in missions as 
envisaged in Article 13 of the "mandate" of the Peace and Security 
Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union286, which includes: 
observation and monitoring mtsswns; other types of peace support 
missions; intervention in a Member State in respect of grave 
circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace 
and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive 
Act; preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict 
from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to 
282 Id, Article 7( 1) 
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neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after 
parties to a conflict have reached an agreement; peace-building, including 
post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; humanitarian assistance to 
alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support 
efforts to address major natural disasters; and any other functions as 
may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly. 287 
As part of its peace support capacity building, SADC has set up a regional 
peacekeeping training center in Zimbabwe to train the SADC Brigade. 
The first test of peacekeeping for SADC came in 1997 during the DRC 
conflict when the Kabila government was challenged by rebels advancing from 
the eastern part of the country. 288 SADC also encountered challenges emanating 
from the military unrest in Lesotho following the election disputes which 
culminated with unrest within the country and the renewed fighting in Angola 
after the breakdown of the Lusaka Peace Accord between National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNIT A) and the government of Dos Santos.289 
Unfortunately SADC member states were not able to agree on a united position to 
respond to these crises. 
Since its establishment, the SADC Brigade has not been deployed to 
undertake peacemaking, peacekeeping, or recovery mission?90 SADC's February 
2013 decision to deploy peacekeeping force in the Democratic republic of Congo 
could be considered as a paradigm shift in the peacekeeping history of SADC. 
The Extraordinary SADC Summit meeting that was held in Maputo decided to put 
together and deploy a force of 4000 SADC troops to address the ongoing conflict 
287 See Article 9(3) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council ofthe African Union 
288Maj inge, Supra note 93 at 481 
289 ld 
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in the eastern parts of the DRC. Such mandate to "enforce the peace" rather than 
just try and keep peace in DRC is a radical deviation and fundamental change 
from the established international norm. SADC Secretary General elaborated the 
scope of the mandate saying that SADC troops could "engage with whoever is 
trying to destabilize the situation in the eastern part ofCongo."291 
SADC has the material resources available to it to play a major security 
and peace support role in the Southern Africa sub-region. 292 In the words of 
McCourbey, what really has adversely impacted on the works of SADC include 
the fierce competition among member states, issues relating to leadership and 
ultimate authority.293 
3.3.3. IGAD Security Mechanism 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 
1996 to serve as a forum for expanded cooperation among the East African sub-
region nations.294 It is one of Africa's youngest sub-regional organizations, 
founded in 1996 to supersede the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD), which was founded in 1986 by the then drought at1licted 
eastern African countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and 
291 Garth Brave Cilliers, Move by SADC for DRC peace keeping makes history: DRC peace 
miSSion challenges existing peace-keeping procedure, 26 February 2013, See 
http://www .leaclershimm I ine.co.za/artic les/brav_e-move-by -saclc-for-drc-peace-keep in 2.-makes-
historv-4835.html (Last visited 12/29/2013) 
292McCoubrey, Supra note 166 at 150 
293 Id 
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Uganda?95 IGAD has been designated as one of the pillars of the African 
Economic Community (AEC) in terms of the AEC Treaty?96 
Given the recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters 
between 1974 and 1984 in Eastern Africa Sub-region, the above six countries of 
the Sub-region took the initiative to establish IGADD, of course with the 
assistance and support of the United Nations.297 This important development was 
a kind of a paradigm shift for a sub-region which had known more conflict that 
cooperation.298 JGAD itself acknowledged in its presentation that "politics in the 
Horn of Africa has been shaped by seeds of violence due to the historical and 
political factors that goes back to the Colonial boundary arrangements and the 
new dynamics during post Cold war era."299 
One could, therefore, plausibly argue that the pressure from donors and 
international organizations such as the United Nations played a paramount role in 
this attempt for a sub-regional cooperative framework. 
IGADD was primarily established to provide coordinated efforts to 
manage drought and development across the Eastern Africa sub-region with a 
focus on food security.300 Around the beginning of 1995, IGADD member states 
realized that addressing the basic economic, social, environmental and 
295 Id. 
296 African Union, Profile: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (!GAD), See 
ht!P://www.africa union.org/Recs/IGAD Protile.pdf (Last visited 0 Ill /20 14) 
297Id 
298 Abdelwahab El-Affendi, The Impasse in the !GAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits of 
Regional Peacemaking?, AFRICAN AFFAIRS, Vol. 100, No. 401 (Oct., 2001), Oxford 
University Press, 581, 582 
299 !GAD, Peace and Security Situation in the !GAD Region, p.l See 
http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/speeches/IGAD Presentation l80ct20 1 O.pdf (Last visited 
12/22/201 3) 
300 See the Preamble and Article 7 of the Agreement Establishing Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Drought and Development in Eastern Africa 
127 
humanitarian problems was not possible in the region if peace and security could 
not be ensured. 301 Note that the Eastern Africa Sub-region, which is commonly 
referred to as the Hom of Africa, is known for its being a cont1ict-ridden sub 
. . Af. 302 regwn m nca. 
Lionel Cliffe accurately observed that the Horn of Africa encountered with 
the same arbitrariness of borders inherited from colonial rule and with the 
inevitably resulting problems of state making and nation building among 
disparate peoples and in contested territory where there were cultural links 
where there were cultural links with people across those borders. These 
features, found throughout Africa and other ex-colonial territories were 
intensified by factors specific to the Horn, each of which further enhanced 
the likelihood of internal and inter-state conflict: an ethnically 
homogenous state Somalia, whose nationalism embraced Somali 
neighboring minorities; Ethiopia with a territory that resulted from 
resistance to European colonialism but also from becoming an empire; 
Sudan straddling the cultural divide between Africa South of the Sahara 
and the North."303 
This reality remains true even today. 
Though the Horn of Africa is not the best area for testing sub-regional 
security cooperation, the Hom states came a long way to collectively address the 
security challenges of the sub-region.304 Accordingly IGADD member states, 
which by then had reached seven with Eritrea as a new member of 
301 CiruMwaura& and Susanne Schmeidl , eds., EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA, 2001,9 
302 Marie Gibert, The European Union in the !GAD-Subregion: Insights from Sudan & Somalia, 
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, 143 
303 Lionel Cliff, Regional Dimensions of Conflict in rhe Horn of Afi·ica, THIRD WORLD 
QUARTERLY, 20, I (1999) 
304 El-Affendi, Supra note 298 at 581 
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IGADD,305convened an Extraordinary Summit on April 18, 1995 in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia and signed a Declaration to revitalize and expand IGADD's mandate.306 
After series of negotiations and consultations among member states, the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Agreement Establishing 
the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on March 21, 1996, 
amending the IGADD Charter.307 It was, therefore, in 1996 that IGADD evolved 
into IGAD, with a much broader mandate and ambitious objectives to cooperate 
in socio-economic, political and environmental fields. 308 
In adopting the IGAD Establishing Agreement, the member states were 
"[i]nspired by the noble purpose of promoting peace, security and stability, and 
eliminating the sources of conflict as well as preventing and resolving conflicts in 
the sub-region".309 IGAD member states also gave due recognition that the 
preservation of peace security and stability are "essential prerequisites for 
economic development and social progress."310 
Under the establishment agreement, the member states expressed their 
commitment to the following principles: 
"sovereign equality of all Member States; Non-interference in the internal 
affairs of Member States; The peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-State 
conflicts through dialogue; Maintenance of regional peace, stability and 
security; Mutual and equitable sharing of benefits accruing from 
cooperation under this Agreement; Recognition, promotion and protection 
305 Eritrea was admitted as the seventh member of !GAD at the Fourth Summit of Heads of State 
and Government of IGADD in Addis Ababa in September 1993. 
306 !GAD Publication Unit, !GAD general information, 1997, p. 1 
307IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Agreement Establishing the Inter-governmental Authority on 
Development, available at 
See the Preamble, Articles 7 and 13 
309 Jd, See paragraph 9 and 18(a) 
310 Jd 
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of human and people's rights in accordance with the provisions of the 
African Charter on Human and People's Rights."311 
According to Article 7(g) of the IGAD Agreement, IGAD's objective is to 
'[p ]romote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the 
sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-State 
conflicts through dialogue'.312 In furtherance of this objective, IGAD member 
states are required to act collectively for the preservation of peace, security and 
b.l. 313 sta 1 1ty. 
The IGAD Agreement requires IGAD member states to take the following 
measures for the preservation of peace, security and stability in the sub-region: 
a) take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-
operation peace and stability; 
b) establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for 
the pacific settlement of differences and disputes; 
c) accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-
regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or 
international organizations? 14 
It is important to note here that the foregoing measures are anticipated in 
the context of the individual member states but not IGAD as an institution. 
IGAD launched a project to build a Peace and Security Strategy for the 
Hom of Africa in 2003. 315 In October 2003, the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of IGAD endorsed a comprehensive regional Peace and Security 
strategy and a 5-year implementation plan drawn by IGAD's Secretariat.316 Both 
311 Id, See Article 6 
312 Id, See Article 7 
313 Id, See Article l8(a) 
314 Id 
315 AlemayehuFentaw, THE EMERGING PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE 
HORN OF AFRICA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES, (17 January 2011) 
316Khartoum !GAD meeting consensus way ahead final 031005, Consensus Document and Way 
ahead, Conference to Launch an !GAD Strategy on Peace Security, 3 available at 
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the strategy and the implementation plan consider the conflict prevention, 
management and resolution programs as IGAD's priority area. 317 Accordingly it 
envisaged the development of a Conflict Management, Resolution, and 
Prevention strategy. The strategy also places emphasis on the primary 
responsibility of member states to provide peace and security for their citizens. 318 
The IGAD strategy has the objectives of developing, implementing and 
sustaining a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts in the 
IGAD region.319 These include facilitation of the development of appropriate 
national-level mechanisms to promote national peace and security within the 
context of common core values; appraisal of structures and mechanisms for 
conflict early warning, management and resolution within the region and across 
its boundaries; achievement of consensus on aims, principles and benchmarks for 
the promotion of regional peace and security, and monitoring and supporting post-
cont1ict transitions.320 
Over the course of the development of IGAD's Peace and Security 
Strategy (IPSS), the preparatory meetings deliberated on what Healy 
characterized as "the most contentious cont1ict themes" in the region, i.e. border 
demarcation, access to the sea for landlocked countries, transboundary water 
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The IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS) auns at achieving 
"sustainable peace and security for the attainment of economic integration and 
development in the IGAD Region." The Strategy has identified four strategic 
priorities: ( 1) Strengthening and streamlining conflict prevention, management 
and resolution in the IGAD Region; (2) Strengthening preventive (track 2) 
diplomacy in the IGAD Region; (3) Promoting cooperation to address emerging 
common peace and security threats relating to terrorism, maritime security, 
organized crime and security sector reform within the IGAD Region; and ( 4) 
Enhancing cooperation in other areas incidental to peace and security including 
management of trans-boundary water resources, and prevention management and 
resolution of challenges relating to refugees and internally displaced persons.322 
IPSA is premised on the principles of respect tor international law, mutual 
respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, rejection of 
the use of force to resolve problems, equitable utilization of trans-boundary 
resources, respect for territorial integrity and sovereign equality of states, and 
respect for colonial borders.323 
The organs of IGAD, namely the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors have 
been charged with the responsibility for implementing the Peace and Security 
mandates ofiGAD. 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which is the supreme 
organ of IGAD, is entrusted with the responsibility to make policy, direct and 
322 1d 
323 Fentaw, Supra note 315 
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control the functioning of IGAD. 324 The Assembly is specifically mandated to 
provide guidelines and to monitor "political issues especially on conflict 
prevention, management and resolution."325 The Assembly operated under a 
consensus rule. 326 
IGAD Council of Ministers is composed of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
and one other focal Minister designated from each Member State.327 The Council 
is mandated to promote peace and security in the sub-region and to make 
recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 328 The 
Council is further tasked with the responsibility to follow up political and security 
affairs, including conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as post 
conflict peace building.329 The Council generally operates under a consensus rule. 
However, decisions are made by a qualified majority in case the Council fails to 
reach an agreement by consensus?30 What makes the Council's voting procedure 
unique is the requisite secret ballot voting by the Counci1. 331 
IGAD's Executive Secretary, who is the Chief Executive Officer of 
!GAD's Secretariat, has a broad mandate to initiate measures aimed at promoting 
the objectives of IGAD. The Executive Secretary is authorized to promote 
cooperation with other organizations, such as the United Nations and African 
Union, with a view to furthering !GAD's objectives.332 
324 See Article 9 ofthe Agreement Establishing Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
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The IPPS architecture comprises of the following components to achieve 
its goals: 
• lOAD Program of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
(CPMR); 
• Protocol on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism 
(CEWARN); 
• Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs); 
• lOAD Civil Society Forum(IOAD-CSO Forum); 
• lOAD Inter-Parliamentary Union (IOAD-IPU); 
• lOAD Women's Desk; 
• lOAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism (ICPAT); 
• Policy Framework for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIO); 
• Panel of the Wise; and 
• Mediation Support Unit (MSU).333 
The IPSA architecture fits within the broader frameworks of the United 
Nations Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which imposed on 
member states the obligation to participate in advancing international collective 
security, as well as the lOAD Agreement. 
The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (commonly 
referred to as "CEW ARN") is worth noting among the IPSA components. 
CEW ARN was established as an integral part of lOAD with the adoption of the 
Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response 
333 Fentaw, Supra note 315 
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Mechanism for IGAD Member States on January 9, 2002. CEWARN has both 
early warning and response functions. 334 
The early warning functions of CEW ARN include receiving, processing 
and analyzing information and reports from the national conflict early warning 
and response mechanism (which are known as CEWERUs); bringing the 
information to the attention of the I GAD secretariat; monitoring and coordinating 
information collection and reporting; and promoting dialogue on information and 
analysis. 335 The development of this early warning mechanism is perhaps one of 
the most significant achievements ofiGAD.336 
With the launching of the revitalized IGAD, a consortium of donor 
governments and international organizations initiated a development partnership 
forum with a view to supporting IGAD's revitalization. This relationship is based 
on partnership and transcends beyond the traditional donor-recipient 
relationship. 337This partnership, known as the International Partnership Forum 
(IPF) is currently comprised of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, European Commission, 
International Organization for Migration, United Nations Development Program, 
and World Bank.338 
m See Article 5 of the !GAD Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and 
Response Mechanism, (9 January 2002), available at 
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Among the permanent UN Security Council members, China and Russia 
are not part of the IPF. Though UNDP formally collaborates with IGAD through 
the IPF, the United Nations Security Council is no part of the IPF. 
Factors that adversely impact on the effectiveness of IGAD include the 
intransigence of the parties involved in conflict/dispute; lack of leverage on the 
disputant parties; competing interests among the members of the IGAD driven by 
their respective national interests; the absence of a stable and consensual regional 
power order; the disputed legitimacy of states and governments and the inability 
of democratic processes to provide that legitimacy; limitations in terms of 
motivating the disputant parties; financial constraints and resources. Unlike 
SADC and ECOW AS, which have found their regional hegemons in South Africa 
and Nigeria respectively, IGAD is characterized by the absence of a sub-regional 
hegemon.339 And this is perhaps another obstacle for IGAD in the discharge of its 
security mandates. 
There are instances where the disputing parties use IGAD to block 
effective form of intervention to address the conflicts. Sudan's reluctance to 
withdraw from the IGAD process is perhaps a typical example in this regard.340 
The eruption of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in May 1998 subsequently removed 
IGAD from its engagement in the Sudan peace process.341 
http:/ /igad. int/index. php':>option=com content& view=artic le& id=93& I tern id= 124& l imitstartc~5, 
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Disagreement among member states over IGAD's policy towards Somalia, 
which the Eritrean government characterized as "irresponsible", also led Eritrea to 
suspend its IGAD membership.342 Given Eritrea's consistent opposition to the 
deployment of international peacekeepers in Somalia, Eritrea opposed IGAD's 
involvement in the establishment and deployment of AMISOM force in 
Somalia. 343 
IGAD also suffers from senous financial constraints to discharge its 
security mandate. While commenting on IGAD's involvement in Somalia, a 
Somali political analyst once told the Voice of America that IGAD "cannot pay 
even its own budget, let alone resolve the conflicts that are taking place in the 
region. "344 
IGAD member states now "face security threats due to their geopolitical 
positions, which now include the threats of piracy/maritime security, and 
Terrorism due to religious extremism."345 Therefore, the joint peace and conflict 
prevention efforts of IGAD member states are crucial for the sub-regional security 
and sustainable development of the countries in the sub-region. 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
Article 52(1) of the UN Charter provides for the "existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the 
342EIU Views Wire, Somalia politics: Eritrea suspends its membership ofiGAD, May 29,2007 
343Id 
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maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional 
action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are 
consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." The Charter 
encourages regional institutions to give priority to finding peaceful solutions to 
conflicts. However, the Charter reserves the right to authorize enforcement action 
for the Security Council. 
Article 53(1) state that "no enforcement action shall be taken under 
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the 
Security Council ... " Thus, all enforcement actions by regional organizations 
require the authorization of the UN Security Council, but even after such 
authorization, these organizations are obliged to keep the Council informed of 
their actions. This principle was largely adhered to for the first four decades of the 
UN but was tested in the early 1990s when several regional and even sub-regional 
organizations undertook military action without an explicit UNSC 
authorization. 346 
The transformation of the OAU into the AU was the most notable 
development in Africa because of its wider global implications. Having adopted a 
comprehensive security regime, the AU, in collaboration with the RECs/RMs, is 
now playing a more pivotal role in managing security in the continent. 347There is, 
therefore, optimism that the norms and institutions developed under the AU are 
346 Report ofthe Chairperson ofthe AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 21 
347 Id 
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progressive than those obtained under its predecessor, the Organization of African 
Unity.348 
Understandably, AU doesn't have the United Nations' level of resources, 
institutional capacity, and experience in dealing with threats to international peace 
and security.349 It also faces the additional challenges of endemic poverty and 
civil conflict among many of its member states. Estimates have pointed to a 
combined economic loss of an estimated $300bn since 1990 by a number of 
African countries affected by conflict. 350 
Despite this reality, its proactive engagement in managing peace and 
security on the continent has given it a high visibility leading to expectations that 
are often not matched by its capacity. It has also gained experience in the area of 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
Since its transformation, AU has initiated four missions-the AU Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS), the AU Observer Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the AU Task 
Force in Burundi and UN/AU Hybrid Force to Darfur.351 The Security Council 
itself recognized the useful role AU has been playing in brokering peace 
agreements, conflict prevention, cns1s management and post-conflict 
stabilization.352 This puts AU in a better position to take more responsibility in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security. 
348KithureKindiki, The normative and institutiona!fi'amework of the Ajhcan Union relating to the 
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Over the past years, AU has also adopted several instruments designed to 
facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. These instruments relate to human 
rights; elections, governance and the fight against corruption; ongoing 
democratization processes on the continent; arms control and disarmament; 
counter terrorism; border management; and the prevention and reduction of 
interstate conflicts. These further represent a consolidated framework of 
commonly accepted norms and principles, whose observance would considerably 
reduce the risk of conflict and violence on the continent and consolidate peace 
where it has been achieved. 353 
Following a process of normative and institutional development, the 
African sub-regional organizations are also now seen as critical providers of 
security as a public good in their respective regions. Nowhere is this more notable 
than in Africa where institutions that were established for economic integration 
purposes are now deeply involved in managing security challenges in the 
continent. However, these regional economic communities on which the African 
Union relies upon also encounter tremendous challenges to effectively discharge 
their security mandates. These include resource constraints, competing interests 
among member states, and issues related to legitimacy. 
The success of AU's and the African sub-regional security mechanisms, in 
addition to other factors, also depends on their role within the new global security 
regime and their relationship and coordination with the United Nations. AU itself 
353 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 9 
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generally considers the UN as its international partner.354 AU as well as the RECs 
also formally recognize the role of the UN Security Council as a primarily 
responsible organ for the maintenance of international peace and security. Given 
this reality, a proper coordination with the UN security mechanism in the 
implementation of their security mandate could significantly contribute in 
complementing the UN efforts in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Hence, the need for renewed efforts to endow the AU and the African 
sub-regional organizations with the requisite resources and enhance their 
decision-making process to enable them fully discharge their mandate in the area 
of peace and security, and be effective partners of the UN and other international 
stakeholders. 355 
354 EX.CL/11 0 (V), See AU Assembly Decision On The African Standby Force (ASF) And The 
Military Staff Committee (MSC), 
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CHAPTER4 
SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS, 
AFRICAN UNION AND AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
The forefathers of the UN Charter anticipated the importance of the 
relationship with regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 1 Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides the framework for 
cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. At the heart of Chapter VIII is the need to 
complement the international legitimacy and legality of the UN with the 
advantages embedded in regionalism. 
Given the primary responsibility entrusted to the UN Security Council in 
the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN, in principle, is 
expected to assume a leadership role in ensuring regional peace and security in 
Africa. Such a hierarchal division is formally endorsed by the regional and sub-
regional organizations in Africa. The Director of the Political Department of AU's 
predecessor, OAU, for example, noted: 
We see a pyramidal relationship between the OAU, the UN, and sub-
regional organizations- the UN is at the top, the OAU in the middle and 
the sub-regional organizations at the bottom . . . The first to engage [a 
crisis] is the sub-region, but the sub-region needs the OAU's continental 
endorsement, and the OAU then takes it to the UN ... The OAU is a 
continental organization, and therefore has more responsibilities of getting 
1 See Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter 
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the international community's attention. Our role IS to mobilize the 
international community.2 
Should regional organizations decide to apply coercive measures, they 
must obtain the prior authorization of the UN Security Council. 3 However, during 
the Cold War years, regional organizations occasionally sought UN Security 
Council endorsement for their initiatives, but overall they had little meaningful 
engagement with the Security Council and vice versa.4 
Strategic partnership with regional organizations was considered as a 
crucial first step in designing a global security architecture that reflected the 
changing dynamics of the international system, especially in the post-Cold War 
period. Given these changing dynamics of the international system, the former 
two UN Secretary-Generals, i.e. Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan, set the stage for 
the evolving partnership between the UN and regional organizations. 5 They put 
forward proposals for a greater contribution by regional organizations with regard 
to issues of the maintenance of international peace and security. 6 Moreover, both 
recognized the need to develop a complementary relationship between the UN 
2Katharina P Coleman, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE 
ENFORCEMENT: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, 100-101 
3 See Article 53 of the UN Charter 
4 David M Malone, Security Council, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED 
NATIONS, 120 
5 PSC/PRJ2.(CCCVII), Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Partnership 
between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater 
Strategic and Political Coherence, (9 January 2012), 23 
6 A/47/277, An agenda for peace, 17 June 1992 
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and regional organization with a view to addressing the gap in the post-Cold War 
era international system. 7 
Following the submission of UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali's 
report entitled "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping" on June 23, 1992, there began a redefinition of the role of regional 
organizations in the maintenance of peace and security. 8 In March 1994, the 
Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and the Strengthening of the role of 
the organization approved a Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation 
between the UN and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of 
international peace and security. 9 
Equally important is the recognition the UN Security Council has given 
to the well suited position of regional organizations "to understand the root causes 
of armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region which can be a benefit 
for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of these conflicts." 10 The 
Declaration reaffirms that: 
The Members of the United Nations entering into such [regional] 
arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to 
achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional 
arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the 
Security Council; . . . Regional arrangements or agencies can, in their 
7 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 23 
8Margarita Dieguez, MECHANISMS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY 
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, REGIONAL MECHANISMS AND INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY IN LA TIN AMERICA, 1998, 93 
9 A/ AC.l82/1994/CRP.3/add.3, Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation Between the 
United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security 
10 S/Res/1809 (2008), United Nations Security Council, Resolution on Peace and Security in 
Africa, 16 April 2008 
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fields of competence and in accordance with the Charter, make important 
contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, 
including, where appropriate, through the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conf1ict peace 
b "ld" II Ul mg. 
The current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has furthered this 
approach to work with regional organizations in the area of peace and security. In 
his first report on the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in 
2008, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called upon the United Nations Security 
Council to properly define the role of regional organizations and streamline the 
strategic partnership between the UN and AU. 12 The Secretary General kept on 
pressing this call in his subsequent reports. 13The October 14, 2010 report 
especially emphasized on the importance of "a revitalized and evolving 
interpretation of Chapter VIII ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations". 14 
4.1 UN-AU Cooperation 
The security situation in Africa has been one of the agenda items of the 
UN since October 31, 1956 when the UN Security Council considered the grave 
11 Supra note 9 
12 S/2008/186, Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and 
regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace 
and security, 7 April 2008 
13 See S/2009/470, UN Secretary General Report on Support to African Union Peacekeeping 
Operations authorized by the United Nations, 18 September 2009, available at 
http://www .securitycounci lreport.org/atf/cf/% 7865 B FCF9 B-6027 -4 E9C-8C 03-
CF6E4FF96FF9% 70/R0%20S2009%204 70.pdf; See also A/65/51 0-S/20 I 0/514, Report of the 
Secretary-General on Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the 
United Nations, 14 October 2010, available at 
http://www.securitvcouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7865BFCF9B-6027-4E9C-8C03 
CF6E4FF96FF9% 70/R0%20S%2020 I 0%20514.pdf, (Last visited I 0/05/20 13) 
14 S/20 I 0/514, UN Secretary General Report on Support to African Union Peacekeeping 
Operations Authorized by the United Nations, 14 October 20 I 0, available at 
lli.t.Q:/ /www. securitvcounci !report .o_rg,l,,-ll.f/ct/%_7 86:5 B FC F9 B-6 02 7-4 E9C-8C 03-
CF6E4FF96FF9% 70/R0%20S'%2020 I 0%205l4Jldf, (Last visited 08/15/20 13) 
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situation created against Egypt. 15 The African continent currently dominates the 
agenda of the UNSC. 16 For example, about 26 of the 4 7 matters considered by the 
UN Security Council in 2013 directly concern Africa. 17 Yet Africa remains the 
most vulnerable continent in terms of security. 
The UN-AU cooperation IS, therefore, extremely important for the 
maintenance of peace and security in Africa and perhaps for ensuring global 
security. The history of their cooperation goes back to the mid 1960's, i.e. two 
years after the establishment of AU's predecessor, the Organization of African 
Unity. 
The cooperative arrangement started with the conclusion of a 
Cooperative Agreement with the Economic Commission for Africa, a regional 
arm of the United Nations, on November 15, 1965. Its focus, however, was 
limited to "cooperation in the accomplishment of their common objectives for the 
economic and social development." 18 The UN-AU partnership in the maintenance 
of peace and security, which started with its predecessor the Organization of 
African Unity, has evolved over the past decade through the testing of new 
arrangements in Somalia and Sudan. 19 
Over the past four decades the UN Security Council and General 
Assembly Resolutions systematically have also been building on the cooperation 
15 S/3 721 ( 1956), 31st October 1956 
16 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 2 
17 Security Council Resolutions, 2013, See 
http://www. un.org!en/sc/documents/resolutions/20 13 .shtml 
18 Cooperation between the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa, OAU-UNECA, Nov, 15, 1965 
19 S/20 l 11805, Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations-African Union cooperation in 
peace and security, 29 December 20 II, 9 
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between the two organizations. The issue has received particular focus in the post-
Cold War era during which the proliferation of conflicts has become acute in 
Africa. 
For example, the UN Security Council held a debate on March 28, 2007 
under the agenda item, "Relationship between the United Nations and regional 
organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international 
peace and security."20 During the debate, many agreed on the importance of 
enhancing and properly streamlining partnership with AU, including through 
capacity-building support. 21 Generally speaking, the need to strengthen the 
cooperation and build the capacity of AU is deeply embedded in the Security 
Council resolutions. 
The PSC Establishment Protocol also devotes an article that specifically 
deals with the relationship between AU and UN.22 The Protocol identifies areas 
as well as channels of cooperation with international organizations in general and 
the UN in particular. It envisages cooperation with the UN in a number of areas 
including early . 23 warmng, conflict prevention, peace b 'ld' 24 m mg , peace 
20 S/PV.5649, Relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular 
the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security, March 28, 2007 
21 !d. 
22 See Article 17 ofthe PSC Protocol 
23 Art. 12 (2)(c) ofthe Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 
the African Union requires the AU Commission to collaborate with the UN to facilitate the 
effective functioning of the Early Warning System. 
24 Article 13(4) of the PSC Protocol requires the Africa Standby Force, where appropriate, to 
cooperate with the UN and its agencies in undertaking its functions enumerated under Article 
13(3) of the Protocol. These functions include observation and monitoring missions, other types 
of peace support missions, preventive deployment and peace building. 
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support,25 arms control and disarmament26 , international terrorism, and capacity 
building.27 
Subsequent to the AU launching, the AU Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government also expressed its determination to address the scourge of 
conflicts in Africa in a collective, comprehensive and decisive manner, within the 
framework of the AU and its relevant Organs, and with the full support of the 
wider international community.28 
The January 9, 2012 report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission 
on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace 
and Security outlines the Commission's vision on the strategic partnership 
between the AU and the UN system in the area of peace and security. 29 This 
vision of AU-UN partnership was subsequently endorsed by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government. 30 A strong African Union capable of securing 
peace and stability on the continent is perhaps in the best interests not only of 
Africa but also ofthe international community as a whole. 31 
The role of the UN Security Council as an organ with primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is duly 
25 Art. 13(15) of the PSC Protocol requires the Commission of the AU to undertake periodic 
assessment of African peace support capacities in collaboration with the UN. 
26 Art. 7(l)(n) of the PSC Protocol requires the AU Peace and Security Council to promote and 
encourage the implementation of UN Conventions on arms control and disarmament 
27 See Article 13(16) ofthe PSC Protocol 
28 Assembly/AU/Dec.21 (II), Decision On The Establishment By The European Union Of A Peace 
Support Operation Facility For The African Union, July 2003 
29Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 
30 Assembly/ AU/6(XVJIJ), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 29-30 January 2012 
31 Charles RizkiMajinge, Future of Peacekeeping in Aji~ica and the Normative Role olthe Afhcan 
Union, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 463 (2010), 463 
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recognized under article 17 of the African Union Protocol establishing AU's 
Peace and Security Council. The Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the AU provides that the PSC would complement the UN in 
the maintenance of regional peace and security. AU considers the UN as its 
international partner.32 UN also views AU as its strategic partner. 33 
This is the starting point for cooperation between the two organizations 
with a common objective of maintenance of peace and security. AU is currently 
establishing itself as a major regional player, and it has been involved with UN 
planning and has become increasingly involved in the provision of troops for 
peacekeeping missions in Africa. 34 
As an immediate reaction to the formal launching of the African Union 
on July 9, 2002, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution 
regarding cooperation between the UN and AU.35 The Resolution acknowledged 
the need for continuing and closer cooperation between the United Nations 
system and African Union in peace, security and the fight against international 
terrorism. 36 
In September 2005, the UN Security Council adopted an important 
Declaration on strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council's role in 
32 EX.CL/110 (V), AU Assembly Decision On The African Standby Force (ASF) And The 
Military Staff Committee (MSC) 
33 United Nations-African Union partnership Security Council Meeting,l2 January 2012 
See http:! /www. unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/20 12/0 I /united~nations-african-union-partnership: 
securitv-council-meetingJltml 
34 Paul Jackson, REGIONAL SECURITY IN SUN-SAHARAN AFRICA, COMPARATIVE 
REGIONAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE, (2012), 116 




conflict prevention, particularly in Africa.37 Among other things, the Declaration 
calls for "the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the 
United Nations and regional or sub-regional organizations or arrangements, in 
accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter."38 
Besides cooperating with AU in its operations on the African continent, 
UN has taken special interest in capacity building of the AU. While urging the 
international community to develop the capacities of the African regional and 
sub-regional organizations, including the AU Standby Force, the foregoing 
Declaration endorsed the UN Secretary General's proposal to establish a ten-year 
capacity building program for AU.39 
The subsequent signing of the Ten year action plan on November 16, 
2006 is a significant step forward to streamline the cooperation between the UN 
and AU. Such cooperation would advance the principal purposes of both the UN 
and AU, i.e. maintenance of peace and security. 
The Ten year plan was negotiated in light of the significant expansion of 
AU's efforts in political, peace and security matters.40 It provides a framework for 
the evolving UN Ten Year Capacity Building Program for the AU. 41 This 
cooperative framework is based on African Union priorities and United Nations 
37 S/Res/1625 (2005), Threats to international peace and security (Security Council Summit 
2005), (14 September 2005) 
38 Id. 
39 Id 
40 U.N. Doc. A59/285, The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General of the United 
Nations to the 59th Session of the General Assembly, (2005) 
41 AbdoulieJanneh, UN Under Secretary General and Executive Secretary of ECA at the Tenth 
Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union.(January 25 2007) 
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comparative advantage.42 Through this cooperative framework, UN endorsed 
AU's motto, i.e. "African solutions to African problems."43 
Under the Action Plan, UN and AU expressed their commitment to work 
together on issues of peace and human security, human rights, post-conflict 
reconstruction and regional integration.44 Generally speaking, this 1 0-year plan is 
a strategic framework aimed at enhancing cooperation between the two 
organizations and to enhance UN system-wide engagement with the AU, its 
regional and sub-regional organizations, to meet the challenges facing the African 
continent, focusing initially on peace and security, with a particular emphasis on 
conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, peacekeeping and peace 
building.45 Another noteworthy feature in the cooperation framework is the clear 
acknowledgment that the UN-AU cooperation is important not just for the 
stability of Africa, but also for the important role in ensuring international peace 
and security. 
As a response to this UN-AU cooperation framework, the UN took 
measures to expand its regional consultation mechanism to include the AU 
Commission and the UN Headquarter departments dealing with political affairs 
and peacekeeping operations46 . The UN Security Council indeed adopted other 
mechanisms of consultation suggested by the Secretary General of the UN, 
including inviting regional organizations to participate in the Council's public and 
42 Assembly/ AU/Dec.l40 (Vlll), AU Assembly Decision On Enhancing Un-au Cooperation: 
Framework For The Ten-year Capacity-building Programme For The African Union, 29-30 
January 2007 
43 Assembly/AU/6(XV), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 27 July 2010 
44 Id. 
45 The Secretary-General, Supra note 40 at para. 16 
46 Id 
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private meetings and encouragmg regional organizations to convey their 
perspectives and analysis to the Security Council pnor to examination of 
. ll l . 4 7 reg10na y re evant 1ssue. 
Under the foregoing cooperative framework, UN also supports the 
development of the African Solidarity Initiative in mobilizing resources for post-
conflict reconstruction and development.48The UN Secretariat provides 
mentoring, advice, operational and planning support and long-term capacity 
building support to the AU Commission for AU's peace support operations such 
as AMISOM.49 
This capacity building initiative helps to boost AU's capability in the 
discharge of its mandate to maintain regional peace and security. Obviously, this 
would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Moreover it would ease the burden of the UN in the discharge of its security 
mandates in Africa. 
An enhanced and innovative partnership is required in order to meet the 
21st security challenges of the African continent. This view is supported by the 
AU which recently warned against the 'deceptive comfort that status quo 
offers. ' 50 The AU Commission Chairperson in his January 2012 report on the 
Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and 
Security pointed out that most of the security challenges of the African continent 
47 S/2006/50719, President of the Security Council, Note of the President of the Security Council 
on the work of the Informal Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, (July 
2006) 
48 A67 /280, S/20 12/614, Report of the UN Secretary General, Cooperation between the United 
Nations and regional and other organizations, 9 August 2012, 4 
49 Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note 19 at 7 
50 Report of the Chairperson ofthe AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 34 
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"can only be addressed more successfully in partnership with the international 
community, in particular the United Nations system."51 
The Assembly of the Head of States and Governments of the AU 
outlined the underpinning principles of cooperation with the UN, for the 
promotion of sustainable peace, security and stability in the African continent. 
These principles are support to African ownership and priority setting; 
consultative decision making; division of labor and sharing of responsibilities; 
and effective use of the respective comparative advantages of the two 
organizations. 52 
4.1.1 Spheres of Cooperation 
A. UN-AU Cooperation in Peacekeeping 
Given the vulnerability of the African continent to conflict and crisis and 
the important role of AU in the maintenance of regional peace and security, UN 
has embarked on cooperation with AU in the area of peace keeping, which has 
taken shape over the years. As is the case with other regional organizations, UN-
AU partnership in peacekeeping has always come as a result of development of 
particular circumstances on the ground. 53 The case studies under Chapter 5 of this 
paper demonstrate this reality. 
The scope of cooperation m peacekeeping involves the provisiOn of 
support to AU m planning, development and management of ongoing 
51 ld at 7 
52 Assembly/ AU/6(XVlll), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 29-30 January 2012 
53 Supra not 49 
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peacekeeping operations and the provision of institutional support to the AU 
Commission for the operationalization of the Africa Standby Force (ASF). 54 The 
cooperation arrangements in the area of peacekeeping include the peacekeeping 
operation in Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the Sudan and the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which took 
over from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). 55The joint AU-UN hybrid missions 
in Darfur marks an attempt to depart from the previous form of cooperation 
between the UN and AU where the AU deploy first and the UN eventually took 
over full responsibility for the mission. 56 
On April 16, 2008 the high level meeting of the UN Security Council 
adopted a resolution welcoming the proposal of the UN Secretary General to 
establish the UN-AU Panel to consider in depth the modalities of how to support 
peacekeeping efforts undertaken by regional organizations mandated by the 
Security Council with a view to enhancing the predictability, sustainability and 
flexibility of financing of United Nations mandated peace operations undertaken 
by the African Union. 57 
The repmi of the Panel emphasized the importance of the partnership 
between the UN and regional organizations, arguing that the complexity of 
modern peacekeeping means that no single organization is able to address the 
54 Report ofthe Chairperson ofthe AU Commission, Supra note 5 at14 
55 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 16; See also UN Security 
Council resolution 1769 (2007) of 31 July 2007, and PSC/PR/Comm. (LXXIX), AU Peace and 
Security Council communique, 22 June 2007 
56AJayiTitilope, The UN, the AU and ECOWAS: A Triangle for Peace and Security in West Afi'ica, 
FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG BRIEFING PAPER 11, November 2008, 3 
57 S/RES/1809 (2008), United Nations Security Council, Resolution on Peace and Security in 
Africa, 16 April 2008 
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challenges involved on its own. The report stressed the need for equitable 
burden-sharing between the UN and the AU, which is faced with the challenge of 
responding to crisis even as it is developing the capacities to do so. In this respect, 
the Panel stressed the need for a shared strategic vision, if the UN and the AU are 
to exercise their respective advantages: the AU's ability to provide a rapid 
response and the UN capacity for sustained operation. Such a vision, it was 
stressed, would also reduce the likelihood of duplication of effort and 
organizations working at cross purposes. 58 
Given the complexity of modern peacekeeping, the Panel recognized 
that no single organization is able to address the security challenges involved on 
its own. 59 The Panel accordingly suggested the need for equitable burden-sharing 
and shared strategic vision between the UN and the AU, based on their respective 
comparative advantage. UN has a comparative advantage in its capacity for 
sustained operation; while AU's comparative advantage is its ability to provide a 
rapid response.60 
The Panel recommended two new financial mechanisms. The first, based 
on UN- assessed funding, is designed to support specific AU-led peace operations 
mandated by the UNSC, on a case-by-case basis. The second mechanism is a 
58 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra not 5 at 3 
59 A/63/666-S/2008/813, Comprehensive review ofthe whole question ofpeacekeeping operations 
in all their aspects, 31 December 2008 
60 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 3 
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voluntary funded multi-donor trust fund, which would focus on comprehensive 
capacity-building for institution building and conflict prevention and resolution.61 
Regarding peace-keeping operations undertaken by African Union or 
under its authority and with the consent of the United Nations, AU advocates for 
UN funding through assessed contributions which presumably ensure predictable, 
and sustainable funding for AU-led peace support operations. 62 Though the UN 
Security Council recognized "the importance of supporting and improving in a 
sustained way the resource base and capacity of the African Union,"63 it took a 
position that "regional organizations have the responsibility in securing human, 
financial, logistical and other resources for their organizations, including through 
obtaining contributions by their members and soliciting contributions from donors 
to fund their operations, and recognizing the challenges in accessing United 
Nations assessed contributions for funding regional organizations."64 
Yet Africa continues to face serious challenges in the area of peace and 
security.65 It is important to note that while the United Nations has undertaken 
various types of peacekeeping partnerships with the African Union and its 
subregional organizations, the form of this partnership has always come as a 
result of the specitlc political and security circumstances of a given conflict.66 
61 ld 
62 ASSEMBLY/AU/3(VIII), AU Assembly Decision On The Activities Of The Peace And 
Security Council Of The African Union And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 29-30 
January 2007 
63 S/PRST/2007/7, Presidential Statement of the UN Security Council, March 2007 
64 Supra note 57 
65 Assembly/ AU/4(XVII), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 30 June- I July 20 II 
66Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note I 9 at I 0 
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On 22 October 2010, the Security Council adopted a presidential 
statement expressing the Council's determination to continue working towards a 
more predictable and sustainable solution to the challenges of securing 
sustainable, predictable and flexible financing for AU-led peacekeeping 
operation. 67 
B. UN-AU Cooperation in Conflict Prevention 
Another area of cooperation between UN and AU involves the 
prevention, mitigation and reduction of conflict. While conflict management 
remains the core function of both the UN and AU, a relatively growing 
recognition has been given over the past years to strengthening collective efforts 
for conflict prevention.68 Hence conflict prevention increasingly becomes central 
to the AU-UN partnership. 69 The involvement of the UN, AU and African 
regional economic communities in the joint preventive diplomacy and 
peacemaking activities in Mali, Madagascar, Sudan and Burkina Faso 
demonstrate this trend of the partnership. 70 
Mediation is an important component of the conflict prevention scheme, 
where UN and AU launched a partnership. This partnership:;4s premised on Article 
52 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the UN Security Council 
to encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through 
regional arrangements. This has been primarily done through close cooperation 
67 S/PRST/20 10/21, UN Security Council Presidential Statement, 22 October 20 I 0 
68 Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note 66 at 5 
69 Id 
70 Report of the UN Secretary General, Supra note 48 at 4; See also Press Release: AU Deeply 
Concerned by the Unfolding Situation in Burkina Faso, 30 October 2014 
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between the UN Secretariat and AU Commission, in which the UN Secretariat 
provide help to the AU Commission to build AU's institutional mediation 
capacity. 71 
AU and UN also embarked on partnership in mediation efforts in 
specific conflict situations. The AU-UN mediation partnership in Kenya in 2008 
is noteworthy in this regard. When AU established the Panel of eminent African 
Personalities to mediate in the post-electoral conflict in Kenya, the UN supported 
AU's mediation effort by stat1ing the Secretariat of the Panel. This was perhaps a 
successful mediation effort from which valuable lessons should be drawn. Though 
such partnership could improve the quality of peacemaking in Africa, it is still a 
work in progress and much has to be done to reach its full potential. 
Noteworthy is the common guidelines for mediation in Africa that UN 
and AU Secretariat have been working on. The guidelines are based on shared 
values and provide broad principles of cooperation aimed at clarifying roles and 
strengthening cooperation between the two organizations when undertaking joint 
mediation efforts. 72 The success of these efforts to make the mediation partnership 
more coherent ultimately depends on the degree to which this approach is adopted 
at the strategic level and supported by Member States.73 
As rightly observed by the UN Secretary General, "[t]he mediation 
partnership between the two organizations has often taken place in an ad hoc 
fashion and more needs to be done to improve cooperation at the 
71 Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note 66 at 2 
72 Id 
73 Id at 7 
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conceptualization, planning and implementation stages of peace processes and in 
translating early warning into effective action through enhanced response 
capabilities." 74 
C. UN-AU Cooperation in Disarmament 
UN-AU cooperation on regional disarmament goes back to January 1, 1986 when 
the UN established the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa 
(UNREC) in Lome, Togo as part of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.75 The UN 
established the Regional Office at the request of AU's predecessor, i.e. the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU).76 
The UNREC is responsible to provide substantive support for "initiatives and other 
efforts of member states of the African region towards the realization of measures of peace, 
am1s limitation, and disarmament in the region, in co-operation with the Organization of 
African Unity, as well as co-ordinate the implementation of regional activities in Africa under 
the World Disarmament campaign."77 Following the establishment of the AU, UNREC was 
further mandated to cooperate with AU to coordinate the implementation of regional 
activities in Africa leading to peace, arms control and disannament.78 
741d at 6 
75 A/Res/40/151/G, UN General Assembly Resolution, , United Nations Regional Center for Peace 
and Disarmament in Africa, 16 December 1985 
76The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of Afiican Unity adopted Resolution 
AHG/Res.l38 (XXI) in July 1985 requesting the Secretary General of the United Nations to take the necessary 
measw-es to establish a regional office in Afiica to promote the objectives of peace, disannament and development 
in the Afiican region. 
77 Supra note 75 
78 See 
Jnt..p_:l /unrec_.org/iJ1dex/index~tion=com cont~nt&view=article&id= l l3&ltemid= 122&lang= 
en 
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In 2012, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN, 
UNOAU and the World Bank launched a one year program to develop AU's 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration capacity. 79 The UN, through the 
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, provides 
support to AU to develop an African common strategy to control small arms and 
light weapons. 80 
D. UN-AU Cooperation on Counter-terrorism 
Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international 
peace and security. 81 The suppression of acts of international terrorism is, 
therefore, considered as an essential element for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.82 AU's position that the primary responsibility for combating 
and ensuring global cooperation against terrorism rests on the UN is in tandem 
with the position taken by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 83 
Today, the international community has recognized that addressing the 
root causes of terrorism is key to effectively preventing and combating terrorism. 
The United Nations in its recent resolution adopted on 17 December 2013 noted 
the following: 
terrorism will not be defeated by military force, law enforcement 
measures, and intelligence operations alone ... [Security Council 
underlined] the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of 
79 Report of the UN Secretary General, Supra note 48 at 5 
so Id 
81 S/Res/2129 (20 13 ), 17 December 20 13 
82 A/Res/49/60, 17 February 1995 
83 African Union, The Peace and Security Agenda, 
A vai lab le at h!!P :/ /www ·i!Jrica-v.n.ion.OJg/rootjau/A U C/Departl]1ents/J.l$C /Cqunter Terrorism.htm, 
(Last visited 08/07/2014) 
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terrorism, as outlined in Pillar I of the United Nations Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) including, but not limited to, the need 
to strengthen efforts for the successful prevention and peaceful resolution 
of prolonged conflict, and the need to promote the rule of law, the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, 
tolerance, inclusiveness to offer a viable alternative to those who could be 
susceptible to terrorist recruitment and to radicalization leading to 
violence. 84 
African concerns over the combating and eradication of the scourge of 
terrorism have a long history. The African nations adopted a Comprehensive 
counterterrorism Convention two years prior to the 9/11 terrorist attack. The 
Convention is known as "The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating 
ofTerrorism", and it was adopted on July 1, 1999 in Algiers, Algeria. 85 The treaty 
entered in to force subsequent to the 9111 terrorist attack, i.e. 6 December 2002.86 
The 9111 terrorist attack provided a new vigor and momentum to fight global 
terrorism at the internationallevel.87 
However the importance of Africa in the global counterterrorism 
campaign was not duly recognized in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks against the United States. The perceptional shift evolved only after the US 
security officials focused on the history of AI quaeda in Africa, and the history of 
other terrorist groups operating and transitioning through Africa. 88 As rightly 
pointed out by Wani, 
terrorism could spread in Africa for several reasons, notable among them 
the growth of radical Islam in several parts of the continent; the existence 
84 Supra note 81 
85 African Union, OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters, available at 
http://www .au.int/en/treaties, (Last visited 06/04/2013) 
86 !d. 
87 Supra note 83 
88 Ibrahim J. Wani, THE AFRICAN UNION ROLE IN GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM, 
AFRICAN COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION: ASSESSING REGIONAL AND 
SUBREGIONAL INITIATIVES, (2007), 41 
161 
of so-called failed states ... ; proximity to the Middle East and the Arab 
World, where many terrorist groups thrive; the general inability of states 
in Africa to sufficiently secure their vast borders; and the movement 
across the continent of potential terrorists from other regions. Also are 
concern are the abject poverty and repressive political environments that 
leave many young Africans desperate, frustrated and potentially 
vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist elements. 
The UN recognized the importance of coordination at the regional, sub-
regional and international levels in order to strengthen the response to 
international terrorism, which is considered as a global threat to international 
. 89 secunty. 
The Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution of the Organization of African Unity adopted a 
Communique, which among other things, expressed Africa's unreserved support 
to the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, i.e. the landmark resolution of the 
UN Security Council to combat global terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations.9° Furthermore, the AU High level Intergovernmental Meeting 
subsequently adopted a Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism in Africa as a response to the landmark resolution of the UN Security 
Council 1373 (2001) following the 9111 terrorist attack in New York. The Plan of 
Action is premised on the need to strengthen the capacity of African states 
through intergovernmental cooperation and coordination.91 The Plan of Action 
parallels the key provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 13 73 (200 1 ). 92 
89 S/Res/1373, 28 September 2001 
90 Supra note 83 
91 Kathryn Sturman, The AU Plan on Terrorism: Joining the Global War or Leading an African 
Battle, AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW, (2002) 
92Wani, Supra note 88 
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Interestingly, there is an overall convergence in the priorities identified 
by the UN and AU in preventing and combating terrorism. These priorities could 
be broadly categorized as Counterterrorism legislation, Operational Mechanisms 
and Capacity building. 
The cooperation between the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee 
Executive Directorate with African Center for the Study and Research on 
Terrorism of AU is worth mentioning in this regard. The AU Center has made 
important contribution by participating in the works of the UN Counter-Terrorism 
Committee Executive Directorate, including through contributions to workshops 
organized by the Directorate and field visits held on behalf of the Security 
Council Committee.93 
However, neither the UN system nor the AU has managed to 
communicate successfully the respective priorities of each to the other. Bridging 
this gap is a priority not only for the UN but also for the AU. 
4.1.2 Modalities of Cooperation 
The existing modalities of cooperation between the AU and UN include 
regular meetings, regular consultations94, informal consultations,95 inviting the 
93 Supra note 79, 5-6 
94 Art. 17(2) requires both the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission to maintain close and 
continued interaction with the United Nations Security Council and the UN Secretary General. 
Including holding periodic meetings and regular consultations on questions of peace, security and 
stability in Africa. The new cluster for Peace and Security, co-chaired by the UN Department of 
Political Affairs and the AU Commission that convened its first meeting on January 18, 2007 is 
worth noting here. 
95 Art. 8(11) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union provides that the PSC may hold informal consultations with ... international 
organizations as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities. 
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UN to attend the deliberations of the PSC96, undertaking joint miSSions,97 
mandating or designating AU to act on behalf of the UN, through the 
establishment of liaison otTices, the appointment of Joint AU/UN Special Envoy, 
and annual address of the UN Secretary General at the opening session of the AU 
Summit. 
Over the last years, senior officials of the African Union have been 
invited to brief the Security Council and the UN Secretary General special 
representatives and envoys have also been invited to brief the Peace and Security 
Council. These briefings have focused on issues of common interest, including 
the situations in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Somalia and the Sudan, the 
activities of the Lord's Resistance Army and thematic issues relating to 
peacebuilding, the prevention of genocide and sexual violence in conflict 
situations.98 
A. Joint Consultation Mechanism 
The relationship between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace 
and Security Council is at the core of the overall strategic partnership between the 
two organizations.99 The UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security 
Council designed a joint consultative mechanism, whereby they conduct annual 
consultative meetings. 
96 Art. 8( I 0) of the PSC Protocol provides a power to PSC 
97 Article 13(16) ofthe PSC Protocol requires the Commission to undertake periodic assessment of 
African peace support capacities in collaboration with the UN. 
98 Supra note 66 at 3 
99 Supra note 66 at 2 
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The launching of a joint annual consultative meeting between the two 
organs of the UN and AU is an important step forward to forge cooperation 
between the two organizations in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. This partnership is premised on the importance of effective cooperation 
between the two organs for successful collective action. 100 
This annual joint consultative mechanism provides the forum for the 
UNSC and AUPSC to discuss on key peace and security issues of mutual interest 
and to explore ways to enhance their cooperation. 101 
The first joint consultative meeting was held on June 16, 2007. Thus far 
they conducted eight joint consultative meetings. 102 During the inaugural meeting, 
the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council undertook to 
develop a stronger and structured relationship, including between their subsidiary 
bodies, and to hold joint annual meetings either in Addis Ababa or New York. 
They also encouraged close consultations between the two organs as decisions are 
being prepared on issues affecting peace and security in Africa. 103 
During the joint consultative meetings, the two organs assess their 
cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and 
100 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 10 
101 Supra note 66 at 3 
102 ISS Peace and Security Council Report, Strengthening AUPSC and UNSC ties, 25 June 2014, 
available at 
(Last visited 10/19/2014) 
103 Report ofthe Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 10 
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peace building, including the maintenance of constitutional order and the 
promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Africa. 104 
While these consultations represent a significant step in the right 
direction, they are yet to translate into a common understanding ofthe foundation 
of the cooperation between these two organs. 105 
B. Cooperation between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission 
A close working relationship between the UN Secretariat and the AU 
Commission is important to enhance cooperation between the UN Security 
Council and AU Peace and Security Council. And it operates on two levels, i.e. at 
a political level and at the level of capacity building. 106 Within the framework of 
the 1 0-year capacity building program, the UN Secretariat and AU Commission 
initiated consultative desk-to-desk meetings on the prevention and management of 
conflicts in Africa. The desk-to-desk meetings bring together the desk officers of 
the two organizations in the area of peace and security to discuss and exchange 
information and ideas on country-specific and thematic issues of common 
interest. 107 
With authorization from the UN, the desk-to-desk meeting has 
subsequently been broadened to include relevant officers from the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High 
104 Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note !9 at 3 
105 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at I 0 
106 ld at 12 
107 ld at 14 
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Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Office to the African 
Union (UNOAU) and United Nations field missions. 108 There is also a field level 
consultation and coordination between AU Liaison Offices and Field Missions in 
conflict and post-conflict zones routinely with their UN counterparts. 109 
Moreover, UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council put 
in place regular teleconferences between the United Nations Secretariat and the 
African Union Commission as a consultation mechanism to enhance coordination 
and consultation at the desk level. 110 
According to the Secretary General of the UN, "[t]he desk-to-desk 
meetings have provided the United Nations, the African Union and the regional 
economic communities with a mechanism for cooperation and information 
sharing, and have led to joint initiatives on country situations and cross-cutting 
issues of mutual interest." 111 Those cross cutting issues include unconstitutional 
change of government, election-related disputes and political violence. 
The establishment of the United Nations Office to the African Union 
(UNO AU) in 2010 is a significant step in the right direction to foster closer 
cooperation and greater coordination between the UN Secretariat and AU 
Commission. UNOAU represents the Political Affairs Department, Peacekeeping 
Operations Department and the Depmiment of Field Support of the UN 
108 Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note 19 at 5 
109 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at 16 
110 Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note 19 at 5 
Ill Id 
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Secretariat at the AU Headquarter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 112 Within the 
framework of the 10-year capacity-building program for AU, UNOAU co-chairs 
the peace and security cluster, coordinating the support of the entire UN system to 
Au . h f' d . 113 m t e area o ·peace an secunty. 
The UN Secretariat also provides mentoring and advisory services to the 
AU Commission through the United Nations Office to African Union (UNOAU). 
For example, UNOAU provides continuous advice and mentoring to the AU 
Commission for the realization of AMANI Africa Calendar. 1 14 The technical 
support provided by UNOAU and the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations for the elaboration of AU Security Sector Reform (SSR) and AU's 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) agenda are also worth 
mentioning here. 115 
In 201 0, the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union 
(AU) Commission launched a Joint Task Force on peace and security with the 
objective of enhancing the strategic partnership on issues of common interest 
between the two organizations. 116 The establishment of the Joint Task force, 
which meets twice a year, has offered the opportunity for both the UN and AU to 
discuss cooperation in various conflict situations in Africa. 117 Given the mandates 
of the Task Force, it will have an important role to play in providing political and 
112 Report of the UN Secretary General, Supra note 48 at 4 
113 Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note 19 at 5 
114 Id at 8; AMANI Africa is an initiative that was born out of the AU-EU (European Union) 
Strategic Partnership adopted in Lisbon on 7 December 2007. 
11s Id 
116 Id at 4 
117 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 5 at I 5 
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strategic guidance, including through assistance to the UN Security Council and 
AU Peace and Security Council to strengthen their partnership and cooperation. 
C. Mini-summits or High-level Meetings 
Mini-summits or High-level Meetings are also important avenues of 
cooperation between the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security 
Co unci I. They are organized to strengthen the regular exchanges between the UN 
Secretariat and the AU Commission and garner coherent regional and 
international support to address maJor conflicts and crisis in the African 
continent.l18 The two Councils involve member states and sub-regional 
organizations in Africa in the Mini-summits and High-level Meetings. 119 
D. AU and UN Security Council Reform 
Most of the African nations were under colonial yoke when the UN 
Charter was adopted. Among the African nations, only Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia 
and the Union of South Africa were the founding members of the United 
Nations. 120 Though Africa represents more than one billion people, no single 
African state is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
AU recognizes the important role the UN has been playing in the 
promotion of peace and security in Africa. About 26 of the 4 7 matters considered 
by the UN Security Council in 2013 directly concern Africa. 121 As stated above, 
the African continent is the only region that does not have a permanent seat on the 
118 Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note 19 at 3 
119 ld 
120 See http://www.un.onddepts/dhl/unms/founders.shtml 
121 Security Council Resolutions, 2013, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/20 13.shtml, (Last visited I 0110/20 14) 
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UN Security Council. AU is, therefore, determined to correct the historical 
injustices against Africa through the Security Council reform. 122 This is perhaps 
the premise for African nations in advancing African Common position regarding 
the reform of the Security Council. 123 
Africa has been able to speak cohesively with one voice regarding the 
UN Security Reform. It established a committee of ten that articulates and 
coordinates African position on the subject and with a view to building more 
alliances in support of African position. The AU Commission facilitates the 
activities of the African Permanent Representatives of the Committee of Ten to 
the UN in the intergovernmental negotiations on UN Security Council reform and 
related consultations. 
AU advocates for a comprehensive reform of the United Nations System 
that "takes into account the principles, objectives and ideals ofthe United Nations 
Chmier for a fairer world based on universalism, equity and regional balance." 124 
Accordingly AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government took a position that 
Africa should be allocated two permanent seats in the UN Security Council with 
all the privileges, including the right of veto, and five (5) non-permanent seats on 
the Security Council. 125 
Africa's non representation as a permanent member in the UN Security 
Council violates the founding principles of the UN Charter. Africa's 
122Assembly/AU/Dec.l05 (VI), AU AssemblyDecision on UN Reform, 23-24 January 2006 
123 Assembly/AU/Dec.57 (IV), AU Assembly Decision On The Convening Of An Extraordinary 
Session Of The Executive Council,, 30-31 January 2005 
124 Assembly/ AU/Dec!. 2 (V), AU Assembly Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United 
Nations, , 4-5 July 2005 
12s Id 
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representation as a permanent member of the UN Security Council is important in 
many ways. It helps the Security Council to be representative and even for its 
legitimacy. 
4.2 Cooperation between UN, AU and Regional Economic Communities 
The AU and the RECs share the goal of a peaceful Africa. 126 AU 
Constitutive Act considers RECs as the "implementing arms" of the AU's goal of 
peaceful and prosperous Africa. 127 They are perhaps considered as the key 
building blocks for economic integration and key actors in ensuring political 
stability in their respective geographical areas. The Protocol on the Establishment 
of the Peace and Security Council ofthe AU outlines the relationship between AU 
and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The Protocol recognized RECs 
as part of the overall security architecture of the AU. 128 
The operational modalities of their relationship is defined by the January 
2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation in the area of peace 
and security between the African Union, Regional Economic Communities and 
the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa 
and Northern Africa. 129The MOU defines the scope and mechanisms of 
cooperation between AU and RECs. 130 
126 UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa & The African Union Permanent Observer Mission 
to the United Nations, Africa's Regional Economic Communities Briefing to the UN Member 
States. 2 
127 Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
128 Article 16 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 
the African Union 
129 Fredrik Soderbaum& Rodrigo Tavares, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICAN 
SECURITY, Routledge, 20 
130 See http://www. peaceau.org/uploads/mou-au-rec-en g. pdf 
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The MOU is premised on the need for strengthening and deepening their 
cooperation and enhancing their capacity to collectively address the scourge of 
cont1icts and ensure the maintenance of peace, security and stability of the 
continent. 131 Under the MOU the signatories committed to institutionalize their 
cooperation with a view to achieving their shared goal of ridding the African 
continent of the scourge of cont1icts and laying the foundation for sustainable 
. d b.l. 132 peace, secunty an sta 1 1ty. 
Under Article Vl(l) of the MOU, AU is recognized as the regional 
organization with primary responsibility to maintain and promote peace, security 
and stability in Africa. 133 Equally important is the recognition given to the 
contributions RECs could make towards the promotion and maintenance of peace, 
security and stability in the continent. 134 The development and implementation of 
the Africa Peace and Security Architecture perhaps depends up on the cooperation 
and commitment of RECs. 135 
The guiding principles of the Cooperation between AU and the RECs 
are adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative 
advantage. 136 The MOU also identifies areas of cooperation including the 
following: the operationalization and functioning of the African Peace and 
131 See 11Jtp://www .peaceau.org/uploads/mou-au-rec-eJl&lli!f 
132 Article III( I) of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation in the area of 
peace and security between the African Union, Regional Economic Communities and the 
Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern 
Africa, available at http://www .peaceau.org/uploads/mou-au-rec-eng.pdf, (Last visited 
05/20/20 13) 
133 Id, Article IV(!) 
134 Id, Article IV(iii) 
135 Intergovernmental Authority for Development, Peace and Security Situation in the !GAD 
Region, 18 October 2010, 12 
136 Memorandum of Understanding, Supra note 132 at Article IV(iv) 
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Security Architecture (including the continental early warnmg system and the 
African Standby Force); the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; 
Post conflict reconstruction and development; arms control and disarmament; 
counter-terrorism; the prevention and combating of transnational organized crime; 
border management; capacity building and any other shared priorities and 
common interest. 137 AU and RECs also cooperate in exchange of information, 
exchange of experience and joint need assessment in the regions. 138 
The modalities of cooperation between AU and the RECs include 
exchange of information, meetings including regular annual meeting between the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Chief Executives of the RECs, 
regular consultations, institutional presence through establishing RECs liaison 
offices at the AU, joint activities and field coordination. 139 
RECs are encouraged to anticipate and prevent conflicts, to undertake 
peacemaking and peace building efforts to resolve conflicts, including through the 
deployment of peace support missions. 140 RECs are not only required to make 
their involvement in the maintenance of international peace and security in 
conformity with the objectives of the AU Peace and Security Council 
Establishment Protocol but also to continuously inform the Chairperson of the 
Commission about their activities in this regard. 141 
137 Id, Article V 
138 Kai Schaefer, THE AFRICA-EU PEACE AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP AND AFRICAN 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, STRENGTHENING THE AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP ON 
PEACE AND SECURITY, (2012), 27 
139 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Supra note 132 at Article XV 
140 Id, Article V 
141 Id, Article XX 
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In the area of deployment of peace support missions, RECs assume the 
responsibility to make available the regional brigades, which they are operating 
for deployment outside of their territorial jurisdiction upon request by the AU 
P d S . c '1 142 eace an ecunty ounc1 . 
Kai identified the following as weaknesses of the RECs in the discharge 
of their security mandates: reluctance of member states on the political level to 
empower the RECs to discharge their security mandates given competing interests 
and varied priorities of member states; reluctance of member states to provide 
sufficient funds for the RECs; Overlap of Membership and Mandates in the 
RECs; the limitation some of the RECs encounter because of the prevailing crises 
especially in North Africa and the Sahel Saharan states and the gaps in the 
experience of RECs in terms of their exposure to activities related to the 
maintenance of regional peace and security. 143 
The MOU also defines the relationship between the RECs and AU, on 
the one hand, and the UN on the other hand. Not only AU and RECs undertook to 
harmonize their views at the forums of the UN but also they agreed to mobilize 
the support of the UN in the objectives AU and RECs set out under the MOU. 144 
AU assumes a leadership role in coordinating this cooperation with the UN. 145 
This partnership involves the UN, AU and the regional economic 
communities, including ECOW AS, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and IGAD. Operationally, the United Nations has previously 
142 ld, Article XX(3) & (4) 
143 Schaefer, Supra note 138 at 27-28 
144 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Supra note 132 at Article XXI 
145 Id, Article XXI 
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worked closely with the African Union and the regional economic communities in 
mediation processes, including in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Somalia, the Sudan/Darfur and the Sudan/South Sudan. Cooperation 
is still ongoing in many ofthese situations. 146 
Regarding relations with ECOWAS, ECOWAS member states 
reaffirmed their commitment to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and 
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. 147 Given the primary 
responsibility given to the UN Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, ECOW AS has duly recognized this role of the 
UN. There can be no doubt that legally ECOMOG would require Security 
Council authorization for any non-consensual enforcement action by reference to 
article 53(1) ofthe UN Charter. 
The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conf1ict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of ECOWAS not only 
explicitly requires ECOW AS to cooperate with the UN and the African 
continental organization, 148 but also require the Chairman of the Mediation and 
Security Council to submit report to the AU and the UN. 149 
The UN has collaborated with ECOW AS predominantly in the area of 
peacekeeping. 150 ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 
146 Report of the Secretary-General, Supra note 19 at 2 
147 See Article 2 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
148 ld, Article 41 
149 Id, Article 28 
150Titilope, Supra note 56 at 3 
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1997 respectively served as precursory efforts to UN subsequent missions in both 
countries. 151 
For example, the UN-ECOWAS cooperation in the Liberian crisis was 
the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation 
with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case 
ECOWAS. 152 ECOWAS and the UN had a division of labor. Whereas the UN 
assumed the role of monitoring and verifying the implementation of the 
ECOWAS sponsored peace Agreement, known as the Cotonou Agreement signed 
between the Liberian warring factions, ECOWAS assumed the primary 
responsibility of supervising the implementation of the military provisions of the 
Cotonou Agreement. 153 
ECOWAS discharged its mandate through ECOMOG, the ECOSOC 
Monitoring Group established by ECOSOC m 1990 to help restore peace and 
security in Liberia. The UN, on the other hand, discharged this important mandate 
through the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), which was established 
by the UN Security Council in September 1993. Interestingly, ECOW AS assumed 
a leadership role in the peace process in Liberia. 
When the violence escalated in Liberia, ECOW AS once again deployed 
a Nigerian-led force in Liberia (ECOMIL) in August 2003 until the UN Mission 
in Liberia (UNMIL) took over the mission in September 2003. 154 AU supported 
151 Id 
152 S/Res/866 (1993 ), 22 September 1993 
153 Jd 
154 S/Res/1509 (2003), 19 September 2003; See also Esther Pan, AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS, 2 December 2005 
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ECOWAS in the Liberian peace process, including by appointing AU Special 
Envoy in Liberia. 
Subsequent to ECOW AS intervention in Liberian crisis, the UN Security 
Council welcomed the ECOWAS effort towards the resolution of conflict in 
Liberia and further called upon ECOWAS to provide assistance in the 
implementation of the Peace Accord, known as the Yamoussokuru IV Accord. 155 
ECOWAS also imposed an arms embargo on Liberia that would support 
ECOW AS in discharging its security mandate. 
Ajayi identified the following as challenges confronted in the 
cooperation between UN and ECOW AS in the areas of their peacekeeping: 
Difficulties that confronted the UN co-operation in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone included lack of clear mandates, disparities in logistics and 
remuneration, and divergent approaches to issues such as sanctions, and 
elections. As such, even though there were some useful consultations 
between the UN Security Council and ECOW AS, the above factors 
created a disconnect between the political decisions that were made and 
their implementation in the field. 156 
Regarding SADC, the Department of Political Affairs of the UN 
established a liaison team with SADC at its Headquarter in Gaborone with a view 
to enhancing UN cooperation with SADC in the areas of conflict prevention, 
mediation and elections. 157 The signing of the Framework for Cooperation on 
September 21, 201 0 between UN and SADC provide a defined framework for 
cooperation on these areas. 158 The Framework is aimed at strengthening and 
155 S/Res/788 (1992), 19 November 1992 
156Titilope, Supra note 56 at 3 
157 Department of Political Affairs, Support to the AU (NEPAD), available at 
h!!p://ww\V.Un.org/africa/osiia/20 l 1 un svstem/DPA NEPAD%202Qll.J:>_cit~ (Last visited 
05/03/20 13) 
158 United Nations, Southern African bloc and UN agree to boost cooperation on peace and 
security issues, 21 September 2010, available at 
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drawing upon the capacities of both the UN and SADC, including SADC's 
knowledge and understanding of the region and the mediation, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding experience of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). 159 The 
UN considers the signing of the Framework as "the first step towards a very 
valuable partnership." 160 
lOAD has played a leading role in the Somali and Southern Sudan peace 
processes. After UN forces finally withdrew from Somalia in 1995, IGAD took 
the initiative to convene a peace and reconciliation conference that eventually led 
to the signing of a Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities in the Horn of Africa. 161 
lOAD is the focal point of all engagements directed at Somalia and also 
participates in the International Contact Group meetings on Somalia. 162 The 
International Contact Group in which the UN participates is used as a platform for 
cooperation between IGAD and the UN. 
lOAD has also been at the lead ofthe Somali and Southern Sudan Peace 
processes. 163 lOAD led the talks that created the Somalia's Transitional Federal 
Government in 2004. IGAD also spearheaded the efforts that brought about the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that paved the way for the 
independence of South Sudan. 
http://www. un. org!apps/news/story .asp')N ews I 0=3603 7 &Cr_:"'peace&Cr 1 ~'security#. U smqO PRDs 
(Last visited 09/1 0/20 I 3) 
1s9 Id 
16o Id 
161 SC/8148, UN Security Council Presidential Statement, 07/14/2004 
162 Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Peace and Security Situation in the !GAD 
region, 18 October 201 0, 9 
163 UN Office of the Special Adviser in Africa & The African Union Permanent Observer Mission 




CASE STUDIES: UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA 
Of the many challenges facing Africa, the quest for peace and security is 
undoubtedly the most pressing. Over the past two decades, the continent has 
witnessed a number of long-term, severe and, in some cases, inter-related crises 
and violent conflicts. African states are grappling with several difficult security 
challenges. While interstate wars and liberation struggle dominated the 1970s and 
1980s, the subsequent decades have been characterized by intra-state violence. 1 
The security dynamics in Africa has especially transformed over the past 
decade? The crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan, the recent crisis in Southern 
Sudan, the terrorist threats in Sahel region and Somalia, and the ongoing crisis in 
Somalia, the ongoing crisis in Burkina Faso, the less-than-transparent 
governments and ongoing uncertainty in Sierra Leone, and Angola, the maritime 
piracy in West Africa and Somalia, and the multi-state conflict in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) are just some examples. 
The AU Commission identified the following as contemporary security 
challenges of the African continent: Governance related intrastate conflict; 
Terrorism; Maritime piracy; border problems and climate change resulting 
1 PSC/PRI2.(CCCVJJ), Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Partnership 
between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater 
Strategic and Political Coherence, 9 January 2012, 5 
2 Chatham House, Africa's Security and Stability: Key Issues and Opportunities for Progress, 
Meeting Summary, 7 November 2012, available at 
http://www .chathamhouse .org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public!Research/ ~frica/071 1 12sUl!ll1.l<:!IYJl 
df(last visited 10111/2013) 
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migration which ends up to be a security challenge.3Transnational organized 
crime groups also exploit the spaces created by such insecurities and engage in 
activities detrimental both to human and international security. Such activities 
include drugs, arms, and human trafficking, cyber crime, money laundering, and 
other activities that feed into the creation of financing opportunities for terrorists 
and other violent groups.4 
The UN Security Council recently determined that the unprecedented 
extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security.5 This perhaps demonstrates the increasing emphasis given to human 
security by the UN Security Council. 
5.1 Contemporary Security Challenges 
The following provides a general overview of the contemporary security 
challenges of the African continent. 
5.1.1 Terrorism as a security challenge 
Terrorism constitutes one of the most senous threats to international 
peace and security. 6 The growing threat of terrorism in Africa also continues to 
pose a serious challenge to the consolidation of peace and security on the 
3United Nations-African Union partnership Security Council Meeting, 12 January 2012, available 
at 
http://www. unmu ltimedia.onz/tv/webcast/20 12/01 /united-nations-african-union-partnership-
securj1v-council-meetiog.html, (Last visited I 0/25/20 14) 
4KwesiAning, IdentifYing and Responding to Africa's Security Challenges, in REWIRING 
REGIONAL SECURITY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD, US Institute of Peace Press, 149 (July 
2011), 149 
5S/RES/2177 (20 14 ), 18 September 20 14 
6 S/RES/2178 (20 14 ), 24 September 2014 
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continent. The Chairperson of the AU Commission in her September 2, 2014 
report on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa stated the following 
regarding the growing challenges of terrorism in Africa: 
Over the past decade, the threat of terrorism in Africa has assumed greater 
proportions. Regions that previously did not perceive the seriousness of 
the threat, or were considered to be immune from terrorism, have been 
targeted by terrorists. During the same period, the threat of terrorism has 
spread from North and East Africa to Western and Central Africa covering 
the Sahel, which expands from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and 
Indian Ocean. 7 
The UN Security Council also recognized terrorism as an important 
element in an increasing number of conflict situations in Africa8 and that 
countering incitement to terrorism, motivated by extremism and intolerance, and 
addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, can complement 
conflict prevention efforts, 
The terrorist threat m Africa is a complex one, with growmg links 
between terrorism and transnational organized crime. This is further compounded 
by the fact that the continent is increasingly becoming a transit route for the 
global narcotics trade, with its potential devastating impact on societies and state 
structures, as well as by the proliferation ofweapons.9 
The AU Commission identified five categories of terrorist threats on the 
African continent; namely, 
(i) terrorist attacks on African interests; (ii) terrorist attacks on Western 
and other foreign interests; (iii) use of African territories as safe havens; 
7 PSC/ AHG/2(CDL V), Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent 
Extremism in Africa, 2 September 2014, I 
8 S/RES/2171 (20 14 ), 21 August 2014, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?svmbol=S/RES/2171 %20(20 14), Last visited on 
09/20/2014 
9 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra I at 6-7 
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(iv) use of Africa as a terrorist breeding ground and source of recruitment 
and financing; and (v) Africa as a transit point for terrorists and 
fund-raising tied to other illicit activities. 10 
5.1.2 Border Disputes and Conflicts 
Another source of concern relates to border disputes and conflicts. The 
artificial and poorly demarcated borders of many African countries during the 
colonial era are considered the most potent source of conflict and political 
instability for the African continent. 11 
Since African countries gained independence, the borders have been a 
recurrent source of conflicts and disputes in the continent. It is estimated that less 
than a quarter of African borders have been properly delimited and demarcated. 
This situation gives rise to "undefined zones" within which the application of 
national sovereignty poses problems. In these zones, a local dispute between two 
communities can rapidly escalate and lead to inter-State tensions. When these 
zones have natural resources, their management can prove to be difficult and be a 
source of misunderstanding. 12 Given this porous nature of the African borders, 
governance-related intrastate conflicts have also spilled over to entire regions, as 
has been the case in the Great Lakes region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa. 13 
As rightly articulated by Ikome, "Africa's colonial boundaries have 
continued to manifest a disturbing lack of homogeneity and functional polities in 
certain states, and, rather than contributing to peaceful relations, have remained a 
10 Report ofthe Chairperson of the Commission, Supra note 7 at 2 
11 Francis Nguendilkome, Africa's International Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict and 
Future Threats to Peace and Security, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES PAPER, May 
2012, No. 233 
12 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note I at 7 
13 Jkome, Supra note 11 
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maJor source of inter-state conflict, apart from fostering the regionalisation of 
intra-state conflict." 14 
5.1.3 Maritime Piracy 
There is a growing concern in Africa over the persistence and spread of 
maritime piracy, which is an international crime pursuant to relevant international 
instruments, including UN Security Council resolution 1918 (20 1 0). 15 
The past decade has seen a rise in Maritime Piracy. 16 In Africa, the 
pirate attacks are largely confined to the Gulf of Guinea, near Nigeria and the 
Niger River delta, and Somalia's Gulf of Aden. 17 Though there was a significant 
drop in maritime piracy in the Somalia's Gulf of Aden in 2013, 18 piracy is on the 
rise in the Gulf of Guinea. 19 In 2013, pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea 
increased by 33%?0 Most of these pirate attacks took place in Nigeria's Niger 
Delta region. 21 However there have also been attacks in Benin, Cote d'lvoire, 
14 Id 
15 Assembly/AU/6(XV), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 27 July 20 I 0 
16 Christopher Alessi& Stephanie Hanson, Combating Maritime Piracy, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 23 March 2012 
17 Id 
18S/2014/740, Report of the Secretary General on the situation with respect to Piracy and Armed 
Robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, 16 October 2014, I. Such decrease in the Gulf of Aden 
has been attributed to the presence of armed guards on ships, increased international naval 
presence and proactive engagement ofthe government of Somalia. (See Rick Gladstone, "Global 
Piracy Hits Lowest Level Since 2007", Report Says," New York Times, January 15, 2014) Note 
that the root of Somali's piracy problem has been the lack of an effective central government in 
Mogadishu, tied with limited economic opportunities throughout the country. 
19"Drop in Sea Piracy Helped by Big Somali improvement Watchdog Says," BBC, January 15, 
2014 
20"Suspected Pirate Attack on Tanker Off Angola," Maritime Executive, January 22, 2014, 
availab I e at http://www .maritime-executive .com/article/Suspected-Pi rate-Attack-on-Tanker-Off-
Angola-20 14-0 l-22, (last visited 09/21/20 14) 
21 Ben-Ari Nirit, A bumpy road to Maritime Security, AFRICA RENEWAL, December 2013 
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Ghana, Guinea and Togo?2 Generally speaking, maritime security in West Africa 
is precarious.23 The acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea have been primarily 
driven by political and social grievances. 24 
Both UN and AU recognize maritime piracy as one of the security 
challenges of the African continent. The UN Security Council in its resolutions 
and Presidential Statements recognized maritime piracy in Africa as a threat to 
international peace and security.25 Since 2008 when maritime piracy in the 
Somali's Gulf of Aden became a major global concern, the AU has advocated a 
comprehensive approach towards combating piracy and armed robbery at sea.26 
Given the magnitude of the problem, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and 
government adopted the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Security Strategy 
(2050 AIM Strategy), which is designed to address the serious concern at the 
growing insecurity in the African maritime space.27 
5.1.4 Governance related intrastate conflicts 
Governance refers to '"the exercise of political, economic 
andadministrative authority to manage nation's affairs (in the best interests of the 
people) and thecomplex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions 
through which citizens and groupsarticulate their interests, exercise their rights 
22 Id 
23 Abdei-FatauMusah, West Africa: Governance and Security in a Changing Region, AFRICA 
PROGRAMME WORKING PAPER SERIES, International Peace Institute, February 2009, 2 
24Aiessi, Supra 16 
25 S/RES/ 1950 (20 I 0), 23 November 20 I 0 
26 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy, African Union, 2012 
27 Assembly/ AU/Dec.496(XXIJ), Decision on the Adoption and Implementation of the 2050 
Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy, 30-31 January 2014 
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and obligations and mediate their differences". 28 Governance related intrastate 
conflict is one of the most important security challenges that African countries 
currently face. 29 
The AU Peace and Security Council in its Communique of 27 October 
2014 spelt out governance related issues which according to the Council are 
"potent triggers of violent conflicts in Africa". 30 These include marginalization, 
human right abuses, refusal to accept electoral defeat, constitutional manipulation, 
mismanagement and uneven distribution of resources, lack of socio-economic 
opportunities and corruption.31 
Empirical data from conflict zones in Africa speak unequivocally to the 
correlation between bad governance and political instability. The AU Peace and 
Security Council in its 360th meeting held on 22 March 2013 acknowledged such 
correlation as follows: "a number of African countries remain trapped in a vicious 
cycle of conflict, linked to multiple factors, including governance deficit. "32 
Bad governance indeed leads to deteriorating human development 
conditions, which reduce productivity and further weaken political institutions, 
eventually weakening the state as an entity. This vicious cycle is also potentially a 
source of tensions across groups and leading to conf1ict. 33 
28 United Nations Development Programme, Reconceptualising Governance, New York, January 
1997 
29 John Bugnacki, CRITICAL ISSUES FACING AFRICA: GOVERNANCE & CORRUPTION, 4 
August 2014, available at http://www.americansecurityproject.org/critical-issues-facing-africa-
govemance-corruption/ (Last visited on 09/11/2014) 
30 PSC/PR/COMM.(CDLXIII), Communique of AU Peace and Security Council, 463'ct Meeting, 
27 October 2014, 2 
31 !d. 
32 Communique PSC/PRICOMM.CCCLX, 22 March 2013 
33JakkieCilliers, Barry Hughes & Jonathan Moyer, AFRICAN FUTURES 2050: THE NEXT 
FORTY YEARS, Institute for Security Studies, January 2011, 9 
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Moreover, such weakened states are frequently unable to exercise a 
monopoly of force within their own formal boundaries creating a situation which 
Jackson characterized as "a situation where at a macro and micro level, the state 
exists as an island of stability within a broader sea of instability beyond its 
control.34 Such situations offer fertile ground for exploitation by terrorists and 
transnational organized criminals. 35 
The emerging trend of election-related conflicts and violence, for 
example, is a worrying development that ensued from bad governance. And such 
development not only undermines the nascent democracies in several African 
states but also could pose a threat to peace and security of the African continent. 
As noted by the Panel of the Wise in its Report on Strengthening the 
Role of the African Union in the Prevention, Management and Resolution of 
Election-related Disputes and Violent Conflicts in Africa, election outcomes are 
increasingly contested in Africa since the new wave of democratization in the 
early 1990s.36 This situation signals weaknesses in the governance of elections 
and the rules of orderly political competition, which perhaps could potentially 
lead to the recourse to armed rebellion to assert political claims and secessionist 
demands.37 The gravity of such tendency poses athreat to the viability of the 
34 Paul Jackson, Regional Security in Sub-Saharan Africa, COMPARATIVE REGIONAL 
SECURITY GOVERNANCE, 20I2, I I7 
35 PSC/ AHG/2(CDL V), Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent 
Extremism in Africa, 2 September 2014, 2 
36 See Assembly/AU/6 (XIII) Annex II, endorsed by the 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of 
the Union held in July 2009 decision Assembly/ AU/Dec.254(XIIl) Rev.! 
37 PSC/PR/2.(CCCVII), Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Partnership 
between the African Union and the : United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater 
Strategic and Political Coherence, 9 January 2012., 6 
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democratic processes in the Continent, as well as to peace, security and stability 
in Africa. 38 
Mention should also be made of the uprisings in North Africa in the past 
decade. The grievances that have driven the North Africa revolts have a universal 
ring to them: widespread dissatisfaction with authoritarian governments; 
increasing income inequalities, high poverty levels, and declining living standards 
for middle classes; and disproportionately high levels of youth unemployment, 
leading to social alienation. Modern tools of mobilization, such as the social 
media, have only contributed to sharpening the organizational tools of the new 
groups and constituencies. 
As stressed by the PSC ministerial meeting of 26 April 2011, the 
uprisings in North Africa should be used as an opportunity for member States to 
renew their commitment to the AU democratic and governance agenda, give 
added momentum to the efforts deployed in this respect and implement the 
political and socio- economic reforms which are called for in every particular 
national situation.39 
5.1.5 Coups d'etat as another security challenge in Africa. 
In 2008 only, there were three coups d'etat in Africa, i.e. in the Islamic 
Republic of Mauritania on 6 August 2008, and in the Republic of Guinea on 23 
December 2008, as well as the attempted coup d'etat in the Republic of Guinea 
38 Assembly/AU/6(XIX), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 15-16 July 2012 
39 Report of the Chairperson ofthe AU Commission, Supra note I at 6 
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Bissau on 5 August 2008.40 The military Coup d'etat in Burkina Faso ousting 
President BlaiseCompaore on October 30, 2014 is the latest coup in Africa.41 
According to AU, the resurgence of the scourge of coups d'etat on the Continent 
constitutes not only a dangerous political downturn and a serious setback to the 
democratic processes, but also a threat to peace, security and stability of the 
Continent.42 
5.1.6 Climate change as a new threat 
Climate change refers to "any change in climate over time, whether due 
to natural variability or as a result of human activity".43 A new threat, relating to 
climate change, is clouding the African horizon. There is a widespread consensus 
that the African continent will be "the hardest hit as a consequence of the climate 
change impacts."44 
Although Africa has contributed least to global warming, the continent 
is likely to suffer the most from the resulting consequences, whether they relate to 
scarce water resources, damage to coastal infrastructure and cities, issues related 
40 Assembly/ AU/Dec.220(Xll), AU Assembly Decision On The Resurgence Of The Scourge Of 
Coups D'etat In Africa, 1-3 February 2009 
41 "Burkina Faso's army chief has declared he is taking over as head of state after the ousting of 
President BlaiseCompaore, See http://www.sbs.eom.au/news/article/20 14/11/0 I/burkina-faso-
coup-armv-seizes-power, (Last visited 1 I /0 I /20 14) 
42 AU Assembly, Supra note 40 at I -3 
43 IPCC, Contribution of Working Group ll to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (lPCC), available at 
http://www. ipcc.ch/pdfiassessment-reportlar4/Yvg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdJ; (Last visited on 
10/27/2014) 
44Mahamat K. Dodo, Examining the Potential Impacts of Climate Change on International 
Security: EU-Afi·ica Partnership on Climate Change, SPRINGER OPEN JOURNAL, 17 April 
2014 
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to the decrease of food security for the general population and environmentally-
induced migration.45 
A comprehensive assessment by the Africa, Climate Change, 
Environment and Security Dialogue Forum (ACCES) concluded that "Burundi, 
Chad, the DRC, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan 
are the most vulnerable countries in Africa in the context of climate change and 
security, and that the Sahel region (stretching from Dakar in the west to 
Mogadishu in the east) is the most threatened region in the continent. "46 It is 
therefore clear that this phenomenon will impact negatively on the quest for peace 
and security in the African continent. 47 
5.1.7 Competing Use of trans boundary resources 
Across much of Africa state politics is dominated by a combination of 
the poverty of most people, t!erce competition for scarce resources and a key role 
played by the state in allocation of those resources. 48Given the scarcity of water in 
Africa, the use of trans boundary resources, especially trans boundary rivers, is one 
potential source of conflict in Africa. For example, river Nile that has almost one-
fifth of the African Nations as its co-riparians could potentially trigger conflict in 
Africa.49 
45 Id 
46Cilliers, Supra note 33 at 41 
47 Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 1 at 7 
48 Jackson, Supra note 34 at 118 
49 David Shinn, A Vision for the Hom of Africa, Remarks at a Conference Hosted by Advocacy 
for Ethiopia and the Ethiopian National Priorities Consultative Process, Arlington, Virginia, 9 
April2010 
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As population grows in the region and demands for water increase, this 
situation cries out of equitable allocation of Nile water. On the technical side 
through organs like the Nile Basin Initiative, there has been considerable progress 
among the riparian states over more efficient use of the water. At the political 
level, however, there are still major differences between the positions of Egypt 
and Sudan, on the one hand, and the other eight riparian states, on the other. So 
far, the situation has not resulted in conflict. It is important to take steps now to 
insure there is no future conflict over Nile water usage and allocation. 50 
5.1.8 Transnational Organized Crimes 
According to UNODC, "Transnational cnme by definition involves 
people in more than one country maintaining a system of operation and 
communication that is effective enough to perform criminal transactions, 
sometimes repeatedly."51 Transnational crime is considered as one of the major 
threats to human security, impeding social, economic, cultural and democratic 
developments. 52 
The spread of new security threats, such as transnational Organized 
Crimes, have added to the concern for the mass of the people on the African 
continent. 53 The June 2008 AU, Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation 
in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional 
Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional 
51 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 2005, !4 
52 Aning, Supra note 4 at !50 
53 Jackson, Supra note 34 at !!3 
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Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa identified transnational 
organized crime as one of security challenges of the African continent. The threat 
and challenges are enormous given the existence of fragile states that would serve 
as potential breeding grounds for transnational organized crimes. 54 
According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), "alarm 
bells are ringing about the volume of cocaine transiting the region (roughly 50 
tons a year). West Africa ... has become a hub for cocaine trafficking ... worth 
almost $2 billion a year. This is more than a drugs problem. It is a serious security 
threat."55 
Today Transnational Organized Crime's (TOC) threat is characterized 
by at least six trends. TOC groups are (1) increasingly global in reach; (2) 
involved in multiple forms of criminal activity; (3) expanding their criminal 
markets to include large-scale financial fraud and cyber crime; ( 4) willing to 
protect illicit activities through violent and ruthless means; (5) linked to 
international terrorist groups; and (6) devising novel organizational strategies to 
deter capture. 56 For example, the serious threats posed by transnational organized 
crime in the Sahel region are linked with terrorism. 57 
54Aning, Supra note 4 at 150 
55 UNODC, Drug Trafficking as a security Threat in West Africa, October 2008, I 
56 Aning, Supra note 4 at I 52 
57 S/RES/2164 (2014), 25 June 2014 
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5.1.9 Ethnicity as a source of Security challenge 
In many ways African security is ethnic related. 58 Ethnicity is "the 
embodiment of values, institutions; and patterns of behavior, a composite whole 
representing a people's historical experience, aspirations and world view."59 
Deprivation of ethnicity amounts to depriving the people of their sense of 
direction or purpose. 60 Every African conflict virtually has some ethno-regional 
dimension. 61 
Deng succinctly explained the co-relation between ethnicity and 
conflicts in Africa as follow: 
In most African countries, the determination to preserve national unity 
following independence provided the motivation behind one-party rule, 
excessive centralization of power, oppressive authoritarian regimes, and 
systematic violation of human rights and fundamental liberties. These in 
turn have generated a reaction, manifested in heightened tension and the 
demand for a second liberation. Managing ethnic diversity within the unity 
of the colonial borders is a challenge that African states are reluctant to 
face, but cannot wish away. 62 
For example, the December 2013 civil war in Sudan that was ignited by 
a political struggle between the South Sudan President SalvaKirr and his former 
vice President RiekMachar eventually escalated into ethnic violence between their 
respective ethnic groups, i.e. Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups respectively. 63 
58 Paul Jackson, Regional Security in Sub-Saharan Africa, COMPARATIVE REGIONAL 
SECURITY GOVERNANCE, 2012, 118 
59 Francis M. Deng, Ethnicity: An African Predicament, Brookings Institute, Summer 1997, 




63 Internal Violence in South Sudan, Council on Foreign Relations, available at 
Jl!tp:!/www.cfr.OI:g/global/globa!-cont1ict-tr(Lcker/p32 J 37#'(.'marker=3J., (Last visited 
I 0/30/20 14) 
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The over two decade's long cont1ict m Somalia also has an ethnic 
dimension manifested in the clan context. 
The Darfur crisis in Sudan's western region that caused death to 300,000 
people and displacement to 2.3 million people is rooted is an ethnic conflict 
"pitting Sudan's Arab-dominated centre against the "Black-African" marginalized 
majority at the periphery."64 
The thirty year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea had an ethnic 
dimension. The 1994 Rwanda genocide was ignited when Hutus began 
slaughtering the Tutsis in Rwanda. 
5.2. Case Studies 
The UN remains a major security influence in Africa. Of the current 
sixteen missions worldwide, nine are in Africa. However these nine accounted for 
$ 4,998,891,380 of the $7.06 billion earmarked for peacekeeping as a whole for 
the Periods from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015.65 The current biggest 
peacekeeping mission is in Democratic Republic of Congo with around 21,048 
uniformed personnel, 3,680 civilian personnel and 483 UN volunteers. 66 This has 
replaced Liberia, which had been previously the biggest mission.67 Examining the 
institutional experience of the UN in the area of its principal mandate to maintain 
international peace and security is key in understanding the challenges, 
64 Francis M. Deng, , The Darfur Crisis in Context, FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW, January 
2005, 44; See also Darfur Conflict, Thomson Reuters Foundation, Updated 31 July 2014, 
available at http://\vww .trust.org/spotlight/Darfur-contlict.(Date last visited on 10/31120 14) 
65 Peacekeeping Factsheet as of 30 September 2014, available at 
http://www. un. org/en/peacekeeping/resources/ statistics/factsheet.shtm I, (Last visited on 
10/27/2014 
66 ld. 
67 Jackson, Supra note 58 at 116 
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shortcomings as well as strengths of the UN security mechanism in Africa, and 
perhaps to propose concrete suggestions that would make it more effective to 
meet the security challenges of the 21st century in Africa. According, an attempt is 
made hereunder to analyze selected case studies of conflict situations in Africa in 
which the UN, AU and sub-regional security mechanisms took part. 
5.2.1 The Case of Somalia 
The problem in Somalia dates back to 1 991 when its state structure 
collapsed following the fall of President MuhammedSiadBarre. Since then, about 
fifteen mediation efiorts have been undertaken to restore peace and order in 
Somalia.68 The fourteenth initiative, spearheaded by Intergovernmental Authority 
for Development (IGAD), resulted in the establishment of the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) in 2004.69 TFG is the legitimate government duly 
recognized by the international community at large, including the UN and AU.70 
Many international actors, including UN, AU, the European Union, 
Arab League, the International Contact Group on Somalia, and Intergovernmental 
Authority for Development (IGAD), have been involved in international efforts to 
avert the crisis in Somalia. The discussion here, however, is limited to UN, AU 
and I GAD's involvement following the establishment of the TFG in 2004. 
68 AU Doc. PSC/PR/2(L V), The Chairperson, Information Note on the situation in Somalia, Peace 
and Security Council 55111 Meeting, (17 June 2006) 
69 John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, , Blowing the Horn, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 62 
(Mar./ Apr. 2007) 
70 !d. 
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A. The UN, AU, IGAD and Somalia 
Following the breakdown of political order in Somalia in 1991, the UN 
Security Council determined that the situation in Somalia constituted a threat to 
international peace and security and accordingly imposed a chapter VII arms 
embargo on Somalia in January 1992.71 The UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 
I) was formed under Security Council Resolution 751 (1992) to monitor the March 
1992 ceasefire and provide security for U.N. personnel and humanitarian 
1. 72 Supp IeS. 
Prior to the adoption of the foregoing resolution by the UN Security 
Council, Djibouti took the lead in the Somalia peace process by organizing two 
conferences to help bring the warring Somali factions together in July and August 
1991.73 Sudan and Eritrea on the other hand proposed to send peacekeeping 
troops to Somalia.74 In 1992, IGADD and OAU designated Ethiopia as the main 
coordinator of the Somali peace process. Such efforts by the regional 
organizations, IGADD and OAU were overshadowed by the interventions of the 
UN and the United States. 
The deteriorating humanitarian situation led the UN Security Council to 
adopt a resolution authorizing member states to employ all necessary means to 
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia 
71 S.C. Res. 733 (1992) (January 23, 1992) 
72 Edward Newman, THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 
NEW ERA: A GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY MANDATE, Macmillan Press Ltd, 136-7 
73 Abdelwahab El-Affendi, The Impasse in the !GAD Peace Process j(Jr Sudan: The Limits of 
Regional Peacemaking?, AFRICAN AFFAIRS. Vol. 100, No. 401 (Oct., 2001), Oxford 
University Press, 581,583 
74 ld 
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under Chapter VII of the Charter. 75 This led to the establishment of Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF), which was mandated to ensure the safe delivery of 
humanitarian assistance in coordination with UNOSOM I. 
On March 26, 1993, the Security Council decided on a prompt and 
phased transition from UNIT AF to the expanded UN Operations in Somalia 




On June 6, 1993, the Security Council condemned the June 5th 
unprovoked armed attack against the personnel of UNOSOM II. 78 This was 
followed by the Council's invitation to the UN Secretary General "to 
consult. .. with regional organizations in his efforts to reconcile the parties and 
rebuild Somali political institutions."79 On November 4, 1994, the Security 
Council decided that continuation of UNOSOM II beyond March 1995 could not 
be justified because the UN objectives in Somalia were being undermined by the 
lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties.80 The mission was 
eventually withdrawn in March 1995.81 Paradoxically, the Council determined in 
that same resolution "that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and 
. .,82 
secunty. 
Although the UN tended to abdicate its responsibility after the Security 
Council decided to withdraw UNOSOM II in March 1995, it has not completely 
75 S.C. Res. 767 ( 1992) (July 24, 1992) 
76 S.C. Res. 814( 1993) (March 26, 1993) 
77 Id 
78 S.C. Res. 837 (1993) (6 June 1993) 
79 S.C. Res. 878 ( 1993) (October 29, 1993) 




ignored the conflict situation in Somalia. However, its involvement is limited 
especially if one compares it its involvement in the Sudan. The UN appears to 
have modeled its level of involvement in the over two decade's long Somalia 
crisis on that of the United States.83 
Subsequent to UNOSOM's departure, the UN Secretary General 
established the United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) on April 
15,1995. Its mission is "to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation through 
contacts with Somali leaders, civil organizations and the states and organizations 
d ,.84 concerne . 
Subsequent efforts of the Security Council focused on the 
implementation of the arms embargo against Somalia. In 2002, the Council 
established a panel of experts that was mandated to investigate violation of the 
arms embargo. 85 
Subsequent to this development, the slogan of African solutions to 
African problems became popular. 86 !GAD also took the leadership in the 
Somalia peace and reconciliation process under the auspices of IGAD.87 
After the establishment of the TFG in 2004, the Security Council 
welcomed AU's continued support of reconciliation efforts in Somalia.88 Both 
the PSC and IGAD had been insisting on the urgency for deploying a peace 
83 Ever since US had its military causalities in the early nineties, its involvement has been primarily 
limited to providing financial, technical and military assistance to the actors in Somalia. Its 
collaboration with Ethiopia is just one example. 
84 See http://www.unpos.org 
85 S/Res/1425 (2002), 22 July 2002) 
86Katharina P. Coleman, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE 
ENFORCEMENT: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, 186 
87 Assembly/ AU!Dec.65 (IV), AU Assembly Decision on Somalia, 30-31 January 2005 
88 S/Res/1587 (2005), 15 March 2005 
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support mission to seize the momentum and stabilize the situation.89 The first 
decision came from the IGAD Heads of State and Government on January 31 
2005, in which it decided to deploy IGAD Peace Support Mission (IGASOM), to 
be followed by an AU Peace Support Mission. 90 IGASOM's mandate was to 
provide security support to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in 
order to ensure its relocation to Somalia and guarantee the sustenance of the 
outcome of the lOAD peace process.91 IGAD also called upon the Security 
Council to provide exemption to the arms embargo against Somalia for the sake 
of facilitating the deployment.92 The PSC, the Executive Council and the 
Assembly of AU followed suit supporting the decision of IGAD.93 
Nonetheless, the implementation of these decisions was difficult until 
recently due to the Security Council arms embargo against Somalia.94 The initial 
reaction from the Security Council was a statement issued in July 2005 that failed 
to address the issue of arms embargo but simply urged the Transitional Federal 
Institutions of Somalia to conclude a national security and stabilization plan.95 A 
month after fighting broke out in Somalia between the Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism and the Sharia courts in February 
2006, the Security Council issued a presidential statement, for the first time 
89 PSC/PRIBRIPS/(XI), Press Statement, The African Union Peace and Security Council, (8 
January 2007), available at 
http://www. a fri caun ion. org/root/ au/News/Communi que/2 00 7 /Press%2 Ostatment%2 0 So rna I ia. doc 
(Last visited, 12/02/2008) 
90 Assembly/ AU/Dec.65 (IV), AU Assembly Decision on Somalia, 30-31 January 2005 
91 Id 
92 Communique of the 26th Session of the !GAD Council of Ministers (November 29, 2005) 
93 S/2006/122, The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia, 
(06/21/2006) 
94 Id. 
95 The Chairperson, Supra note 80 at para. 13 
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welcoming the possible deployment of IGASOM, to be followed by the AU Peace 
Support Mission.96 The Council finally gave the green light on its readiness to 
consider the requested exemption to the arms embargo. 
However the subsequent press statement issued on 31 May 2006 took 
the Security Council back to its original position of insisting on strict compliance 
with the arms embargo. Such a stance was simply absurd. And paradoxically, the 
Security Council was insisting on the need for the Transitional Federal 
Institutions of the TFG to continue working towards establishing effective 
national governance in Somalia.97 Under the circumstances, where the embargo 
even extended to limiting the provision of training to the TFG, it was 
incomprehensible to expect effective governance in Somalia. 
Although long overdue, the UN Security Council eventually adopted 
Resolution 1725, granting the requested exemption to arms embargo.98 The 
Resolution mandated IGASOM to undertake activities aimed at providing security 
support and institutional capacity building for the Transitional Federal Institutions 
and creating conducive conditions for dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia.99 
Alarmed by the growing precarious situation in Somalia, the TFG 
invited Ethiopia to help. 100 Ethiopia's military intervention, at the express 
invitation of the TFG, created a situation that, according to the PSC, "represents a 
d h. . . ··101 new an Jstonc opportumty. 
96 ld. 
97 S/Res/1676 (2006), May I 0, 2006 
98 S/Res/1725 (2006), (December 2006) 
99 ld. 
100 A.U. Doc. EX.CL/319 (X), The Chairperson, Report of the Chairperson of the African Union 
Commission, submitted to the gth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, paragraph 94 
101 PSC.PR/BR/PS (XI 8), Press Statement on the Situation in Somalia, (January 2007) 
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When it became clear that IGAD would be unable to deploy IGASOM, 
the PSC decided that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) would be 
deployed for six months to contribute to the initial stabilization phase in 
Somalia. 102 AMISOM is anticipated to have a total strength of 8,000 military 
personnel and 270 police officers. 103 
Accordingly, the PSC requested the UN and the Security Council to 
provide all the support necessary for the deployment, including a review of 
Resolution 1725 (2006).AU' s call for financial, logistical and technical support 
for the deployment of AMISOM suggests the areas where AU requires the 
assistance ofthe global community, including the Security Council of the UN. 
In January 2007, AU urged the UN to lead the TFG initiative for an 
inclusive inter-Somali dialogue, which the AU considered as critical endeavor for 
sustainable peace in Somalia. 104 UN played an important role in the promotion of 
an all-inclusive political process in Somalia which resulted in the signing of the 
June 9, 2008 Agreement, under the auspices of the UN, between the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of 
Somalia (ARS). 105 
The PSC also urged the Security Council to consider authorizing a UN 
operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the expiration of its 
six-month mandate.This call triggered the adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 1744 in February 2007. Under this resolution, the Council welcomed 
102 S/20071115, UN Secretary-General Report on the Situation in Somalia, (February 28, 2007) 
103 Report of the Chairperson ofthe Commission, Supra note I at 17 
104 Assembly/AU/Dec.l42(VIII), AU Assembly Decision on Somalia, 29-30 January 2007 
105 Assembly/ AU/2 (XI), AU Assembly Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council 
on its activities and the State of Peace and Security In Africa, 30 June-lJuly 2008 
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AU's intention to establish a m1sswn m Somalia (AMISOM) and authorized 
member states of AU to establish the mission for a period of six-months. 106 
AMISOM's mandate includes: supporting dialogue and reconciliation; providing 
protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions; providing security for key 
infrastructure; providing assistance in the implementation of the National Security 
and Stabilization Plan; and, creating the necessary security conditions for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. 107 
AU's original plan was to have AMISOM for an initial stabilization 
phase, to be followed by an eventual deployment of a UN peacekeeping 
mission. 108 
The Security Council further requested the UN Secretary-General to 
send a technical assessment team to report on the political and security situation 
with the possibility of a UN peacekeeping operation following the AU 
deployment. 109 Although the role of regional organizations in helping resolve the 
situation is one among several factors that must be taken into account while 
considering new UN peacekeeping operations, 110 the hesitation of the Security 
Council to transform the AU mission to a UN operation largely suggests that the 
Council prefers to follow a wait-and-see approach. 
106 S/Res/1744 (2007),21 February 2007) 
1o7Id. 
108 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission, Supra note 1 at 17-18 
109 Id. 
110S/PRST/1994, Presidential Statement, Statement of the President of the UN Security Council, 
(May 3, 1994) 
On May 3, 1994 the Security Council decided that several factors must be taken into account when 
discussing new peacekeeping operations, including whether regional or sub-regional 
organizations could help resolve the situation. 
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The AU PSC in its Communique of June 29, 2008 once again called 
upon the UN to deploy peacekeeping operation in Somalia that will support the 
long-term stabilization and post-conflict restoration in Somalia. The response of 
the Security Council was renewal of AMISOM's mandates for a further period of 
six months on August 19, 2008. 111 
Successive AU calls to the UN Security Council to provide greater 
support to AMISOM and to fully assume its responsibilities towards Somalia and 
its people through the deployment of a UN operation to take over AMISOM have 
not born any fruit. 112 Though the UN technical and logistical support to AMISOM 
was authorized on account of the council's expressed intent to deploy a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation as a follow-on force to AMISOM at the right 
time under the right conditions, 1 13 it has not been realized yet. 
Given the security challenges presented by Somalia, the UN Secretary 
General recommended the deployment of a multinational force with full military 
capabilities instead of a UN peacekeeping mission. 114 Not only was the attempts 
to raise such a multinational force a failure, but the UN Security Council also 
refused to transform AMISOM in to a UN peacekeeping force or perhaps to 
deploy its own peacekeeping force. 1 15 The UN Security Council, through its 
111 S/Res/183 I (2008), 19 August 2008 
112 Assembly/ AU/5(XVI), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 30-31 January 2011, 
See also Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security Council On Its Activities And The 
State Of Peace And Security In Africa, Doc. Assembly/AU/4(XVII), 30 June- I July 2011 
113 S/20 II /805, Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations-African Union cooperation in 
peace and security, 29 December 2011, I 0 
114 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission, Supra note I at 17-18 
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successive resolutions, responded by authorizing AU Member States to maintain 
the mission in Somalia. 116 
Despite AU's authorization of an increase in AMISOM's strength from 
8,000 to 20,000 in October 2010, the UN Security Council authorized an increase 
to only 12,000 troops. 117 This decision limited the scope of the UN logistical 
support to AMISOM because the UN Security Council decided to provide a 
logistical support package only for a maximum of 12,000 AMISOM uniformed 
personnel. 118 This is just another example where the UN Security Council became 
reluctant to fully endorse the recommendations of the AU Peace and Security 
Council. 
The establishment of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM 
(UNSOA) to facilitate the delivery of the UN support to AMISOM elevated the 
level of UN's engagement in the peace process in Somalia. 119It especially plays 
an important role in facilitating the provision of logistical support to AMISOM. 
However, given the seriousness of the security challenges on the ground, the UN 
logistical support is inadequate to cover all the critical mission support 
elements. 120 
As of June 2007, the situation got more complicated by the proliferation 
of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea against vessels off against the coast of 
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doubt upon the even-handedness of the UN when it comes to a crisis in Africa, the 
marginalized continent. 
The TFG supported and facilitated AMISOM's deployment while the 
insurgents advocated against it. This is indeed one of the challenges the mission 
has had to encounter in its operation. AU has deployed forces in Somalia. AU 
member states support the AU mission in different ways including through troop 
contribution and the provision of logistics. Thus far Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra 
Leone, Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi that have contributed 22,126 uniformed 
personnel. It took many years for the African nations to deliver their promise to 
contribute such number of troops to AMISOM. It is currently operating under the 
AU command. Resource and logistics constraints are among the major factors 
that held back the African nations from delivering their promises. UN only 
provides logistical support while the Europen Union funds payment for troop 
allowance and other related expenses. 
!GAD's decision for an imposition of targeted sanctions against all those 
elements seeking to undermine the peace efforts in Somalia was endorsed by 
AU. 121 This was followed by the UN Security Council's sanctions against Eritrea 
on December 23, 2009. 122 The sanctions include arms embargo, travel restrictions 
and a freeze on the assets of political and military leaders for, among other things, 
121 Assembly/AU/4 (XII), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, l-3 February 2009 
122 UN Security Council Resolution 1907(2009), 23 December 2009 
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providing political, financial, and logistical support to armed groups engaged in 
undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia and regional stability. 123 
Recognizing the imperative of political engagement in Somalia, the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed former President Jerry John 
Rawlings of Ghana as the AU High Representative for Somalia to galvanize 
international support and attention for Somalia, and the engagement of the 
population in governance processes, in order to enhance the legitimacy of the 
TFG.I24 
In April 2010, AMISOM, the United Nations Political Office for 
Somalia (UNPOS) and the IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somalia signed a 
memorandum of understanding to coordinate their efforts in Somalia. 125 The 
Memorandum provides the framework for coordinating their activities in the 
promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Somalia. 126 
Subsequent to the signing of the Memorandum, UN, AU and IGAD 
convened two mini-summits regarding Somalia during the African Union 
summits in Kampala in July 2010 and in Addis Ababa in January 2011. 127 The 
second mini-summit was co-chaired by UN, AU and IGAD. 128 Following these 
mini-summits, UN and AU developed a strategic concept for AMISOM in early 
123Assembly/AU/3(XVI), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 2 February 20 I 0 
124Assembly/ AU/5(XVI), AU Assembly Decision On The Report Of The Peace And Security 
Council On Its Activities And The State Of Peace And Security In Africa, 30-31 January 20 II 
125 S/2011/805, Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations-African Union cooperation in 





2012, which was subsequently endorsed by the UN Security Council and AU 
Peace and Security Council. 129 
The AU's peacekeeping posture in Somalia points to the emergence of a 
different peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU 
views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it. 130 
Subsequent to the February, 27 2013 PSC's endorsement to enhance 
AMISOM with a view to facilitating the recovery of the areas under the AI-
Shabaab'scontrol and building the capacity of Somalia's national defense, public 
safety institutions and civilians, AMISOM has been able to register positive gains 
on the ground, signaling some optimism in the future of Somalia. However, as of 
this writing, the situation still remains fragile. In this connection, the AU 
Chairperson in her recent report on Somalia stated the following: 
Despite the peace and security gains recorded in those areas recovered 
from Al-Shabaab, the overall security situation in Somalia remains 
volatile. Al-Shabaab continues to carry out a dual-track asymmetric 
campaign focused on the conventional targeting of vulnerable AMISOM 
and SNA defensive positions and emplacement of Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) at AMISOM and SNA supply lines. On 21 February 2014, 
a group of 9 Al-Shabaab militants launched a complex attack on Villa 
Somalia. During the attack, 14 people were killed, including Government 
officials. On 5 July 2014, Al-Shabaab attacked the Federal Parliament, 
killing 4 people and injuring 7 others. 131 
Under the circumstances, AMISOM's miSSion IS likely to continue 
facing enormous challenges. 
129 A67 /280- S/20 12/614, Report of the UN Secretary General, Cooperation between the United 
Nations and regional and other organizations, 9 August 2012, 5 
130 Report ofthe Chairperson ofthe Commission, Supra note 1 at 19 
131 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia on the occasion of the 
462nct Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, available at 
http:l/cpauc.a\tlnt/en/cont~nt/repgrt-chairp9L~on-coJJJIJ1ission-sjrtJ_ation-somalia-oc£.(!Sion-4§2nd­
~~32''~~'-"'="''-'~~'-"'-'~~ (last visited 10/05/2014) 
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B. Challenges encountered 
Challenges facing Somalia m general are diverse, formidable and 
complex. The discussion here is, however, limited to those challenges the lJN, 
AU and IGAD, have encountered in undertaking the peace support initiative in 
Somalia, including the challenges in the cooperation between these organizations. 
The cont1ict in Somalia highlighted the crisis inherent in African peace 
initiatives at the international, regional, sub-regional and local levels. On the 
international level, it shows the reluctance of the UN Security Council to get 
physically involved in the African conflicts. United Nations has largely delegated 
the peacekeeping operation to the AU. Its involvement in the area of 
peacekeeping in Somalia has been less active. Clearly, UN's involvement in 
Somalia remains well behind AU and IGAD. 
Inadequate funding is one of the maJor challenges for both the 
deployment of AMISOM and the capacity building endeavors of the Transitional 
Federal Institutions (TFI) in Somalia. Unlike the UN, AU doesn't have a system 
of assessed contribution to fund peace support operations. Inadequate funding has 
been one of the biggest obstacles shared by other African political and security 
organizations in filling the gap created by the inaction of the UN Security 
Council. 132 
Funding AMISOM was, indeed, one of the thorny issues within the 
African Union. The AU Assembly has been consistently calling upon the UN to 
examine, within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the possibility of 
132 Eric, See Supra note 36 at 41 
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funding through assessed contributions, peace-keeping operations undertaken by 
AU or under its authority and with the consent of the UN. 133 Similarly, the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission had been blaming the international 
community for its failure to provide immediate and sustained support to the TFI 
d C' h . . s 1' 134 an 10r t e peace support operatiOn m oma 1a. 
The fact that the Security Council is still hesitant to transform AMISOM 
into a UN peace-keeping operation makes the situation even more compelling. 135 
As articulated by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the 
limitations in AU's management capacity to oversee large-scale peace support 
. . h d . h 11 136 operatiOns IS anot er auntmg c a enge. 
The UN Secretary General noted in his series of reports that the African 
Union continues to face serious, financial, logistical, and force-generation 
constraints in completing the deployment of AMISOM. 137 
The delay of responsiveness on the part of the UN Security Council to 
demands of AU is the third major challenge. The delayed response of the Security 
Council to AU's demand for waiver of the arms embargo undermined the results 
of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference-a unique and unprecedented 
opportunity for national reconciliation in Somalia. 138 This also has contributed to 
the present challenges of AMISOM's deployment in Somalia. In addition to the 
skepticism and the 'wait and see' approach of the Security Council to transform 
133 See Assembly/AU/Dec. 145 (VIII), Assembly Decision, (January 2007) 
134PSC/PR/2(LXIX), The Chairperson, Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the 
Situation in Somalia, January 19,2007, para. 35 
135 Security Council, See Supra note 115 
136The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Supra note 134 at para. 36 (January 19, 2007) 
137See S/2008/466, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia, 16 July 2008 
138 !d. at 35 
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AMISOM into a UN operation, the Council's failure to timely respond might pose 
a vexing dilemma for the AU, especially when the AU admittedly has limitations 
in its management capacity to oversee large-scale operations. This, along with 
other internal problems, can undermine the role of the AU stabilization force and 
provide the insurgents the opportunity to drag out and aggravate the crisis. 
Another challenge concerns the Jack of regular consultations between 
the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council. Though the AU 
Peace and Security Council has often expressed a desire to be consulted more 
regularly on the contents of the UN Security Council resolutions or presidential 
statements that impact joint endeavors, the experience suggests that there is a long 
way to go. However it should be noted that the recent UN Security Council visit 
to Somalia is a step in the right direction for a meaningful cooperative effort. Joint 
United Nations-African Union experience highlights the need for more informal 
communication and consultation between the two bodies. 
Equally challenging for the efficacy of the stabilization force is the delay 
on the part of AU member states in contributing troops to AMISOM. This is 
perhaps one factor for the extended fragile security situation in Somalia. It also 
appears that the lessons of Somalia in the beginning of 1990s resulted in a 
distinctive reluctance of African nations to volunteer troops to the AU 
Stabilization Force. In this respect, Berman and Sams argued that the council's 
reliance on burden sharing is particularly troubling as concerns Africa, where the 
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demand for peace keepers is arguably the greatest and the indigenous supply faces 
the most obstacles. 139 
The proliferation of initiatives and the involvement of many actors, 
sometimes with competing interests, such as the EU, Arab League, the 
International Contact Group on Somalia, IGAD, AU, UN, Yemen, Egypt and 
Sudan, is another serious challenge for the peace support initiative in Somalia. 
The absence of administrative structures and institutions in Somalia and the 
existence of underground residual elements of the Union of Islamic Courts are 
also challenges that need to be overcome to make the peace support initiative a 
success. 140 
UN expenence m Somalia has affected the UN's approach to the 
division of labor with regional organizations in the management of international 
security. 141 Its enforcement operation back in the 90s made the UN wary of 
operating multidimensional peace missions. UN's reluctance to deploy UN 
peacekeeping operations demonstrate how much its earlier experience adversely 
affected the political will of many Western Europeans and Americans to commit 
themselves for UN peacekeeping in Somalia. The wait and see approach of the 
Security Council in African conflicts was practically demonstrated by the Security 
139 Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, The Peacekeeping Potential of African Regional 
Organizations, In Jane Boulden, DEALING WITH CONFLICT IN AFRICA: THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Palgrave Macmillan, 35, 44-45 
140 See Supra note 123 at para. 31 
141 Margaret A.Vogt, Regional arrangements, The United Nations and Security in Africa, 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS, United 
Nations University Press, 1999, 295, 307 
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Councils' increasing application of political considerations rather than security 
and humanitarian needs in intervening in African conflicts. 142 
5.2.2 The Case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is considered as one 
of the worst humanitarian crises since World War II. 143 The International Rescue 
Committee estimates that the conflict and humanitarian crisis in DRC have caused 
5.5 million deaths since 1998. 144 The DRC crisis also involved many external 
actors, including its neighboring states. 
The DRC crisis can be traced back to the colonial period, and thereafter 
m the political situation after independence. 145Post colonial DRC (formerly 
known as Zaire) under the late President Mobutu SeseSeko is characterized by a 
lack of national cohesion where several of its border towns such as, the mineral 
rich Goma, essentially becoming economic appendages of its neighboring African 
• 146 Th h . k d . . h G L k . 147 h countnes. e et me rna eup an tenswn m t e reat a es regwn w ere 
DRC is located further made the states' relations in the Great Lakes region 
somewhat unstable. 148 
142 Charles RizikiMaj inge, The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa and the Normative Role of the 
African Union, GOETTING EN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2 (20 1 0) 2, 463, 466 
143 IosifKovras, UN's Moral Responsibility in the Spill-Over of Genocide from Rwanda to the 
Democratic Republic ofCongo, 19 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145 (2011), 147 
144 International Rescue Committee, Congo Crisis, available at http://www.rescue.org/ (Last 
visited, I 0 October 20 14) 
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The current DRC crisis is the product of three overlapping conflicts 
which are more complex than a competition over mineral resources, involving 
ethnic conflict over land, autocratic rule, citizenship and local political power. 149 
The first conflict started in 1996, and it ended up with the overthrow of 
late President of Zaire Mobutu Seseseko in 1997. 150 The beginning of this conflict 
is closely connected to the Rwanda genocide in 1994, where the Tutsi led 
Rwandese government invaded DRC in pursuit of extremist Hutu militias that 
instigated the slaughtering of over 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda. 151 Note that 
president Mobutu let the Hutu Interahamwe militia, which was responsible for the 
Rwanda genocide, to regroup in the eastern part of Zaire under the pretext of 
hosting refugee camps. 152 The Rwandan government which was upset with 
President Mobutu's complacence provided support to the Congolese Rebels, 
known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
(AFDL). 153 Supported by Rwanda, AFDL used the opportunity to overthrow the 
late President Mobutu SeseSeko and they installed the late President Laurent 
Kabila in 1997. 154 Kabila then renamed the country as Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), which was formerly known as Zaire. 155 
149Kovras, Supra note 143 at 145 
15o Id 
151 H. Dashwood, Mogabe, Zimbabwe, and Southern Ajhca: The Struggle for 
Leadership, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (Winter 200 1-2002), 80 
1s2 Id 
153 Supra note 146 
154 Id: Uganda and Rwanda helped Kabila because they wanted to secure their borders against 
rebel attacks. 
155 United Nations, MONUSCO Background, available at 
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The second conf1ict signified the end of the late Congolese President 
Laurent Kabila's dependence on Rwanda and Uganda. 156 This happened in 1997 
after President Kabila's former allies, i.e. Uganda157 and Rwanda, started backing 
DRC rebels, the Congo Liberation Movement (CLM) and the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (CRD) respectively, following a rift between Kabila and the two 
former allies. 158 
A third conflict running concurrently and continuing to the present is 
taking place in the country's eastern provinces between armed factions. 159 The 
competition among armed groups for control of minerals, notably gold and 
cassiterite, has been a major factor in this conflict. 160 The fact that the mineral 
resources in eastern DRC are controlled by rebel groups has played a significant 
I . fi . h . 1 161 ro e m mancmg t e v1o ence. 
DRC has effective control only on part of its territory. 162Vast areas of 
the North, some provinces in the South around Katanga and large areas of the east 
are either of dubious loyalty or are under the control of micro-level regional 
players that may or may not be loyal to Kinshasa. 163 The difficult geographical 
terrain, and the involvement of multiple external actors conducting proxy war 
156Kovras, Supra note 143 
157 During the same period the Ugandan government was fighting against the insurgent groups 
supported by Sudan and operating from DRC. See Africa Confidential, May 9, 1997, 1, 5-6 
158 Supra note 146: Rwanda rejected Kabila's demands of removing the Rwandan forces from 
DRC because the Interahamwe continued to use eastern DRC as a base. Rwanda further claimed 
that Kabila was supporting the Rwandese rebels, which Kabila denied. Uganda was mainly 
concerned about Ugandan dissidents using northern DRC as a springboard to launch attacks 
against Uganda. 
159Kovras, Supra note 143 
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SPIRI POLICY BRIEF, July 2010 
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worsened the security situation in DRC. 164Local, national and regional forces, 
including forces from neighboring countries, are involved in the DRC conflict. 165 
Though DRC had its first free elections in 2006 which brought President 
Joseph Kabila in power, the situation on the ground remained fragile. 166 The 
competition for the plunder of mineral resources among various armed groups has 
remained a central reason for the continued violence and the fragile situation in 
DRC. 167The crisis in DRC not only resulted in the collapse of the state but the UN 
considered it as a threat to regional peace and security. 168 
A. UN, AU & SADC on the DRC Crisis 
AU's predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, first got involved in 
the DRC crisis in 1996 when it reacted to the silence of the UN Security Council 
at the regional summit organized in Nairobi, Kenya. 169 However, OAU was not 
prepared to handle the DRC crisis of this magnitude because of its structural 
weakness combined with its shortfall of resources needed to support this type of 
initiative in the DRC. While recognizing the need for a continuing process of 
genuine national Reconciliation in DRC, the UN Security Council called upon 
AU's predecessor, OAU, to help all the Congolese in organizing a national 
164 Id 
165 Id 
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169 T. Murithi, Towards a Symbiotic Partnership: The UN peace building commission and the 
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THE DEAF: ESSAYS ON AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS, (Johannesburg: Jacana, 
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dialogue and to finalize agreement on the facilitator for a national dialogue. 170 
OAU's involvement in the DRC crisis was, therefore, limited at the beginning. 
This provided a vacuum for SADC's involvement in DRC. 
Nevertheless, SADC was not initially forthcoming to get involved in the DRC 
crisis. DRC, Angola and Zimbabwe intentionally avoided the discussion of the 
DRC crisis at the monthly meeting of SADC Inter-State Defense and Security 
Committee (ISDSC) by not sending their delegates to the meeting. 
After a while, only Defense ministers of Angola, Zambia, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe met in Harare and agreed that SADC will support DRC's government 
to ensure its survival. 171 The SADC defense Ministers decided to intervene in the 
DRC with a view to secure DRC's sovereignty, restoring its law and order, and 
protect the government of Kabila which the Ministers consider as legitimate. 172 
However the ISDSC did not have a mandate to make such a decision. More so, 
there were only four SADC member states present at the August ISDSC 1998 
meeting. 173 Paradoxically, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who was the then 
chair of SADC, announced on behalf of SADC that it was unanimously agreed 
that military aid should be sent to secure Kabila' s position. 174 
This decision was opposed by South Africa, which is a SADC member 
and the hegemonic power in Southern Africa, on the ground that military 
170 S/RES/1279 (1999), 30 November 1999 
171 Y. Bangura, Comments on Regional Security and the War in Congo, in Mandazaibbo, ed, 
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172Majinge, Supra note 142 at 482 
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intervention is not the right approach to resolve the cns1s m DRC. 175 Such 
position is perhaps understandable given its geographical distance from DRC and 
lack of any particular interest in DRC. The attitude of South Africa in the DRC 
conf1ict opened a floodgate of interventions by other states with stakes. 
Noteworthy is the military interventions of the three SADC member states, i.e. 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. Their military interventions under a Mutual 
Defense Pact on the one hand and South Africa's attempt to maintain neutrality 
deeply polarized SADC. 176 The other SADC members chose to remain silent 
following the foregoing decision by SADC. SADC was, therefore, divided in its 
. . . 1 177 m1t1a response. 
Another challenge for SADC to devise a strategy of its own to help DRC 
was the fact that none of the Great Lakes countries are members of SADC. 178 
Interestingly, South Africa shifted its position in September 1998, and 
declared that military intervention in DRC is reasonable at the mini SADC 
Summit in Durban, South Africa. 179 However South Africa made it clear that it 
would not send troops to DRC. 180 
Though Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola invoked alliance claims under 
SADC Treaty, their military intervention was outside SADC's institutional 
175 ld 
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framework. 181 However, the intervention played an important role in protecting 
the DRC capital, Kinshasa, against advancing rebel forces. 182 Even though SADC 
Summit did not initially approve the intervention in DRC, it subsequently adopted 
a declaration welcoming this SADC initiative and commending Angola, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe for providing troops to assist the peace process in DRC. 183 
Unfortunately, the OAU did not even try to comment on the interventions in the 
DRC. 
SADC found a common ground in pursuing diplomatic initiatives, led 
by South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia. 184 This diplomatic effort was 
supported by OAU and the UN. 185 Months of SADC's diplomatic efforts in the 
Lusaka peace process led to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasetire Agreement in 
July 1999. 186 The Agreement provided a road map for the resolution of the 
conflict in DRC. It basically established the political imperative to hold the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue among the DRC government representative, the armed 
opposition, the political opposition and civil society. 187 
UN's first operation in DRC is traced back to November 30, 1999 when 
UN authorized the establishment of the UN Observer Mission in DRC (commonly 
referred to as MONUC), following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
181 Van As, Supra note 145 at 333 
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Agreement between DRC and five regional States, i.e. Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe. 188 
MONUC's initial mandate was to oversee the key components of the 
Lusaka peace agreement, including the observation of the ceasefire and 
disengagement of forces and to maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire 
Agreement. 189 However MONUC's mandate changed over the course of time. In 
2000, the UN Security Council expanded MONUC's mandate to "facilitate 
humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to 
vulnerable groups including women, children, and demobilize child soldier." 190 
Despite the continued violence in DRC, the implementation of the 
Lusaka Peace Agreement was continuously missed. 191 Whilst the majority of 
Kabila's Southern African allies withdrew, rebel groups remained active in the 
four Eastern provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu, Ituri, and Maniema. In 2004 
Rebel fighting in the region intensified and widespread riots began in protest in 
response to the UN' s failure to act. 
As a reaction to this development, the UN Security Council expanded 
MONUC's mandate to include to protecting civilians, humanitarian and UN 
personnel, to discourage violence using force, if necessary, and to allow UN 
188JakkieCillers& Mark Malan, PEACE KEEPING IN DRC: MONUC AND THE ROAD TO 
PEACE, 200 I, Institute of Security Studies, available at 
http://www. issafrica .org/pub I ications/monographs/monograph-66-peacekeeping- in-the-drc.-
monuc-and-the-road-to-peace-jakkie-cilliers-and-mark-malan, (Last visited 06/10/20 II) 
189 S/RES/1279 ( 1999), 30 November 1999 
190 S/RES/1291 (2000), 24 February 2000 
191 Supra note 187 
219 
personnel to operate freely, particularly in the eastern part of DRC. 192 MONUC 
also increased its personnel for the discharge of this mandate. 193 
This led to the next phase under which MONUC was mandated relating 
to the transition and organization of elections in DRC. 194 Following the 2006 
election in DRC, MONUC's mandate was redefined with changes evolving on the 
ground. The UN Secretary General identified the following as pillars for the 
revised task: 
Assist the government of the DRC in (a) building a stable security 
environment, (b) consolidating democracy, (c) planning security sector 
reform and participating in its early stages, (d) protecting human rights 
and strengthening the rule of law, (e) contribute actively, ifrequested to do 
so by the government, to the coordination of international assistance. 195 
Given its importance for governance and the future stability for DRC, 
MONUC gave priority to the Security Sector Reform in DRC. 196 In terms of 
implementing this mandate, the UN Security Council advocated for a national 
approach and a nationally owned process in pursuing the Security Sector 
Reform. 197 
Despite the February 25, 2008 decision to reform the armed forces and 
the national Congolese police under the Security Sector Reform, MONUC fell 
short of achieving this important objective of the Mission. Terrie attributed this to 
the lack of a "doctrinal based campaign plan that clearly identified the role and 
192 S/RES/1565 (2004), 1 October 2004 
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task of its military forces in achieving the wider objectives ofthe mission."198 The 
lack of capacity of the DRC armed force, the continued proliferation of arms 
further made the accomplishment ofMONUC's mission difficult. 
In early 2007, MONUC undertook the task of coordinating 
demilitarization and reintegration of foreign groups. 199 MONUC's task under this 
phase included ensuring the total withdrawal of foreign groups from the 
Congolese territory under the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
system (DDR).200 MONUC established temporary reception center where 
combatants could surrender their weapon to be destroyed by MONUC.201 
MONUC repatriated about 14, I 00 soldiers during this process.202 
MONUC had implemented multiple political, military, rule of law and 
capacity-building tasks as mandated by the UN Security Council resolutions.203 
MONUC also endeavored to help the resolution of ongoing conflicts in various 
DRC provinces. 204 
MONUC remained on the ground until it was renamed and transformed 
into United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC MONUSCO) in July 2010. Such transformation was 
triggered by the need to overcome the challenges ensuing from DRC entering into 
a new phase of its transition towards peace consolidation. 205 MONUSCO is given 
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an additional power to use all means necessary to carry out its mandate relating to 
the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders 
under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the 
DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. 
The UN Security Council duly recognized the linkage between "the 
illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources and the proliferation and 
trafficking of arms is among the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts 
in the Great Lakes region".206 In establishing MONUSCO, the UN Security 
Council expressed its serious concern over the humanitarian and human rights 
situation in the areas affected by armed conflicts in DRC, especially the targeted 
attacks against the civilian population, the widespread sexual violence, the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers and extrajudicial executions.207 
UN Security Council authorized M ONUSCO a maximum of 19,815 
military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 
personnel of formed police units.208 This was in addition to the civilian, judiciary 
and correction components?09 The Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO is a more 
aggressive kind of force which is mandated to use military force to restore peace 
and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.210 This mandate allows the 
Intervention Brigade to conduct offensive operations in the protection of 
civilians. 21 1 
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A technical committee was also established to define the regional 
benchmarks anticipated under the UN Security Council Resolution 2098 
(2012). 212 MONUSCO strongly feels that only good army could address the 
problem by armed forces? 13 Hence its underlying emphasis is working on the 
Security Sector Reform, which would help DRC to have its own strong army? 14 
MONUSCO has been playing an important role in coordination with the 
DRC army for the restoration of state authority in the areas previously controlled 
by the rebellion? 15 The restoration of state authority in the areas previously 
controlled by March 23 (M23) rebellion is worth mentioning in this regard.216 
The continued cycle of conflict and persistent violence by Congolese 
and foreign armed groups in eastern DRC led into the signing ofthe Addis Ababa 
Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region on 
February 24, 2013? 17 The Movement of March 23 (M23) rebel group plunged 
the eastern DRC in chaos, which was perhaps the immediate triggering factor for 
the negotiation of the Framework? 18 This Framework was signed by ten 
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countries, namely DRC, Central African Republic, Angola, Burundi, the Republic 
of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania.219 
The UN, AU, SADC and the International Conference on the Great 
Lakes Region signed the Framework as witnesses. These organizations put their 
etTorts together for the signing of the Framework though UN led the initiative.220 
The Addis Ababa Framework describes the extent of the conflict and the 
violence as follows: The consequences ofthis violence have been nothing short of 
devastating. Acts of sexual violence and serious violations of human rights are 
used regularly and almost daily as weapons of war. Displacement figures are 
among the highest in the world and persistently hover near two million people. 
The implementation of the country's reconstruction, security sector reform and 
poverty alleviation program is regularly disrupted.221 
The countries of the region recognized that the path followed thus far 
was untenable and the Framework Agreement is meant to address the root causes 
of the conflict. 222 
The Addis Ababa Framework provided the principles of engagement 
among the countries of the region and the international community at large, 
including the UN Security Council. As far as the UN Security Council is 
concerned, the Framework provides that the Security Council would remain 
seized of the importance of supporting the long-term stability of DRC and the 
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Great Lakes region?23 It also anticipates a strategic review of MONUSCO with a 
view to supporting DRC to address security challenges and extend state 
authority. 224 The Framework further provided an oversight mechanism for the 
proper implementation of the Framework under which the signatories, UN, AU 
and SADC could work together. 225 
In February 2013, the SADC Summit, which called for a peaceful and 
durable resolution of the conflict in eastern DRC, decided to deploy a peace-
keeping force in DRC?26 This decision challenged existing peace-keeping 
procedure and could have far-reaching consequences for all future peace-keeping 
. 227 operatwns. 
B. Challenges Encountered 
The complexity of the conflict in DRC made the UN mission long and 
very expensive.228 It is not an easy venture to evaluate the success of the UN 
operation in DRC given the complexity of the problem in a vast country like 
DRC. The UN was clearly slow in initially responding to the DRC crisis. It took 
the UN over three years to authorize the deployment of peacekeeping force in 
DRC reflecting the strategic marginality of the African continent. This is not to 
undermine the important role the UN has been playing in the maintenance of 
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peace and security in DRC since the late 90s but to emphasize on the importance 
of timely response to mitigate the damages. 
Though MONUC's initial role was limited to monitoring the 
implementation of the Lusaka Agreements, its mandates progressively expanded 
to include intervention and assistance. UN has also been involved in the 
reconstruction of DRC by assisting this war ravaged country in the establishment 
of rule of law, Security Sector Reform and the improvement of human rights. 
Though UN has the largest peacekeeping in the DRC, it has not done 
enough to addressing the root causes of the conflict, especially the unlawful 
exploitation of mineral resources, which still put the security situation in eastern 
DRC fragile. Among other things, the absence of credible political process and 
the international community's selective and inconsistent engagement adversely 
impacted on the effectiveness ofthe UN?29 
As articulated by Ricci, the lack of familiarity with the environment and 
the culture of the population also attributed for MONUC's inefficiency. 
Inadequate financial resources and inadequate number of peacekeepers given the 
vast size of DRC also attribute to MONUC's inefficiency. 230The challenges, 
facing the mission include inadequate financial resources and the inadequate 
number of peacekeepers who are too few, given the vast size of DRC. 
The Addis Ababa Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework 
recognized this shortcoming of the UN operations in DRC. The proper 
229 The Perils of Peacekeeping without Politics, MONUC and MONUSCO in the DRC, Rift 
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implementation of the Framework, which is perhaps designed to address the root 
causes of the problem in DRC, is critical to realize the security objectives of the 
UN. The appointment of Mary Robinson as a special representative of the UN 
Secretary General in DRC helps a lot to facilitate cooperation among international 
actors and more importantly in the implementation of the Addis Ababa Peace, 
Security and Cooperation Framework. 
Given the track record in the region where implementation of previous 
peace agreements regarding DRC crisis was a serious problem, the 
implementation of the Framework has already encountered some challenges. 
These include: 
(i) the continued presence of negative forces in eastern DRC, including the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); (ii) the delay in 
the implementation of the Conclusions of the Kampala Direct Dialogue 
between the DRC Government and the M23, as contained in their 
statements adopted in Nairobi on 12 December 2013; (iii) the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources in eastern DRC; and (iv) the persistence 
of impunity despite the reforms that the Congolese Government is 
endeavouring to bring about.231 
The fact that the Framework is vague would further put some doubt on 
the genuine commitment of the signatories to address the root causes of the DRC 
crisis. Moreover the involvement of multiple actors in the implementation of the 
Framework may adversely impact on the smooth implementation of the 
231 PSC/PR/COMM/(CDLII), Communique of the Peace and Security Council, 452nd Meeting, 22 
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Framework. Yet one should remain optimistic taking into account the positive 
steps thus far taken towards the implementation of the Framework. UN should 
therefore assert its leadership role if sustainable peace is to be achieved in DRC. 
5.2.3 The Case of Liberia 
In 1989, a civil war broke out in Liberia following a fraudulent election 
under President Samuel doe's regime?32 This resulted in the collapse of the 
Liberian government and a major humanitarian crisis with a high refugee inf1ux 
that threatened the security of the sub-region.233 In July 1990, President Doe 
requested for the deployment of ECOWAS peacekeeping force alleging that the 
rebellion led by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front would devastate the 
entire sub-region.234 
A. UN and ECOWAS on Liberia Crisis 
ECOWAS member states were initially divided on how to respond to 
this call. Whereas Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida, who is a personal friend 
of President Doe, favored military intervention, the two leading Francophone 
states in ECOW AS, i.e. Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, expressed support to 
Taylor's rebellion and opposed ECOWAS' intervention in Liberia.235 ECOWAS 
heads of state and government formed a Standing Mediation Committee 
composed of Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Mali and Togo to identify a peaceful 
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228 
solution to the crisis in Liberia.236 The committee's initial attempt to negotiate a 
ceasefire did not succeed because of President's Doe's refusal to step down?37 
The rebel leader, Tayor, on the other hand aspired to gaining ground and political 
power.238 
In July 1990, the ECOW AS Sub-Committee on Defense convene a two 
days meeting in Sierra Leone and drew up a plan for military intervention force in 
Liberia. 239 On August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee met 
and adopted the ECOW AS Peace Plan for Liberia?40 Accordingly it established 
an ECOW AS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to help resolve the internal 
armed conflict in Liberia on August 7. 1990.241 The Committee further made a 
call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and deployed ECOW AS Ceasefire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG, and codenamed Operation Liberty by Nigeria) on 
August 24, 1990?42 
Despite the resistance from some ECOWAS member states, the 
ECOWAS Authority ultimately not only endorsed the ECOWAS SMC peace plan 
but also considered it as a "timely initiatives taken on behalf of the entire 
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community' .243 This after the fact unammous endorsement was made at an 
emergency meeting inN ovcmbcr 1990 following the killing of President Doc?44 
ECOMOG was originally mandated to arrange and supervise a cease-
fire in Liberia to be followed by the establishment and sustenance of an interim 
government leading to democratic elections within twelve months.245 Its role 
shifted into that of enforcement after the rival forces murdered President Doc few 
weeks after ECOMOG's arrival in Liberia which left a governmental power 
vacuum. 246 The hostile reception from the rebel army in Liberia is an important 
factor that triggered the need for ECOMOG's peace enforcement mandatc.247 It 
was the first peace enforcement operation by an African sub-regional 
organization.248 
ECOWAS neither sought nor obtained the UN mandate to take 
enforcement action in Libcria. 249 The Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) that 
established ECOMOG only sought international financial support for the 
intcrvcntion.250 In a letter addressed to the UN Secretary General two days after 
ECOMOG's creation, Nigeria's Minister of External Affairs stated the following: 
In view of our shared responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, we have no doubt that you will lend your considerable 
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moral support to the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia. We are also confident 
that [you will] generously contribute materially towards the attainment of 
the stated ECOWAS objective in the Republic of Liberia?51 
This rmses a legally contentious Issue as to whether ECOW AS 
intervention is consistent with Article 53 of the UN Charter that requires regional 
organization to get the UN Security Council authorization for undertaking 
enforcement actions. Though ECOMOG's initial intervention strictusensu goes 
against the Charter of the UN, ECOW AS attributed the blame on the UN Security 
Council for its failure to be forthcoming to resolve the Liberian crisis.252 
Except ECOW AS, other international actors such as UN and OAU did 
not intervene in Liberia except for an international condemnation of one faction or 
another by the UN. 253 At the time, the focus of the international community was 
on the conllicts in the Gulf, former Yugoslavia and Somalia.254 
Despite calls for UN effective engagement and eventual takeover from 
ECOWAS of the mission in Liberia, UN was not forthcoming to do so?55 The 
Secretary General of the UN wrote to the ECOWAS Chairman that he was 
"wishing the organization's initiative in Liberia every success".256 The UN 
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Secretary General Boutros BoutrosGhali considered ECOMOG's intervention as a 
landmark event that heralded 'a new division of labor between the United Nations 
d . 1 . . ' 257 an regwna orgamzatwns . 
The UN Security Council had its first deliberation on the Liberian crisis 
in January 1991 and formally commended the actions of the ECOWAS in May, 
1992. characterizing the Yamoussoukro Four Accord as presenting an appropriate 
framework for the peaceful resolution of the cont1ict. 
It is important to note that the lJN Security Council adopted fifteen 
resolutions between January 1991 and November 1996 on DRC crisis and the 
President of the UNSC issued nine presidential statements relating to the situation 
in Liberia and none of these resolutions condemned ECOMOG's intervention?58 
Instead, they commended ECOMOG for its effort; called upon member states to 
provide financial assistance to this effort; and called upon African states to 
contribute troops to ECOMOG. 259 For example, In January 1991, the UN Security 
Council president commended efforts made by the ECOW AS Heads of state and 
government to promote peace and normalcy in Liberia.260 
Two years after ECOMOG's intervention, the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 788, determining that the deterioration of the situations in 
Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, particularly in 
West Africa as a whole.261 Through this resolution, the UN Security Council gave 
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formal endorsement to ECOMOG intervention by commending ECOWAS for its 
efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia.262 While imposing arms 
embargo against Liberia, the UN Security Council made exception to arms 
deliveries destined to ECOWAS forces in Liberia.263 This is an important step to 
facilitate ECOMOG's operation in Liberia. 
The July 25, 1993 Peace Agreement signed between the three Liberian 
parties called upon the UN and ECOMOG to assist in the implementation of the 
Peace Agreement.264 UN Security Council responded to this call through the 
adoption of Resolution 866 under which it established the UN Observer Group in 
Liberia (UNMTL) to be co- deployed with ECOMOG.265 It became the first peace-
keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-
keeping mission already set up by a regional organization.266 The resolution 
provides the following as mandates ofECOMOG: 
262 Id 
263 Id 
(a) To receive and investigate all reports on alleged incidents of violations 
of the cease-fire agreement and, if the violation cannot be corrected, to 
report its findings to the Violations Committee established pursuant to the 
Peace Agreement and to the Secretary-General; 
(b) To monitor compliance with other elements of the Peace Agreement, 
including at points on Liberia's borders with Sierra Leone and other 
neighbouring countries, and to verify its impartial application, and in 
particular to assist in the monitoring of compliance with the embargo on 
delivery of arms and military equipment to Liberia and the cantonment, 
disarmament and demobilization of combatants; 
(c) To observe and verify the election process, including the legislative and 
presidential elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of the 
Peace Agreement; 




(d) To assist, as appropriate, in the coordination of humanitarian assistance 
activities in the tl.eld in conjunction with the existing United Nations 
humanitarian relief operation; 
(e) To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for the 
demobilization of combatants; 
(f) To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to 
the Secretary-General; 
(g) To train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and, in cooperation with 
ECOMOG, coordinate the identification of mines and assist in the clearance 
of mines and unexploded bombs; 
(h) Without participation in enforcement operations, to coordinate with 
ECOMOG in the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities both 
formally, through the Violations Committee, and informally.267 
The UN Security Council also endorsed the plan of the UN Secretary-
General to conclude an agreement with the Chairman of ECOW AS detl.ning the 
roles and responsibilities of UNOMIL and ECOWAS in the implementation of 
the Peace Agreement. 268 
UNOMIL was originally designed to remain unarmed, while ECOMOG 
troops were to provide security for UNOMIL. 269 By February 1994, UNOMIL 
was established on the ground with a military, medical, engineering, 
communication, transportation and electoral component.270 ECOMOG's mandate 
in Liberia came to an end on February 2, 1998.271 
Some key members of the UN Security Council were also in favor of 
ECOMOG's peace plan. For example, the United States Ambassador to the UN 
stated the following in support of ECOMOG intervention: 
The dispatch of a six nation West African peacekeeping force in 1990 
demonstrated unprecedented African determination to take the lead in 
267 Id 
268 Id 
269Ero, Supra note 241 
270 Id 
271 TapitapiaSanna, Mandate of ECOMOG ends, Pana!Tican News Agency, 2 February I 998 
234 
regional conflict resolution . . . we have supported this effort from its 
inception. 272 
US further complemented ECOW AS mediation efforts as supportive of 
the UN Security Council goals 'of regional solutions to regional problems' .273 
The earliest involvement ofthe Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 
Liberia crisis came in July 1990 by sending two delegations, i.e. one to Liberia 
and the second one to countries ofthe sub-region involved in ECOWAS Standing 
Mediation Committee?74 Upon the reports of the delegations, the then OAU 
Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim issued a statement outlining the probable 
necessity of establishing an OAU formal mechanism for tackling internal conflicts 
in Africa.275 However, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not intervene 
in Liberia because of lack of resources and political will reinforced by vivid 
memories of its perceived failure in Chad in 1981.276 But it expressed its total 
support of ECOWAS initiatives in Liberia. 277 
The Organization of African Unity not only endorsed ECOMOG's 
intervention but also made considerable efforts to legitimize its military 
intervention.278 This really helped ECOMOG to generate international legitimacy 
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for its military intervention in Liberia.279 OAU's support was consequential in 
getting endorsement and assistance for ECOW AS' action in the UN Security 
Council. Moreover OAU appointed Cannan Banana as the Special Representative 
of the OAU Secretary General to liaise with the UN and ECOWAS in resolving 
the Liberian crisis. 
Acting Executive Secretary of ECOWAS had even claimed that as the 
Liberian war developed, all along ECOWAS was in touch with the UN, warning 
that the situation was getting worse, but there was no help forthcoming. Therefore 
ECOWAS countries decide to act together. 
Among ECOWAS member states, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone contributed troops?80 Other ECOWAS member states and two non-
ECOWAS states, i.e. Tanzania and Uganda, also subsequently contributed troops 
to ECOMOG?81 However Nigeria which is the strongest sub-regional military 
power took the lead. 
In a short span of time ECOMOG was able to establish control over the 
capital Monrovia thwarting Taylor's attempt to seize power though unable to save 
President Doe.282 Based on its experience in Liberia, ECOW AS member states 
adopted the 1993 revised ECOWA Treaty which provides for the establishment of 
peace-keeping or enforcement forces where necessary?83 
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The UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that the 
situation in 'Liberia represent( ed) a good example of systematic cooperation 
between the United Nations and regional organisations, as envisaged in Chapter 
VIII of the Charter.' 284 
One of the challenges of an ad hoc force such as ECOMOG is the lack 
of joint training that makes their operation a bit difficult. This also holds true for 
the other peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
The division between Anglophone and Francophone within ECOW AS is 
also another source of problem for ECOW AS to take actions in Liberia.285 After 
series of efforts, ECOMOG managed to commence the disarmament of the 
warring groups in November 1996 and elections were conducted under UN and 
ECOWAS supervision on 19 July 1997.286The rebel leader, Charles Taylor, was 
elected as president partly because of his threat to renew hostilities unless he is 
elected as president.287 Subsequent to the election, UNOMIL and ECOMOG 
withdrew from Liberia in September and November 1999 respectively. 288 
In 1999 another civil war broke in Liberia which eventually forced 
President Taylor to relinquish his power and went into exile in Nigeria. 2890nce 
again, ECOW AS got involved in peacekeeping efforts but with a UN mandate 
284C. Shiner, A disarming start, AFRICA REPORT, May-June 1994, 64 
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and with the understanding that UN peacekeeping mission will take over the 
responsibility. 290 
On June 28, 2003, the UN Secretary-General wrote a letter to the 
President of the Security Council calling for the deployment of a multinational 
force, under the lead of a Member State, to reverse Liberia's drift towards total 
disintegration. 291 Four days later, ECOWAS leader convened a Summit in Dakar 
and decided to deploy a vanguard force to Liberia to help to stabilize the security 
situation and facilitate the handover of power by President Taylor. 292 
On August 1, 2003, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1497 
authorizing the establishment of multinational force in Liberia to support the 
implementation of the June 17, 2003 Ceasefire Agreement.293 Resolution 1497 
enumerates the following as tasks ofthe multinational force: 
establishing conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration activities, to help establish and maintain security in the 
period after the departure of the current President and the installation of a 
successor authority, taking into account the agreements to be reached by 
the Liberian parties, and to secure the environment for the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, and to prepare for the introduction of a longer-
term United Nations stabilization force to relieve the Multinational 
Force?94 
The first team of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) was 
?95 deployed on August 4, 2003.- Two weeks after ECOMIL's deployment, a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by the parties in Liberia.296 
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On September 19, 2003, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 
1509 establishing a stabilization force by the name United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL). 297 UNMIL was mandated to provide support for 
implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, support for humanitarian and human 
rights assistance, support for security reform, and support for implementation of 
the peace process.298 The resolution specifically provides for coordination and 
collaboration with ECOW AS in the discharge of UNMIL mandate.299 
The UN Security Council further decided that UNMIL would consist of 
up to 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including up to 250 military 
observers, and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 UN police officers, including 
formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia, as 
well as the appropriate civilian component.300 Upon request from the UN Security 
Council, ECOW AS transferred its peacekeeping duties from its forces, i.e. 
ECOMIL, to UNMIL on October 1, 2003.301 In November 2005, Ellen Johnson-
Sirleaf was elected as the president of Liberia in what international observers 
called a free and fair election.302 
UN and ECOW AS play important role in facilitating a smooth transition 
towards the free and fair election in the country bringing about a durable peace in 
297 S/Res/1 509 (2003) 19 September 2003 
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Liberia. To borrow the words of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia is now 
0 I b . . f d ''303 "'ce e ratmg ten consecutive years o peace an progress. ~ 
The UN multinational force deployed in Liberia was mandated to 
support the transitional government and to assist in the implementation of a 
comprehensive peace agreement for Liberia. 304 The Peace Agreement declared an 
immediate end to the war and provided for the establishment of a national 
Transitional Government in Liberia, in charge of the implementation of the 
h · 3M compre ens1ve peace agreement. 
ECOMOG has provided a modicum of security, especially around 
Monrovia, and its contingents were less prone to human rights abuses than 
Liberian factions in the civil war. 306 However, ECOMOG's economic excesses, 
including black marketeering, theft, looting, and the wholesale exploitation of 
Liberia's natural resources, diminished its popular support. 
B. Challenges encountered 
ECOW AS involvement in Liberia demonstrates the significant role that 
regional organizations can play in international legal enforcement and offers 
insights into contemporary conf1icts in Africa and elsewhere throughout the 
world. 
303 Address by Her Excellency Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to the 68th Session of the United 
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ECOMOG's peace enforcement operation is considered as a test case for 
regional conflict management. 307 It has indeed served as a model for other 
African organizations considering regional peace enforcement operations. 
The problems encountered by ECOMOG include financial constraint, 
issues of mandating and command and control within ECOMOG and relations 
between ECOW AS, OAU and UN. 308 The financial burden for ECOWAS 
operation was primarily shouldered by Nigeria. 309 Few other states such as the 
United States also provided financial support.310 Yet ECOWAS suffered financial 
constraints to finance ECOMOG operations. 
It took years for the UN to actively engage and intervene in the Liberian 
crisis. Given the magnitude of the problem, the situation would have been worse 
had it not been for the swift actions of ECOWAS that played an important role in 
stabilizing the situation in Liberia. One popular reason has been the United 
Nations fear of getting entangled in one more ethnic conflict with its long drawn 
out problems. This may have informed Javier de Cuellar's initial statements 
concerning the crisis being a local one. 
5.2.4 The Case of Ethiopia/Eritrea War 
Eritrea was a maritime province of Ethiopia since time immemorial. It was 
separated from Ethiopia by a historical incident in 1885 when Italy occupied 
coastal positions in Ethiopia. Italy maintained its colonial hegemony in Eritrea 
307 Id at 73 
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until 1941. During the colonial period the Eritrean port of Assab played an 
important role in the relationship between Ethiopia and Italy/Eritrea. The Treaty 
of 1928 on the use of the Port of Assab by Ethiopia which was signed between 
Ethiopia and Italy guaranteed a free zone in the Port of Assab and it also 
envisaged the cession of free port facilities to the former. 311 
After the defeat of Italy in 1941, Eritrea became a mandated territory 
under British rule until it was finally decided by the UN General Assembly that 
Eritrea should be federated with Ethiopia.312 The decision by the Ethiopian 
Emperor to dissolve the federation and unify Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1961 
unleashed the 30 years' war of independence by Eritreans which culminated in the 
de facto independence of Eritrea in 1991.313 Almost two years later a referendum 
was held and Eritrea formally declared its independence with full support of the 
Ethiopian Government though it turned Ethiopia landlocked. 314 
However Ethiopia, Eritrea and the international community at large were 
optimistic about the booming cooperation between the two countries following 
Eritrea's independence. Tekle considered the relationship as one that opened 
"new chapters in their respective histories". 315 
311 Hauria, Commentary: Facts don't start and end at Upsilon, available at 
www.geocities.comc-dagmawi(Last visited 10/20/20 13) 
312Martin Plaut& Patrick Gilkes, Conflict in the Horn: Why Eritrea and Ethiopia are at War, 
BRIEFING PAPER NEWS SERIES, No. 1 March 1999 
313 ld 
314Andreas Eshete, THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT: POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
DIMENSIONS, A paper presented at a public meeting organized by Law Forum for Peace, 
UNECA, 9 December 1998, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
315 A. Tekle, (Ed)., ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA: FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION, 1994, 
The Red Sea Press Lawrenceville, NJ, 1 
242 
Immediately after the referendum, Ethiopia and Eritrea entered into 
cooperation arrangements to cooperate in a number of areas of mutual concern. 
The Friendship and Cooperation Agreement that was signed in September 2003, 
for example, provides for cooperation in a number of areas including 
"preservation of the free flow of goods and services, capital and people; 
Ethiopia's continued free access to Eritrea's sea ports, paying for port services in 
its currency (the birr); cooperation in monetary policy and continued use of the 
birr by both countries until Eritrea issued its own currency; harmonization of 
customs policies; and cooperation and consultation in foreign policy."316 
Ethiopia and Eritrea entered into a large-scale and deadly armed conflict 
m May 1998 under the pretext of a border war. Though the border between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea was never demarcated, it was not the sole reason for the 
eruption of the border war between the two countries. The war was rather a 
culmination of the controversy on trade, fiscaL and access to the sea issues 
between the two countries. With the introduction of Eritrea's local currency, 
known as Nakfa, Ethiopia took a position that the trade between the two countries 
should be conducted like any international trade through the use of convertible 
foreign currency. This had a spillover effect on the port fee and port usage. 
The war was formally started with Eritrea's mobilization of the 
mechanized army to the Ethiopian border town of Badme on 12 May 1 998 and 
316See The Friendship and Cooperation Agreement between the Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia and the Government of Eritrea, available in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
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Ethiopia's statement that Eritrea invaded its sovereign territory on, 13 May 
1998.317The conflict resulted in the displacement of 1.2 million people.318 
A. UN and OAU on the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict 
Immediately after the eruption of the war, United States and Rwanda 
launched a mediation effort by putting forward a four point peace proposal. This 
proposal demanded the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Badme (the flash point 
of the war) and their redeployment to positions they held before 6 Mayl998 and 
the reconstitution of the civilian administration. While Ethiopia accepted the 
peace plan, Eritrea rejected it. 
The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government deliberated on 
the conflict situation at its 34th Ordinary Session that was held in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso from June 1-10, 1998.319 The Summit established a High-Level 
Delegation consisting of the heads of states of Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Zimbabwe 
and Rwanda. and the OAU chairperson, to facilitate negotiations between 
E h. . dE . 32o t 10p1a an ntrea. 
On June 26, 1998, 1.e. over a month after the war erupted, the UN 
Security Council made its initial reaction by adopting resolution 1177.321 While 
commending the efforts ofthe OAU for its effort to the peaceful settlement ofthe 
conflict, the UN Security Council condemned the use of force, and demanded that 
317 See Ethiopia's Submission to the Ethiopia Eritrea claims Commission 
318S/2000/643, Report of the Secretary General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 30 June 2000 
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both parties to immediately cease hostilities and refrain from further use of 
force. 322 
The OAU then took over the mediation effort and developed an OAU 
Framework Agreement to guide the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
OAU further elaborated Modalities for the implementation of the Framework 
Agreement and Technical arrangements. 
On January 29, 1999, i.e. about six months after the war erupted, UN 
Security Council adopted its second resolution expressing its strong support for 
the mediation efforts of the OAU and for the Framework Agreement as approved 
by the Central Organ Summit of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, and Resolution.323 The resolution further affirmed that "the OAU 
Framework Agreement provides the best hope for peace between the two 
parties."324 While welcoming Ethiopia's acceptance of the Framework 
Agreement, the UN Security Council calls for cooperation with the OAU and full 
implementation of the Framework Agreement without delay.325 The resolution 
also endorsed the appointment of a UN special envoy to the Hom to bolster the 
OAU peace initiative. 326 The resolution further urged both Ethiopia and Eritrea to 
remain committed to the peace process and to abstain from use of military force 
against each other. 327 
322 Id 






Nine months after the eruption of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
the UN Security Council determined that the situation between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea constitutes a threat to peace and security. 328 
Following the outbreak of renewed fighting between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1227 on February 10, 1999 
condemning both Ethiopia and Eritrea for their recourse to use force. 329 The 
resolution further called the two countries to immediately halt the hostilities and 
to resume diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.330 
In May 2000, i.e. two years after the eruption of the war, UN Security 
Council decided to send a special mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Special 
mission which was composed of the Ambassadors of the United States of 
America, France, Mali, Namibia, The Netherlands, Tunisia, and United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.331 The Security Council Special Mission 
made two visits to the capitals of the two countries within a span of two days.332 
The Mission also held consultation with officials of the OAU about the status of 
the Ethiopia/Eritrea peace process and the challenges encountered in pursuing the 
OAU peace plan.333In the wordings of the Special Mission's report, the special 
mission's understanding of the complexities of the problem grew after the 
328 S/Res/1227 (1999), 10 February 1999 
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visit.334This signifies the importance of Security Council's closer and timely 
engagement over the matters on its table. 
Immediately after the Security Council's Special Mission visit, a 
renewed fighting erupted between Eritrea and Ethiopia which triggered the 
adoption of another Security Council resolution on May 12, 2000. 335 
The resolution recognized that the ''renewed hostilities constitute an 
even greater threat to the stability, security and economic development of the sub-
region".336 Strongly condemning the renewed fighting between the two countries, 
the Security Council demanded the two countries "the earliest possible 
reconvemng, without preconditions, of substantive peace talks, under OAU 
auspices, on the basis of the Framework Agreement and the Modalities and of the 
work conducted by the OAU".337 Interestingly, the Security Council also decided 
to meet within 72 hours "to take immediate steps to ensure compliance with this 
resolution in the event that hostilities continue".338 
Five days later, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo 
against both Ethiopia and Eritrea under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.339The 
arms embargo was imposed for one unless the UN Secretary-General reports that 
a peaceful definitive settlement of the conflict has been concluded. 340The Council 
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also established a special committee composed of member countries of the UN 
Security Council to ensure compliance with the resolution.341 
Ethiopia was bewildered by the arms embargo feeling betrayal by its 
treatment as an aggressor. 342 And it perhaps became the turning point of 
Ethiopia's relations with the UN over its dispute settlement endeavor.343The 
Ethiopian Parliament condemned the UN Security Council Resolution for the 
imposition of a provocative arms embargo. 344 This set in a distrust by Ethiopia in 
the UN's role as a neutral mediator. 
This development ignited another round of mediation effort led by the 
OAU. The OAU facilitated a proximity talk between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 29 
May to 1 0 June 2000 which led into the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement between the two countries on June 19, 2000. 345The proximity talk 
took place under the Chairmanship of Algeria, i.e. the then Chair of the OAU i.e. 
Algeria. 346 United States and European Union were also involved in the proximity 
talk. Note that the UN did not directly participate in the proximity talk?47 
Under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, Ethiopia and Eritrea 
agreed to an immediate cessation of hostilities. They further agreed on the 
341 !d. 
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deployment of a peacekeeping miSSIOn by the UN under the auspices of the 
OAU. 348 The agreement established a temporary security zone along the common 
borders of the two countries and also defined the mandates of the peacekeeping 
mission?49 The mandate included monitoring of cessation of hostilities; 
monitoring the redeployment of Ethiopian troops; ensuring the observance of the 
security commitments agreed under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement; and 
monitoring the Temporary Security Zone. 350 
The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement also calls upon the UN and 
OAU to establish a Military Coordination Commission, to be composed of 
representatives of both parties under the chairmanship of the head of the 
peacekeeping mission.351 The primary tasks of the Military Coordination 
Commission is coordinating and resolving issues relating to the implementation of 
the mandate of the mission, in particular, military issues arising during the 
implementation period.352 
The Cessation of hostilities Agreement provided for the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces and the creation of a 25 kilometers buffer zone inside the 
territory of Eritrea. The agreement required Ethiopia to withdraw its troops from 
positions it occupied after 6 February, which were not under the Ethiopian 
administration. Eritrea, on the other hand, agreed to settle its troops 25 kilometers 







formation of a military coordination commission to facilitate the settlement of a 
peacekeeping mission and monitor the implementation of the agreement. 
On July 31, 2000, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1312 
(2000) establishing the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) 
consisting of up to 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff 
until 31 January 2001, in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to 
future Council authorization.353The resolution mandated UNMEE to establish and 
maintain liaison with Ethiopia and Eritrea; to visit their military headquarters and 
other units in all areas of operation of the mission deemed necessary by the UN 
Secretary-General; to establish and put into operation the mechanism for verifying 
the cessation of hostilities; to prepare for the establishment of the Military 
Coordination Commission, and to assist in planning for a future peacekeeping 
3"4 operation as necessary. ) 
On September 15, 2000, the UN Security Council authorized the 
deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,200 troops, including up to 220 military 
observers.355The Security Council broadened UNMEE's mandate under resolution 
1320. 
UNMEE's mandate included monitoring the cessation of hostilities; 
assist, as appropriate, m ensuring the observance of the agreed upon security 
commitments agreed by the parties; monitoring and verifying the redeployment of 
Ethiopian troops from positions taken after 6 February 1999 which were not under 
Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998; monitoring the positions of 
351S/Res/ 1312 (2000), 31 July 2000 
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Ethiopian forces once redeployed; simultaneously, monitoring the positions of 
Eritrean forces that are to redeploy in order to remain at a distance of 25 
kilometers from positions to which Ethiopian forces shall redeploy; monitoring 
the temporary security zone (TSZ) to assist in ensuring compliance with the 
Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities; chairing the Military Coordination 
Commission (MCC); coordinating and providing technical assistance for 
humanitarian mine action activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it, and 
coordinating the Mission's activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it with 
humanitarian and human rights activities of the United Nations and other 
. . . h 356 orgamzatwns m t ose areas. 
This was followed by the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea on December 12, 2000. The peace agreement is 
premised on the acceptance by both parties of the OAU Framework Agreement 
and the Modalities for its Implementation.357 
The UN Secretary General and the OAU Secretary General signed on 
the Peace agreement as a witness.358The Peace Agreement is aimed at bringing an 
end to the conflict between the two countries. Among other things, the peace 
agreement provides for the establishment of the boundary commission and claims 
commission. The Boundary commission was mandated to delimit and demarcate 
the boundaries of the two countries in accordance with the colonial treaties and 
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international law. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission awarded its 
delimitation decision on April 13, 2002.359 
Though both Ethiopia and Eritrea accepted the Commission's 
delimitation decision, Ethiopia subsequently sought interpretation, correction and 
consultation of certain aspects of the Commission's delimitation decision that has 
become a serious source of tension between the two countries. 360 The Boundary 
Commission rejected Ethiopia's request and the boundary between the two 
countries. 361 Following unsuccessful attempts by the Boundary Commission to 
enter dialogue with both Ethiopia and Eritrea in August and November 2006, the 
commission made a decision to mark the border through virtual demarcation, 
using image processing and terrain modeling in the emplacement of boundary 
pillars on the ground?62 Accordingly, the Boundary Commission made available 
to Ethiopia and Eritrea a list of pillars and maps illustrating the emplacement so 
that it could resume its demarcation operations.363 Since the two countries did not 
comply with the commission's request within the one year deadline, the 
commission ended its work with the virtual demarcation.364 
The Claims Commission, on the other hand, was authorized to determine 
compensation issues accruing from the war. The Commission also gave its awards 
on the claims. The awards have not yet been enforced. 
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On April 18, 2001, UNMEE declared the formal establishment of the 
Temporary Security Zone.365 UNMEE remained an effective buffer separating the 
two countries which had concentrated their troops along the common border. 
In 2002, the UN Security Council adjusted UNMEE's mandate to assist 
the Boundary Commission in its work, including demining in support of the 
demarcation process?66 The resolution also mandated UNMEE to provide 
administrative and logistical support to the field offices of the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Boundary Commission.367 Though Ethiopia signed the Status of Force 
Agreement, Eritrea became reluctant to sign the Agreement until the end of 
UNMEE's mission.368 
In January 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed the 
former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy as his special representative 
to help the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process move forward. 369 Eritrea rejected the 
appointment and never let the special representative visit Eritrea. 
Due to changes in political and security environment m UNMEE's 
mission area, the Security Council decreased UNMEE's military component to 
2,300 troops, with a mandate renewal every four months.370 
The Military Coordination Commission, which was perhaps the only 
forum where the two governments meet face to face, stopped its regular meeting 
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366 S/Res/1430 (2002), 14 August 2002 
3671d 
368 S/2008 (2006), 7 April 2008 
369SG/SM/9139-SG/ A/864-AFR/822, 30 January 2004, Secretary General names Lloyd Axworthy 
Special Envoy for Ethiopia and Eritrea, available at 
ll11J2:!/www.un.org/press/en/2004/sgsm9139.doc.htm, (Last visited on 10/29/2013) 
370 S/RES/1 681 (2006), 31 May 2006 
253 
since July 2006 because of Eritrea's violation of the integrity of the Temporary 
Security Zone.371 This was triggered by Eritrea's decision to restrict all UNMEE's 
helicopter flights in Eritrean air space, including in the Temporary Security Zone 
in 2005.372 Such restriction hampered the operation and security ofUNMEE.373 In 
January 2008, Eritrea took further actions deploying its army in the Temporary 
Security Zone and blocking fuel supplies to UNMEE.374It considers the EEBC's 
virtual demarcation the end of the border dispute and argues that the continued 
presence of UNMEE or Ethiopian troops on its territory is tantamount to 
occupation. 
On July 30, 2008, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1827 
terminating the mandates of UNMEE effective July 31, 2008. 375 The underlying 
reason that triggered the termination was Eritrea's obstructions which undermined 
the basis ofUNMEE's mandate.376 
B. Challenges Encountered 
According to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the non-
implementation of the Boundary Commission's decision, and the erosion of other 
aspects of the Algiers Agreements such as Eritrea's restrictions of UNMEE's 
flights and the invasion of the Temporary Security Zone, have undermined the 
prospects for a lasting peace between the two countries.377 
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Kroslak characterized the Ethiopia/Eritrea situation as "unfinished peace 
in the Horn of Africa."378 Though both the boundary commission and the claims 
commission gave their final awards, the decisions have not been implemented 
until today. There is, therefore, now a cold peace between the two countries. The 
approach pursued by the UN Security Council appears to be weak, especially its 
failure to put pressure on Eritrea for its obstruction to UNMEE's operation in 
Eritrea and the temporary security zone. More so, its approach was only confined 
on the border issue rather than pursuing a comprehensive approach to bring a 
lasting solution to the conflict between the two countries. 
Moreover, UNMEE's lack of a clear mandate of enforcing the decision 
of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission crippled the effectiveness of the 
mission. The UN Security Council acted indecisively even when it was clear that 
the actions of the two countries were undermining the peace process. As is the 
case with other conflict situations in Africa, the UN Security Council pursued a 
wait and see approach in the discharge of its security mandate. 
The lack of trust by the Ethiopian government is another factor that 
impeded the efiectiveness of the UN Security Council in pursuing its conflict 
resolution endeavor. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
"Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding", Albert 
Einstein 
The African continent has had its share of violence, from ancient tribal 
wars through colonial conflicts to current day internal strife and destruction. In 
the past forty years only there have been at least thirty major conflicts which 
claimed the lives of seven million people, and displaced more than twenty million 
people. 
Following the end of the cold war, a number of welcome indications such 
as the establishment of the OAU conflict prevention mechanism and the end of 
the 30 years war in Ethiopia, signaled that Africa was headed into a more 
predictable era. The African countries also apparently moved to a new era taking 
charge ofthe regional security issues. 
However the end of the Cold War era in and of itself did not remove the 
underlying causes of conflict and tension in Africa. Destabilizing factors 
continued unabated. Africa currently portrays the image of a continent riddled 
with territorial disputes, ethnic conf1icts, civil wars, violence, conflict over natural 
resources, maritime piracy, governance related conflicts and fragility of states. 
Somalia is if anything worse than a failed state: it has become virtually a 
phantom state, since the fall of President MuhammedSiadBarre in 1991. The 
Somali conf1ict is multidimensional. It is a clan conflict. It is a national conflict 
because of the conf1ict between the South and the North. It is also a platform for 
proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It also has a wider international 
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dimension because of the interest of the international community to fight 
terrorism in Somalia. Despite a sign of progress because of the engagement of the 
international community, including the UN, AU and IGAD, Somalia is still in a 
state of civil war. 
The 1998 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which resulted in the death of 
over 70,000 lives, remains unresolved and they rather entered into proxy war in 
Somalia. The tension between the two countries, therefore, continues. 
The conf1ict in the Great Lakes area that involves six African countries has 
been around for over sixteen years now. Democratic Republic of Congo is the site 
of one of the world's ongoing humanitarian crisis. Up to 1,200 people continue to 
die each day from conflict-related causes, mostly disease and malnutrition but 
ongoing violence as well. 
The conflict in Darfur that flared in 2003 caused the death of over 300,000 
population and the displacement of more than 2.3 million people is far from over. 
The level of violence has once again stepped up in 2013 causing displacement for 
nearly 400,000 people in the first half of 2014.379 
The twenty years of civil war in Sudan had claimed the lives of two 
million people and caused the greatest displacement of people in Africa. The civil 
war that broke out in December 2013 in South Sudan few years after its 
379Darfur Conflict, Thomson Reuters Foundation, Updated 31 July 2014, available at 
http://www. trust.org/spotl ight/Darfur-conflict 
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independence resulted in the death of I 0,000 people and the displacement of more 
than 1 million people.380 
The border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea resulted a no peace no 
war situation between the two countries. The war with the Lord's Resistance 
Army in Uganda that started in 1986 has displaced an estimated one million 
people since 1986. 
The fragile security situation in the North of Mali and the continuing 
activities of terrorist organizations, including AI Shabab in Somalia, Al-Qaida in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West 
Africa (MUJAO) continue to be threats to peace and security m 
Africa.381 Unfortunately, armed conflicts cost Africa equivalent to or more than 
what it received in international aid. 382 
The UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations 
HerveLadsous in his October 28, 2014 statement to the Fourth Committee of the 
United Nations stated the following regarding the state of security in Africa: 
The conflicts of today, while fewer in number, are deeply rooted. For 
example, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, and South Sudan 
today, are in a second or third wave of conflict. And many are 
complicated by regional dimensions that are key to their solution 
... Conflicts today are also increasingly intensive, involving determined 
armed groups with access to sophisticated armaments and techniques. 
They involve a mix of armed groups as well as transnational criminal 
networks and, in Mali, terrorist organizations. In the past year, we have 
38°Council on Foreign Relations, Internal Violence in South Sudan, available at 
http://www.cfr.on?./globallglobal-conf1ict-tracker/p32137#!1?markeF33, (Last visited II /02/20 14) 
381 S/RES/2164(20 14), 25 June 2014 
382The UN Secretary General Report on Conflict Prevention in Africa, January2008 
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also seen the outbreak of the devastating Ebola virus which may have 
enduring security, economic and social impacts. 383 
UN itself clearly sees the need for stable Africa. It has increasingly put a 
great deal of efforts to address the security challenges of Africa in the post cold 
war era. The United Nations' operation in Africa has dramatically increased with 
the end of the Cold War with an emphasis on conflict resolution, peace building, 
conflict prevention and mediation. UN has also focused its attention on human 
security, and environmental security as these also affect security of the African 
continent in the present era. Noteworthy is the recent resolution of the UN 
Security Council 2177 which recognized the unprecedented extent of the Ebola 
outbreak in Africa as a threat to international peace and security.384These issues 
continue to demand the undivided attention of the international community. 
Of the 50 matters presented to the UN Security Council in 2014 (i.e. until 
November 2, 2014), 25 ofthem directly concern Africa.385 Out of the current 16 
UN peacekeeping operations, 9 are in Africa.386In the area of peace building, UN 
has laid the ground to closely work with Africa. The UN has indeed been 
advancing Security Council reform in which Africa coordinates its position 
through the African Union. 
UN has also undertaken a number of measures to promote cooperation 
with the African Union and African sub-regional organizations, such as 
383Statement of UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations HerveLadsous to the 
Fourth Committee of the United Nation, 28 October 2014 
384S/RES/2177(20 14), 18 September 2014 
385See http://wvvw .un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/20 14.shtm I, (Last visited on I 1/02/2014) 
386See ht!Q://www. un.org/en/pea~ek~~ping/operfltions/curr.ent.s)2t_I]j, (Last visited on II 102120 14) 
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ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD, with a view to addressing the security challenges 
of the African continent. There is now a more streamlined cooperation between the 
UN, AU and the African sub-regional organizations in the domain of peace and 
security. 
Although UN has been able to register notable achievements in the 
maintenance of peace and security in Africa in the past decades, it has 
experienced various setbacks in fulfilling its primary obligations of maintaining 
international peace and security in the African continent.387 The foregoing 
chapters illustrate the extent of the challenges as well as the weaknesses of the 
UN in the discharge of its security mandate in Africa. As once articulated by the 
UN Secretary General, "a considerable gap remains between rhetoric and realty". 
Therefore, it is still work in progress. 
Of course, assessing the effectiveness of the UN Security mechanism in 
addressing the contemporary security challenges of the African continent is a very 
vexing issue. Here, it is contended that UN has a significant role to play in 
effectively overcoming the contemporary security challenges of Africa. As stated 
above, there is some goodness in having the UN, especially the UN Security 
Council providing greater attention to the security challenges in Africa. However, 
the way to strengthen the African security requires a more robust action and 
serious commitment on the part ofthe UN. 
387Francois Van As, African Peacekeeping Past Practices, Future Prospects and its Contribution 
to International Law, 45 MIL.L & L WAR REV, 329(2006), 320 
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Such analyses are important due to the never declining security problems 
in Africa.Afterover two decades since the end of the Cold War, several conflicts 
remain unsettled in Africa. And Africa has continued to be riddled with conflicts 
and internal strife. 
Given the contemporary security challenges of Africa, including 
governance related intrastate conflicts, terrorist threats, Transnational Organized 
Crimes, maritime piracy, border problems, ethnicity, serious, gross, and 
systematic human rights violations, and climate change, and their far reaching 
impact in the global security, Africa is not only a vital concern of the African 
nations and their regional organizations, but also of the international community 
at large.These contemporary security challenges act as powerful reminders for 
revisiting the UN peace and security architecture. The track record of the UN 
peace and security architecture are indeed further reminders that the UN should 
provide the requisite attention to make its peace and security architecture 
effectively work in Africa. It is perhaps in the interest of the rest of the world as 
Africa has also recently seen an upswing in the economic fortunes, especially 
with the discoveries of valuable natural resources. 
The current situation, therefore, demands that the United Nations should 
draw lessons from its experience, and takes appropriate measures to revisit its 
policy and existing mechanisms to effectively overcome the contemporary 
security challenges of the African continent. Generally speaking, much remains to 
be done on the part of the UN. 
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In this situation, the United Nations faces a number of fundamental 
questions. What policies should the UN pursue to fill the lacunae exhibited in the 
discharge of its principal responsibility to ensure the maintenance of international 
peace and security in Africa? What formulas should UN prescribe to strengthen 
its capabilities and to boost its effectiveness in this regard? What further steps by 
the UN will help assure regional security in Africa? What should be the role of 
the African regional and sub-regional organizations in these processes?How 
should the UN further streamline the coordination with AU and African sub-
regional organizations in the implementation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter? 
The foregoing chapters illustrated the challenges inherent in peace 
initiatives in Africa at the United Nations, regional, and sub-regional levels. In 
many cases, the UN watches conflicts and crises in the African continent develop; 
in the worst cases, as in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, UN did nothing to 
intervene. This is not to completely undermine the role of the UN in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security in Africa. For example, UN 
peacekeeping missions in West Africa were critical to bringing countries like 
Liberia and Sierra Leone out of civil war.388 
There is a consensus that the primary responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security squarely falls on the shoulders ofthe UN Security 
Council. But in reality the Security Council has not come out with objective 
criteria whether a situation involving international peace and security merits the 
388 Pan, Esther, African Peacekeeping Operations, Council on Foreign Relations, available at 
http://www.cfr.org/world/african-peacekeeping-operations/p9333 (Last date vi site 10 October 
2014) 
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UN intervention. The decision of the Council is rather dictated by political 
considerations than actual human suffering and the potential ramification of the 
situation on international peace and security. 389 
The major global powers that primarily dictate the operation of the UN 
peace and security architecture have now a heightened interest in Africa. For 
example the United States policy towards Africa is dictated by its commercial 
interest, security interest and the promotion of democracy. 390 The Chinese 
interest on Africa is dictated by its economic and political interest.391 The list goes 
on. The competing interests and the different expectations of the major players in 
the UN Security Council obviously shadow on the operations of the 
organization.The political will on the part of the major players, especially the 
Permanent Members of the Security Council, is, therefore, crucial.It is against this 
background that the following recommendations are put forward. 
The case studies under Chapter 5 illustrate that these competing interests 
have been one of the reasons for the belated actions of the UN Security Council 
on African conflicts and crisis. Hence, the UN Security Council should formally 
adopt general objective criterion on what constitutes threats to international peace 
389H. Kusano, 'Humanitarian Intervention: An Interplay of Norms and Politics', in M C. Davis et 
al., INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD: MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND POWER POLITICS, 2004, 128-130; see also, S. Chesterman, JUST 
WAR OF JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2002), 126-132 
390Mwangi S Kimenyi, Priority Issues during Secretary Clinton's Trip to Africa, Opinion, 
Brookings, August I, 20 12 
391Jane Boulden, (ed.), RESPONDING TO CONFLICT IN AFRICA; THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, May 2013, 54 
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and security.It should indeed set in place a clear set of guideline for intervention 
by the SC. 
Such definition and guideline should take into account the contemporary 
security challenges that evolve over the course of the past decades. The adoption 
of an objective standard and a clear set of guideline would not only halt the use of 
double standard but also would help ensure that Africanswho exhibited 
misgivings on the past actions of the UN Security Council will have trust on the 
system.Failing to get the support and trust of Africans would prove unproductive 
and damaging for the UN endeavors in the area of peace and security. 
The UN, AU and sub-regional organizations in Africa should also address 
the gaps between them with respect to the conceptualization of what constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security. The rejection by the UN Security 
Council of AU's demand for the deferral of Kenya's ICC trial on the ground that 
the threat does not rise to the level of threat to international peace and security is 
one recent example where such gap between UN and AU had recently manifested. 
AU's request was based on Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which allows the UN 
Security Council to postpone the prosecution at ICC if pursuing the case will 
constitute threat to international peace and security. Though AU took a firm 
position that pursuing the case at the ICC will constitute a threat to international 
peace and security given the volatility of the region, UN rejected AU's demand. 
This resulted in a row between the UN Security Council and AU member 
states.This is a significant gap that should be part of the broader policy 
discussions between UN, AU and sub-regional organizations because it has 
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practical implications on the effectiveness of the UN m the maintenance of 
international peace and security on the African soil. 
Due to the change in the international landscape over the past seven 
decades, regional and sub-regional organizations such as AU, ECOWAS, SADC 
and IGAD have emerged to address security challenges in Africa because the UN 
was either unwilling or unable to address those challenges.The increasing 
involvement of these regional and sub-regional organizations is perhaps in tandem 
with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, at the heart of which is the need to 
complement the international legitimacy and legality of the UN with the 
advantages embedded in regionalism. 
Given the intimate knowledge regional and sub-regional organizations 
most often have, and also the greater interest they have in solving and managing 
cont1icts in their respective areas of responsibility, they have a comparative 
advantage in addressing conflicts in their respective regions or sub-regions.AU 
and African sub-regional organizations have cornea long way creating ambitious 
legal and institutional frameworks aimed at addressing the security challenges of 
the continent.Today they play a vital role in many cases in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security, including in cont1ict prevention, peacekeeping and 
peace building in Africa. 
Recognizingthis important role of AU and African sub-regional 
organizations in the maintenance of regional peace and security, UN has been 
coordinating its endeavors with these African institutions in the area of peace and 
security in line with the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. While the 
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coordination between UN, AU and African sub-regional organizations has not 
been without its challenges, their coordinated efforts have already demonstrated 
the tremendous potential to help the maintenance of regional peace and security. 
Despite a growing cooperation between the UN and these African 
institutionsin the areas of peace and security, their cooperationmostly tend to be 
ad hoc, more complicated and often more costly.The efforts to ensure cooperation 
between them have indeed often faltered because such efforts were mostly ad hoc 
and lacked coherence. A truly strategic and predictable partnership between UN, 
AU and African sub-regional organization is, therefore, in order if the UN is to 
effectively discharge its security mandate in Africa.This requires refocusing 
attention on the strategic partnership beyond the support and assistance currently 
provided by the UN to broader issues of mutual strategic interest in the areas of 
peace and security. 
In the present era where regional organizations have become indispensable 
pillars of multilateralism, UN Security Council should surpass the rhetoric of 
advocating strategic partnership and institutionalize a strategic and predictable 
partnership through a formal agreement with AU, which is recognized as the 
regional organization with primary responsibility to maintain and promote peace, 
security and stability in Africa.392This partnership agreement provides the general 
framework for the strategic partnership, which would eventually serve as the basis 
392Note that the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation in the area of peace 
and security between the African Union, Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating 
Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa entrusted 
AU the leadership role to coordinate cooperation with the UN. 
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for the specific collaborations in the field that are determined on a case by case 
basis. 
The partnership agreement should be framed along the spirit and intent of 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in the context of collective security. It should 
however be notedthatapragmatic and more flexible application of Chapter VIII 
would contribute to developing a more realistic global order. Though the UN 
Charter explicitly prohibits regional organizations from taking enforcement action 
without the authorization of the Security Council, the post-Cold War Era has 
witnessed a trend where regional organizations claim legal competence for 
enforcement actions on the basis of their founding treaties, without deference to 
the Security Council. It is even more so with the AU as its founding instrument 
provides for AU's enforcement action on grounds that are not anticipated when 
the Charter of the UN was crafted, i.e. war crimes, genocide and crime against 
humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order. This development should 
be taken into account in framing the partnership between the UN, AU and African 
sub-regional organizations. 
The starting point for the partnership agreement should be the agreed upon 
guidelines to govern the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. 
These include "the supremacy of the Charter in governing the partnership, the 
primary responsibility of the Council in international peace and security, the need 
for consistency and impartiality by both the United Nations and all partner 
organizations, the need for flexibility and pragmatism, and the need for the 
partnership to reflect comparative advantage of all, developing an effective 
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division of labor in ... operational collaboration". 393In defining the principles of 
the partnership, lessons drawn from UN-AU-African Sub-regional organizations 
cooperation in the area of peace and security and the changing dynamics of 
international security should be taken into account. 
Furthermore, the UN Security Council should seriously consider the 
principles which the AU Assembly of Head of States and Governments recently 
outlined as the underpinning principles of AU-UN cooperation. These principles 
include support to African ownership and priority setting; consultative decision 
making; division of labor and sharing of responsibilities; and effective use of the 
respective comparative advantages of the two organizations.It is interesting to 
note that the current UN Secretary General also suggested comparative 
advantages, complementarity of mandates, and the optimal use of resources and 
capacities as important basis of cooperation.394 This shows that there is a common 
ground to lay out the cooperative arrangement. 
The division of labor is crucial for the success of the strategic partnership. 
It should, therefore, be one of the key pillars of the strategic partnership to help 
avoid duplication of efforts and resources in managing conflicts and crisis in 
Africa. The partnership agreement should define the role of AU and the African 
sub-regional organizationsto ensure that a structured system of cooperation is put 
393A/47/277, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, 
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992 
394S/20 11/805, Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations-African Union cooperation in 
peace security 29 December 20 II, p.2 
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m place,and perhaps to bring about coherence of international and regional 
responses to conflicts and crisis in Africa. 
On the UN level, the international community appears to be unprepared to 
get physically involved in the African conflicts. The UN is rather increasingly 
inclined to leave for Africans to deal with their continent's conflicts and to find 
African solutions. Given also the current trend whereby the de facto division of 
labor in peacekeeping operations is such that regional organizations pursue rapid 
deployment while UN deploys the blue helmet forces, 395such division of labor 
should be ref1ected in the proposed partnership agreement.Generally speaking, the 
partnership agreement should set out procedures for enhancing cooperation and 
coordination among UN, AU and African sub-regional institutions and 
appropriate burden-sharing in peacekeeping operations, suitable to the specific 
political circumstances. 
In this respect, it is contended that African owned continental and sub-
regional peace and security initiatives should be supported rather than duplicated 
by the UN. This is not to say that UN should defer all African conflicts and crisis 
situation to African institutions. Rather UN should support and utilize the solid 
regional initiatives, such as the African Standby Force, the Continental Early 
Warning System, the AU Border Program, and the African sub-regional security 
mechanisms discussed under Chapter 3. UN should further ensure that its actions 
are complimentary to regional initiatives. 
395S.C.S/PV5649 (March 28, 2007) 
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Another important component of the partnership agreement should be 
defining the cooperation in conflict prevention. Though UN, AU as wells as 
African sub-regional institutions generally recognize the importance of conflict 
prevention for the maintenance of the regional peace and security and perhaps 
instituted some level of cooperation on conflict prevention, they remain to be ad-
hoc. Hence more needs to be done to structure the cooperation in conflict 
prevention. There is a need for greater political strategic coherence in conflict 
prevention, and permanent mechanisms have to be in place to avoid duplication 
and to reconcile and align conflict prevention approaches of the UN, AU and 
African sub-regional organizations. 
While this research paper is being finalized, the UN Security adopted a 
resolution reaffirming its commitment to addressing the prevention of armed 
conflicts in all regions of the world and instructed the UN Secretary General to 
submit a report ''on actions taken by him to promote and strengthen conflict 
prevention tools within the United Nations system, including through co-
operation with regional and sub-regional organizations, by August 31, 20 15."396 
This provides a basis for structured cooperation between UN, AU and African 
sub-regional organizations on conflict prevention. 
Since AU and the African sub-regional organizations are well positioned 
to understand the root causes of conflict in the African continent, and perhaps 
more likely to act as first responders, the partnership agreement should recognize 
this important role of AU and the sub-regional organizations in conflict 
396S/RES/2 1 71 (20 14 ), 2 1 August 20 1 4 
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prevention. The partnership agreement should set out procedures for consultation, 
methodologies of conflict prevention, division of labor and coordination of 
conflict prevention endeavors. Equally important is the need to leaving a room for 
flexibility and adaptation to the often fluid circumstances on the ground. 
Strengthening the linkage between early warning and early response IS 
very instrumental in ensuring successful conflict prevention efforts of the United 
Nations. Such linkages enables the UN, especially the UN Security Council and 
the UN Secretary General, operate with the required flexibility and act effectively 
on the information provided regarding potential conflicts and crises. It is therefore 
crucial that a mechanism should be in place to make sure that the information 
gathered by the conflict early warning mechanisms of AU and African sub-
regional organizations gets to the UN on a regular basis. The UN Office to the 
African Union could serve as an important gateway to gather the information 
from AU and the sub-regional conflict early warning mechanisms.Strengthening 
the African conflict early warning mechanisms is also very important to prevent 
conflicts and to take informed and timely decisions to manage crisis. The 
partnership agreement should, therefore, provide a set of procedures on 
strengthening the conflict early warning mechanism and enhancing the 
cooperation in the conflict early warning system. 
The UN Security Council should also establish an effective system 
whereby peacekeeping forces are deployed to conflict areas in a timely fashion. 
The deployment of UN peacekeeping missions normally takes a minimum of six 
months which in quite a number of cases renders it meaningless because several 
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lives have already been lost before UN peacekeepers are on the ground. Some 
conf1icts are better handled and manage if peacekeepers were on the ground 
before the conflict deepens. 
AU and African sub-regional organizations clearly have an important role 
to play in ensuring rapid deployment. UN's partnership with AU and African sub-
regional organizations in the peacekeeping operations will only be productive 
when AU and the sub-regional organizations are equipped with the necessary 
resources to finance their peacekeeping operations. Given this resource limitations 
of the AU and African sub-regional institutions, the importance of finding a 
lasting solution to the funding of AU/Sub-regional organizations-led peace 
support operations cannot be over-emphasized. Experience has demonstrated that 
support using UN assessed contributions is the most viable response to the 
challenge at hand, especially when the operations concerned, as is the case for 
AMISOM, are undertaken with the explicit endorsement of the Security 
Council. It is suggested that UN should set up a special fund to finance such 
regional peace keeping operations. This fund will be financed by UN assessed 
contribution. The UN Security Council should set out procedures and conditions 
for accessing this special fund for use by regional/sub-regional peacekeeping 
operations. 
Drawing lessons from the DRC crisis where the Addis Ababa Peace, 
Security and Cooperation Agreement provided for an oversight mechanism in 
which the UN, regional organizations and stakeholders are regularly involved, it 
is suggested that UN and AU should set up a Joint Oversight Mechanism in 
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situations where UN is involved with AU and the sub-regional organizations in 
the maintenance of international peace and security. This mechanism would serve 
as a useful tool to bring together all the international actors to coordinate and 
streamline their efforts, to tackle challenges, and to establish consensus on the 
way forward. 
As part of pursuing a strategic partnership between UN, AU and the 
African sub-regional institutions, the need for achieving the goals of the UN 
Security Council reform should be seen as a key component. The UN Charter was 
drafted in an era when most African nations were still under colonial rule, and as 
such their views and aspirations were not properly incorporated in the global 
security architecture that was crafted in 1945. Though Africa represents more than 
one billion people and though most of the matters dealt by the Security Council 
directly concern Africa, no single African state is a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. Africa's non representation as a permanent member in the UN 
Security Council violates the founding principles of the UN Charter. Though 
increasing the SC membership may further frustrate the speed of crisis responses 
by the Council, equitable representation with a strong voice is key to enhance the 
effectiveness ofthe Security Council. 
Africa is part of the broader global community, and Africans should be 
given a place to contribute to African security. Africa's representation as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council not only makes the council 
representative but also helps for its legitimacy. There is also a need to properly 
reflect the changing world order in the global security architecture. Only genuine 
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Security Council reform in which diversity is embedded would make the UN 
Security Council legitimate, credible and more effective. Africa should perhaps 
assume its rightful place within the UN Security Council. Given the leverage 
Nigeria and South Africa have had in conflict management in Africa (as 
illustrated in the case studies under Chapter 4 ), it is suggested that these two 
countries could be ideal candidates for the Permanent Membership. 
The launching of a joint annual consultative meeting between the UN 
Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council has been an 
important step forward to forge cooperation between the two organizations in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The case studies illustrate the 
importance of even closer, more frequent and streamlined cooperation between 
the two organs in the maintenance of international peace and security. Given the 
high volume of African conflict and crisis situation annually dealt by the UN 
Security Council, robust and regular consultation mechanisms between the UN 
Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council should be in place. 
Putting in place such frequent and regular consultation mechanism between the 
two bodies would help ensure consistency, uniformity, timely response and 
certainty m pursuing the objectives of maintenance of peace and security in 
Africa. 
This can be achieved in either of the following two ways. The first 
potential avenue could be using the African non-petmanent members of the UN 
Security Council as spokesperson of the AU Peace and Security Council in the 
deliberations and works of the UN Security Council. This will require a closer 
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coordination between AU Peace and Security Council and the African non-
permanent members of the Security Council. Since Article 7(1 )(K) of the Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union entrusted the Council with an authority to promote and develop a strong 
"partnership for peace andsecurity" between the AU and UN, it simply takes a 
decision of the AU Peace and Security Council to implement this mechanism. 
The regular consultation mechanism could also be achieved by setting up 
a Committee of Ambassadors composed of Permanent Representatives of African 
countries to the United Nations that are also members of the AU Peace and 
Security Council. This Committee of Ambassadors should be established by the 
decision of the AU Peace and Security Council pursuant to its mandate under 
Article 7(1 )(K) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union. And the Committee of Ambassadors that 
is based in New York will be a subsidiary body of the AU Peace and Security 
Council. This arrangement is not only economical but also facilitates a regular 
consultation mechanism between the two important organs in the area of peace 
and security. It also helps to overcome the barrier to hold emergency ad-hoc joint 
consultative meetings if and when the need arises. 
The African nations are also to blame. State security in most of Africa, is 
not threatened by conventional threats of armed attack from other countries but by 
more insidious measures many of which flow from the very weakness of the state, 
governance related problems and its absence of control over its own territory. The 
starting point is that each African Government bears primary responsibility for 
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ensunng peace, stability and the protection of civilians in their respective 
countries. This is perhaps a view endorsed by the UN Security Council in a series 
of its Resolutions. However the UN has also a role to play in strengthening and 
building African institution of governance. In this regard, the UN development 
and capacity building works are very critical and should be seen part and parcel of 
the UN peace and security mandate. 
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